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MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP’S HOMILETICS
MARC SPINDELMAN*
ABSTRACT
Viewed closely and comprehensively, Masterpiece Cakeshop, far from simply
being the narrow, shallow, and modest decision many have taken it to be, is a rich,
multi-faceted decision that cleaves and binds the parties to the case, carefully
managing conflictual crisis. Through a ruling for a faithful custom-wedding-cake
baker against a state whose legal processes are held to have been marred by antireligious bias, the Court unfolds a cross-cutting array of constitutional wins and losses
for cultural conservatives and traditional moralists, on the one hand, and for lesbians
and gay men and their supporters committed to civil and equal rights, on the other.
The Court’s central anti-religious-discrimination holding doesn’t only potentially
benefit opponents of such discrimination in other cases. This holding also has
boomerang-like tendencies that should make it useful for those who would level antidiscrimination claims on a variety of other grounds. Liberal and progressive audiences
might thus reconsider their aversions to the decision for this reason alone. What’s
more, Masterpiece Cakeshop’s “shadow rulings,” described in detail here, dole out
notable victories to cultural conservatives, traditional moralists, and lesbians and gay
men alike. Officially declining to adjudicate the merits of the baker’s artistic freedom
claim under the First Amendment, the Court’s opinion expresses openness and
sympathy, but ultimately substantive doubt about it. In these respects, and
notwithstanding suggestions to the contrary, Masterpiece Cakeshop is full of
substantive lawmaking. Having tracked that lawmaking to its textual limits, analysis
turns to the opinion’s final passage, which, on one level, importantly recapitulates the
opinion’s constitutional rulemaking, instructing courts and governmental actors one
last time on how to handle cases like this one in the future. On another level, the
passage is a compass pointing to lessons in moral politics that the opinion offers to the
partisans of the Kulturkampf. One version of the Court’s moral-political teaching
involves instruction in a moral politics of respect and friendship. This may be
practically politically viable, leaving aside whether it will in fact be accepted. A more
ambitious version of the opinion’s moral-political teaching involves a moral politics
of sibling love that’s certain to be widely and emphatically rejected. Reconfigured in
aesthetic terms, however, the moral politics of sibling love may receive a more
nuanced hearing: widely dismissed as an undertaking appropriate for politics, but
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received with perhaps different sensibilities on an aesthetic plane. If it’s presently
uncertain and undecidable whether Masterpiece Cakeshop will prove to have been a
major legal event, whatever is ultimately made of it, it covers plenty of ground, doing
plenty of legal and extra-legal work, in the here and now.
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INTRODUCTION
There is more to the Supreme Court’s decision in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v.
Colorado Civil Rights Commission than initially meets the eye.1
Masterpiece Cakeshop isn’t simply a narrow, shallow, and modest ruling by the
Court for a faithful custom-wedding-cake baker against a state whose legal processes
were marred by anti-religious taint.2 The Court’s decision does entail that ruling, of
1

138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).

2 For some illustrations of thinking describing Masterpiece Cakeshop in these basic terms,
see, e.g., Douglas Laycock, The Broader Implications of Masterpiece Cakeshop, 2019 B.Y.U.
L. REV. 167, 167 n.2 (2019) [hereinafter, Laycock, Broader Implications of Masterpiece
Cakeshop] (collecting sources describing the case along these lines, and noting the narrow
readings courts have given Masterpiece Cakeshop); Douglas NeJaime & Reva Siegel, Religious
Exemptions and Antidiscrimination Law in Masterpiece Cakeshop, 128 YALE L.J. FORUM 201,
202 n.5 (2018) (noting sources) [hereinafter NeJaime & Siegel, Religious Exemptions and
Antidiscrimination Law in Masterpiece Cakeshop]; Robert Barnes, Supreme Court rules in
favor of baker who would not make wedding cake for gay couple, WASH. POST (June 4, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/supreme-court-rules-in-favor-of-bakerwho-would-not-make-wedding-cake-for-gay-couple/2018/06/04/50c68cf8-6802-11e8-bea7c8eb28bc52b1_story.html?utm_term=.c3e0d13c12df (talking about “Kennedy’s narrow
ruling”); Amy Howe, Justices send cake sequel back to state court, SCOTUSBLOG (June 17,
2019),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/06/justices-send-cake-sequel-back-to-state-court/
(describing Masterpiece Cakeshop’s “narrow ruling”); Adam Liptak, In Narrow Decision,
Supreme Court Sides With Baker Who Turned Away Gay Couple, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2018, at
A1 (remarking that “[t]he breadth of the court’s majority was a testament to the narrowness of
the decision’s reasoning”); see also Chad Flanders & Sean Olivera, An Incomplete Masterpiece,
66 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 154, 158 (2019) (characterizing Masterpiece Cakeshop not only as “a
narrow decision,” the “goals” of which may have been “avoidance and minimalism,” but also
as “an incomplete decision, even a badly incomplete one”); Mark Movesian, Masterpiece
Cakeshop and the Future of Religious Freedom, 42 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 711, 750 (2019)
(concluding that “Masterpiece Cakeshop is a narrow decision,” and that “[t]he case turns on
rather unique facts and does little to resolve conflicts between our anti-discrimination laws . . .
and our commitment to religious freedom,” but then observing that the decision’s “narrowness”
is “deceptive” and reflects broad “cultural and political trends” that may impact the shape of
future doctrine). The analysis in these pages converges with and exceeds perspectives that have
already challenged the received wisdom on Masterpiece Cakeshop. See, e.g., Laycock, Broader
Implications of Masterpiece Cakeshop, supra, at 168 (venturing that Masterpiece Cakeshop
isn’t narrow, because, “as written, combined with . . . savvy lawyering . . . , [it] logically leads
to a general protection for conscientious objectors, at least in religiously important contexts
such as weddings”); NeJaime & Siegel, Religious Exemptions and Antidiscrimination Law in
Masterpiece Cakeshop, supra, at 202 (arguing that Masterpiece Cakeshop is not narrow,
because it “supplied more guidance on the relationship between religious exemptions and
antidiscrimination law [in cases of sexual orientation as well as race] than most have
acknowledged”); Mark Strasser, Masterpiece of Misdirection, 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 963,
964 (2019) (describing Masterpiece Cakeshop as a “narrow opinion” while pointing to its
“potential to . . . bring about significant changes in existing law” where “the bases for these
important deviations are found not in the holding itself but in the factors that the Court implicitly
endorses for consideration and in the implicit roles that these factors should play in future
cases”).
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course, but it also unfolds a more complex and cross-cutting array of constitutional
wins and losses for cultural conservatives and traditional moralists, on the one hand,
and for lesbians and gay men and their supporters, and for others committed to civil
and equal rights, on the other.3
This larger tally of Masterpiece Cakeshop includes dimensions of it that have been
widely missed. Not only does the Court’s central anti-religious-discrimination holding
pour a jurisgenerative foundation that may prove useful for opponents of
discrimination on religious grounds, but that same ruling also has boomerang-like
tendencies that make it useful for those who might wish to level other sorts of antidiscrimination claims. There is also the matter of Masterpiece Cakeshop’s “shadow
rulings”—rulings that, to varying degrees, dole out notable victories to cultural
conservatives, traditional moralists, and to lesbians and gay men and other members
of other traditionally subordinated groups alike. Of the opinion’s textured treatment
of the First Amendment claims to protections for artistic freedom ventured on the
cakemaker’s behalf, the Court, officially declining to adjudicate their merits,
nevertheless subtly does, striking a pose of openness, sympathy, but ultimately
substantive doubt about them. Having surveyed these aspects of Masterpiece
Cakeshop, discussion focuses on the final passage of the Court’s opinion, which is a
source of constitutional rulemaking and an important aspect of the larger moralpolitical instruction that Masterpiece Cakeshop provides: teachings on and around
moral politics of respect and friendship, and, more ambitiously, of sibling love, key
aspects of the opinion’s homiletics.
Viewed closely and comprehensively, Masterpiece Cakeshop, far from being
simply a narrow, shallow, and modest decision, though not wholly lacking in those
elements in some refined respects, is an opinion that complexly cleaves and binds the
parties to the case. It carefully manages conflictual crisis while leaving uncertain and
undecidable as of yet whether the case is or will become a major or minor legal event.
As Justice Kennedy explained shortly after issuing his enigmatic decision for the
Court in Romer v. Evans when pressed in an interview to reveal its meaning: “It will
be interesting to see how [it] is understood[.]”4 Everything depends on what’s done
with it. Whatever that is, with time, Masterpiece Cakeshop covers plenty of ground
and does plenty of legal and extra-legal work in the here and now.

I. READING THE MAJORITY OPINION
This engagement with the Supreme Court’s opinion in Masterpiece Cakeshop
begins with the reasons for the broad agreement that quickly emerged and coalesced
3 Saying this this way and so following standard imaginaries of the stakes of the case to some
degree isn’t to forget that some LGBT people are cultural conservatives and traditional
moralists. A different, but connected, way of thinking along these lines is supplied by Joseph
William Singer, Public Accommodations & Human Flourishing: Sexual Orientation &
Religious Liberty (An Essay in Honor of Greg Alexander), CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
(forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 10) (“Baker Jack Phillips saw marriage as a religious matter
and same-sex marriage as a sin, and if that is so, then he refused to design a wedding cake for
Craig and Mullen because their religious beliefs differed from his own.” (footnote omitted)).
4

Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Jeffrey Rosen, The Agonizer, NEW YORKER, Nov.
11, 1996, at 82, 90 (quoting Justice Kennedy).
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around the decision in liberal and progressive circles, where it is already ordinarily
portrayed as a narrow, shallow, and modest ruling.5 This representation is highly
congenial to projects circulating among left-liberals and left-progressives that, owing
to their various commitments, seek to minimize the reach of the victory that
Masterpiece Cakeshop hands to anti-liberal and anti-progressive forces of cultural
conservatism and traditional moralism.
The tactical utility of this gloss is one thing, but as an account of Masterpiece
Cakeshop as text it is something else. Certainly it is if one begins with the issue of
authorship. Here, right now, in this case suddenly, an emerging convention effectively
braves to say that Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, at the very tail end of his career on
the U.S. Supreme Court, has broken with the romantic, mysterious, agonized, and
ultimately quite maximalist method that has for years been a signature of his
jurisprudence and legacy, not least of all respecting the rights of lesbians and gay men
in intimate relationships.6
This is a possibility to be sure, but it is sensible to approach it with a degree of
skepticism—skepticism warranted even acknowledging that Masterpiece Cakeshop
itself purports to focus in a very common-law-like fashion on the particularities of the
record and the legal proceedings in the case and even acknowledging that the
common-law-like features of the Court’s opinion are designed to give it the
appearance of being minor and slow-going, an incremental, one-case-at-a-time
ruling.7 Nor is the skepticism about Masterpiece Cakeshop’s ostensible judicial
minimalism overcome by the way Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court, again on
its surface, purports to leave the deep questions and clashes of values swirling in the
case undecided.8
These calibrated assertions by the Supreme Court’s Masterpiece Cakeshop
decision may—indeed, should—be doubted. As the argument developed in the
5 See, e.g., Press Release, ACLU, Supreme Court Upholds Basic Principles of
Nondiscrimination, Reverses Colorado Civil Rights Commission Decision (June 4, 2018)
(available at https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/supreme-court-upholds-basic-principlesnondiscrimination-reverses-colorado-civil) (“The court did not accept arguments that would
have turned back the clock on equality by making our basic civil rights protections
unenforceable, but reversed this case based on concerns specific to the facts here.”); Press
Release, Lambda Legal, Supreme Court Fails to Affirm LGBT Equality Rights (June 4, 2018)
(https://www.lambdalegal.org/news/us_20180604_masterpiece-cakeshop-decision) (“Today,
the U.S. Supreme Court handed the religious right a limited, fact-specific victory . . . .”). The
standard reading of the case as narrow, shallow, and modest holds even against the ways liberal
and progressive readers also recognize some of the decision’s more far-reaching aspects. See,
e.g., id. (“The Court today has offered dangerous encouragement to those who would deny civil
rights to LGBT people and people living with HIV.”) (statement by Lambda Legal CEO Rachel
B. Tiven). See also sources cited supra note 2.
6 A number of criticisms leveled at Justice Kennedy and his jurisprudence are collected and
responded to in Douglas M. Parker, Justice Kennedy: The Swing Voter & His Critics, 11 GREEN
BAG 2d. 317 (2008).
7

See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE
SUPREME COURT (2001).

AT A

TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM

ON THE

Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723–24, 1732
(2018).
8

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2020

5

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

352

[Vol. 68:347

following pages maintains, Masterpiece Cakeshop textually addresses, and in
important ways engages, the deep and broad clashes of values between equality-based
civil rights, particularly for lesbians and gay men, and freedom of speech and of
religion. Beyond any question of authorial intent, there is action, there is text: Justice
Kennedy’s Masterpiece Cakeshop opinion for the Court puts down markers on the
very issues it says it’s leaving unresolved and does so in ways that, once
comprehended, should be taken as legally authoritative in important, if variegated,
respects.
Sketching the larger thought while leaving details to be filled in: A minimalist
gloss on Masterpiece Cakeshop has its tactical utilities, but in its robust forms above
all, it cannot be sustained as a meaningful account of the text of the opinion the
Supreme Court actually has brought down. Without venturing prediction, it is possible
that, in time, Masterpiece Cakeshop will be recognized as a deeply generative source
of law, much in the way that Romer v. Evans, which eventuated in Obergefell v.
Hodges, now is.9 The ground that Masterpiece Cakeshop turns is certainly
jurisprudentially fecund. How fecund and in exactly what ways remains to be seen.
To summarize the argument pressed in this part: Closely read, the opinion’s factminded holding in favor of Masterpiece Cakeshop and its owner, Mr. Jack Phillips,
operationalizes ideas about governmental discrimination that are strikingly farreaching; moreover, those ideas far exceed the central holding of the case—that Jack
Phillips and his cakeshop suffered unconstitutional discrimination based on religion
at the state’s hands—and involve several supplemental or “shadow” rulings that
Masterpiece Cakeshop also delivers.10 These shadow rulings practically engage and
resolve significant aspects of the deep and “difficult questions” the opinion suggests
it is bracketing in their entirety.11 The significance of the substantive constitutional—
and by extension, as will be seen, the political and moral—promises the Court makes
as shadow law, importantly structured so as symmetrically to benefit both supporters
of equality-based civil rights, including LGBT rights, and cultural conservatives and
traditional moralists, elevates these rulings to a doctrinal status that, if not formally
black letter law, is not very far from it, and that cannot be treated merely as dicta. 12
9 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2596 (2015); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
On Romer’s potential generativity, which proved prophetic, see generally Louis Michael
Seidman, Romer’s Radicalism: The Unexpected Revival of Warren Court Activism, 1996 SUP.
CT. REV. 67 (1997). For a similar notion of this comparison of Masterpiece Cakeshop with
Romer, see Thomas C. Berg, Masterpiece Cakeshop: A Romer for Religious Objectors, 2017
CATO SUP. CT. REV. 139, 151 (2017–18) (invoking Seidman’s prediction and suggesting that
Masterpiece Cakeshop may be “‘generative’ of broader holdings” for religious conservatives).
10

Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1732.

11

Id. at 1723.

12

According to reports, this symmetry was on display even as Masterpiece Cakeshop was
being handed down. Here’s Mark Walsh’s description: “Kennedy keeps teetering from
principles favoring one side or the other.” Mark Walsh, A “View” from the Courtroom: Justice
Kennedy’s
Master-pièce
de
Résistance,
SCOTUSBLOG
(June
4,
2018),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/06/a-view-from-the-courtroom-justice-kennedys-masterpiece-de-resistance/. For a different reading of the case than the one offered here that also
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This suggests the need in the future for some mapping of the forms of shadow law. 13
In any event, viewed together, all the rulings in Masterpiece Cakeshop cast the tactical
description of it in liberal and progressive quarters as a narrow, shallow, and modest
ruling as, at best, more politically useful than faithful to the complexities of the Court’s
text. Masterpiece Cakeshop has ambitions that run wide and deep and that are not
modest in any meaningful sense. Everyone either already knows this or should to a
degree. What follows explores the substantive ground this knowledge treads.

A. An Initial Look: Masterpiece Cakeshop’s Formal Holding
Before the Supreme Court handed down its opinion in Masterpiece Cakeshop,
many in left-liberal and left-progressive circles were convinced that they knew and
understood the relevant scene of constitutional discrimination the case involved. That
scene, naturally, involved the refusal by Mr. Jack Phillips, Masterpiece Cakeshop’s
owner, a baker and a man of deep faith, to prepare and bake a custom wedding
celebration cake for Mr. Charlie Craig and Mr. David Mullins, a gay couple who
wished to celebrate their love and their out-of-state wedding back in their home state
of Colorado.14 And so it was that many left-progressives were surprised—shocked,
alarmed, outraged, too—when Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Masterpiece
Cakeshop, seemingly out of nowhere, rewriting the script, changing the subject, and
making the case’s central holding turn on the record and proceedings below,
announced that another scene of decision—the legal proceedings themselves—was
constitutionally dispositive.15
Famously, Justice Kennedy’s Masterpiece Cakeshop opinion trains its sights on
the machinery of state in Colorado and how it processed Craig and Mullins’s
complaint against Phillips and Masterpiece Cakeshop, zeroing in on a few key
moments during the hearings before the Colorado Civil Rights Commission which
took place after a state Administrative Law Judge had issued a decision finding
Phillips and Masterpiece Cakeshop had in fact and at law discriminated against Craig
and Mullins when refusing to make them a bespoke wedding celebration cake. 16
Surveying this extended bureaucratic moment via a review of the paper record, the
Court announces its conviction that a few moments of the proceedings and their
recognizes the symmetries it involves at the level of its “tone and spirit,” but that emphasizes
its “reasoning betrayed its own rhetorical posture” and could “undermine the very spirit of
symmetric toleration that the opinion’s rhetoric aims to advance,” see Zachary Price, Symmetric
Constitutionalism: An Essay on Masterpiece Cakeshop and the Post-Kennedy Supreme Court,
70 HASTINGS L.J. 1273, 1292 (2019).
13 The concept of “shadow law” as used here doesn’t map onto ideas of secret law, say, in the
way discussed in the government secrets literature, e.g., David Pozen, Deep Secrecy, 62 STAN.
L. REV. 257 (2010), Dakota S. Rudesill, Coming to Terms with Secret Law, 7 HARV. NAT’L SEC.
J. 241 (2015), nor to customary law as found in the social norms theory literature, see, e.g., Lisa
Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extra Legal Contractual Relations in the Diamond
Industry, 21 J. LEGAL. STUD. 115 (1992); Marc Spindelman, Sexual Freedom’s Shadows, 23
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 179 (2011).
14

Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1723–24.

15

See, e.g., id.

16

Id.; id. at 1725–27.
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aftermath tainted the entire legal processing of Craig and Mullins’s anti-discrimination
claim against Phillips and his bakery.17 This, in short, is because the process, in the
Court’s estimation, was “inconsistent with the State’s [constitutional] obligation of
religious neutrality.”18
Justice Kennedy’s Masterpiece Cakeshop opinion describes the Commission’s
proceedings in sharply reactive terms. Treating the two hearings before the
Commission together—the first hearing held on May 30, 2014, and the second, on
July 25, 2014—the Court says that they involved “some elements of a clear and
impermissible hostility toward the sincere religious beliefs that motivated” Phillips to
refuse to make Craig and Mullins the wedding celebration cake they wanted. 19
According to the Court, the record of the Commission’s proceedings reveal that
“hostility” toward religion, and Phillips’s faith in particular, “surfaced” at both
“formal, public hearings.”20
Starting chronologically with the May 30, 2014 hearing, the Court explains that,
during a “public[]” “conven[ing],” state “commissioners [at several points] endorsed
the view that religious views cannot legitimately be carried into the public sphere or
commercial domain, implying that religious beliefs and persons are less than fully
welcome in Colorado’s business community.”21 Bolstering this interpretation of the
record, the Court points to statements by an unnamed civil rights commissioner—pure
bureaucrat in this sense, but also importantly an adjudicator—saying in public and for
the official record “that Phillips can believe ‘what he wants to believe,’ but [he] cannot
act on his religious beliefs ‘if he decides to do business in the state.’”22 This is worse
than it may initially sound, the Court explains, for no sooner does the commissioner
offer these thoughts than “[a] few moments later,” in slightly different language,
repeats them.23
If you find yourself puzzled, not yet seeing the anti-religious bigotry the opinion
is highlighting, do not be alarmed. The opinion, having rehearsed these remarks, itself
affirms that they may be understood in a wholly anodyne light. On one view, the Court
acknowledges, these statements merely indicate that Phillips, from the commissioner’s
perspective, had an obligation to accommodate Craig and Mullins under state law
regardless of his religious beliefs. Here the commissioner would be understood to say

17

Id. at 1723–24, 1729–30.

18 Id. at 1723. Indeed, the constitutional rot that Masterpiece Cakeshop sees is so deep that it
declines to send the case back for a do-over. It sets “the order [of the Commission] . . . aside”
and “invalidate[s]” the state court’s enforcement of the Commission’s order, closing the book
shut on this chapter of the proceedings. Id. at 1732. Thoughtful, if brief, discussion on this point
is in Flanders & Olivera, supra note 2, at 174–75.
19

Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1729 (both dates and quoted language).

20

Id.

21

Id.

22

Id.

23

Id.
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that Phillips’s “refus[al] to provide services [to Craig and Mullins] based on [their]
sexual orientation [is unlawful], regardless of [his] . . . personal[, religious] views.” 24
No sooner is this understanding noted, however, than it is set against another, in
which the commissioner’s observations entail an anti-religious attack. “On the other
hand,” the Court continues, the commissioner’s statements “might be seen as
inappropriate and dismissive comments showing lack of due consideration for
Phillips’ free exercise rights and the dilemma he faced.”25
In saying this, the Court’s opinion is not setting two equally available interpretive
options on the table. Rather, the opinion is actively framing its own case that the
Commission proceedings against Phillips and Masterpiece Cakeshop involved antireligious bias, a reading of the record that takes fuller shape as the opinion engages
“comments that followed” at the second public hearing of the Colorado Civil Rights
Commission in July 2014, a few months later on.26
Almost luckily, the commissioner’s remarks at this second public hearing, quoted
by the Court at some length, expressly reach back to what was said in the first public
hearing, making them, by their own terms, a continuation of “what we[, the
commissioners,] said in the hearing or the last meeting.”27 This collapse of time, space,
and thought, which unifies two otherwise distinct legal events, turns out not to be all
that significant. It is the observations that follow this looking-back, the observations
independently made at the second Commission hearing, that ultimately serve as the
touchstone for the Court’s decision that Masterpiece Cakeshop involves a scene of
state-based, anti-religious discrimination that must, constitutionally, be addressed, and
that is, formally speaking, more fundamental to the case’s disposition than whatever
private and statutorily-appointed discrimination Craig and Mullins suffered at
Phillips’s and Masterpiece Cakeshop’s hands.
The commissioner’s remarks during the July 2014 hearing being as important as
they are to the Court’s disposition of Masterpiece Cakeshop, and in its view so harmful
that they drive the Court to overturn the entire proceedings against Phillips and his
bakery, they are worth quoting at the exact same length as they appear in the Court’s
opinion. Hear the commissioner speak:
“I would also like to reiterate what we said in the hearing or the last
meeting. Freedom of religion and religion has been used to justify all kinds
of discrimination throughout history, whether it be slavery, whether it be
24

Id.

25

Id.

26 There are recognizable parallels between Masterpiece Cakeshop’s aggressive reading
protocol and the one featured in Romer v. Evans. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623–24, 626–
36 (1996).
27 Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1729. The commissioners quoted by the Court’s
opinion at the two Commission hearings are different. By name, the commissioner quoted by
the Court at the first hearing was Commissioner Raju Jairam, and at the second hearing,
Commissioner Diann Rice. See Melissa Murray, Inverting Animus: Masterpiece Cakeshop and
the New Minorities, 2018 SUP. CT. REV. 257, 274–75 (2019) (naming the commissioners); Leslie
Kendrick & Micah Schwartzman, The Etiquette of Animus, 132 HARV. L. REV. 133, 139–40
(same).
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the holocaust, whether it be—I mean, we—we can list hundreds of
situations where freedom of religion has been used to justify
discrimination. And to me it is one of the most despicable pieces of rhetoric
that people can use to—to use their religion to hurt others.”28
After quoting this language, the Court repeats the comments it considers
disparaging to religion: when the commissioner said that using religion “to justify
discrimination” is “one of the most despicable pieces of rhetoric that people can use
to—to use their religion to hurt others.”29 From the Court’s perspective, its own
repetition of the very language that generates the constitutional injury does not
redouble but repairs it. It does this by rejecting the thought that the commissioner was
taking a constitutionally permissible normative stance in the course of the
proceedings, saying in basic form something like this: Faith ought to be about love
and caring for others, and, therefore, invoking religion to justify discrimination
darkens faith’s name in problematic ways that the state remains free to regulate.
The Court’s opinion is clear that the commissioner’s remarks insult religion in a
double sense. “To describe a man’s faith as ‘one of the most despicable pieces of
rhetoric that people can use’ is to disparage his religion in at least two distinct ways:
by describing it as despicable, and also by characterizing it as merely rhetorical—
something insubstantial and even insincere.”30
Leave aside the opinion’s curious, if common, understanding of “rhetoric” in order
to focus on its deeper didacticism, along with its sense of how unavoidably wounding
for a person of faith like Phillips the commissioner’s remarks are. In the Court’s
opinion, the commissioner’s remarks are, without question, harmful.
The opinion’s instruction and simple conviction on this point are notable
handiwork for other reasons. In certain faithful circles, Justice Kennedy’s own preMasterpiece Cakeshop efforts delivering and securing constitutional rights for LGBT
persons achieved their disapproved-of advances through what amounted to a
homologous and practically indistinguishable set of anti-religious insults. The entire
line of cases from Romer v. Evans to Lawrence v. Texas to United States v. Windsor
to Obergefell v. Hodges constitutionally set back the religious views and traditional
moral values that had long supported a broad and traditional sexual morality that
condemned all non-marital sexuality, including sodomy, as sin, as dangerous to the
social fabric, hence properly public offenses, while holding up marriage as an article
of faith and definition as the union of one (bio) man to one (bio) woman as husband
and wife.31 From this point of view, the Court’s pro-lesbian-and-gay decisions,
certainly most emphatically from Lawrence on to Obergefell, which variously likened
and ultimately equated sodomitical sexual relations with cross-sexed intimacies
28

Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1729.

29

Id.

30

Id.

31

Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744
(2013); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). See
also Kendrick & Schwartzman, supra note 27, at 142–43 (noting continuities between the
Supreme Court’s pro-lesbian-and-gay rights decisions and the positions expressed in Civil
Rights Commission hearings).
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between husbands and wives in two-in-one-flesh unions in marital bedrooms across
the nation, were their own offenses to religious and moral values that far exceeded a
rhetorical insult to religion. The body of Justice Kennedy’s lesbian and gay rights
jurisprudence thus not only refused to give religious or traditional moral values the
political respects that those who subscribed to them believed they were due and that
everyone knows they had long enjoyed, but also, as many understood those decisions
(some hissing, some cheering), the cases in this line diminished religious views and
moral values when announcing the laws they were declaring unconstitutional were
grounded in no more than what, in constitutional terms, appeared as animus or
irrationality.32 Painting religious views and moral values supporting limits on lesbian
and gay rights, along with other anti-gay sentiments, as hateful or crazy in
constitutional terms, hence inconsistent with the Constitution’s public morality,
regardless of the historical dominance and sway they enjoyed, the Court’s and Justice
Kennedy’s own pro-lesbian-and-gay jurisprudence registered with many people of
faith and conservative moralists in exactly the same key as the commissioner’s
remarks now register with the Court: as state action entailing unconstitutional, antireligious insult.33 Many liberal, libertarian, and progressive supporters—irreligionists
and immoralists perhaps above all—understood and secretly cheered these aspects of
that body of law.
Set against these understandings of his constitutional legacy, Masterpiece
Cakeshop’s didacticism about the commissioner’s observations on religion extends
beyond its pedantry—a pedantry that joins it to the larger pedantic through-line in
Justice Kennedy’s constitutional jurisprudence.34 It is also an effort that operates,

32 See, e.g., Romer, 517 U.S. at 632 (1996) (“[The sheer breadth of the law] is so discontinuous
with the reasons offered for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus
toward the class it affects; it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state interests.”); see also,
e.g., Windsor, 570 U.S. at 770 (2013) (noting how § 3 of the federal Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA) was unconstitutionally animus-based).

On “hateful” and “crazy” in the relevant constitutional sense, see, e.g., Romer, 517 U.S. at
636 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Court has mistaken a Kulturkampf for a fit of spite.”); id. at
645 (“The Court’s portrayal of Coloradans as a society fallen victim to pointless, hate-filled
‘gay-bashing’ is so false as to be comical.”); see also, e.g., Windsor, 570 U.S. at 795 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (describing it as a “lie” “that only those with hateful hearts could have voted ‘aye’
on this Act”); id. at 798 (reading Windsor as describing Congress’s opposition to same-sex
marriage as a “hateful moral judgment”); id. at 800 (describing Windsor as indicating Congress
acted “irrationally and hatefully” when passing DOMA); id. at 795–96 (noting how
extraordinary the charge of irrationality, or a “bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular
group,” is, and describing the position as creating and maintaining “the illusion of the Act’s
supporters as unhinged members of a wild-eyed lynch mob”). On “insult,” see, e.g., Romer, 517
U.S. at 652 (“To suggest, for example, that this constitutional amendment springs from nothing
more than ‘a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group’ . . . is nothing short of
insulting.”); see also, e.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2626 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(“Perhaps the most discouraging aspect of today’s decision is the extent to which the majority
feels compelled to sully those on the other side of the debate. . . . These apparent assaults on the
character of fairminded people will have an effect, in society and in court.”).
33

34 See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007) (“While we find no reliable data
to measure the phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to conclude some women come to regret
their choice to abort the infant life they once created and sustained.”).
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consciously or not, to restore constitutional faith, to make amends with people of
conservative faith and moral traditionalists who found the Court’s reasoning in earlier
pro-LGBT opinions insulting and discriminatory against them. Interestingly, the
apologia’s structure bears an uncanny resemblance to the form of projection widely
seen operating in cases of gay panic, in which someone else is blamed and punished
for thoughts and desires that “are properly one’s own.” 35 Here, in a panic involving
religious rights, the commissioner’s remarks are pinned and blamed for what Justice
Kennedy’s own writings had previously said and done.36 Form aside, Masterpiece
Cakeshop’s instruction on anti-religious insult and discrimination demonstrates that
Justice Kennedy, speaking for the Court, may have achieved a new (or anyway, a
different) level of understanding of the relationship between pro-lesbian-and-gay
sentiment and anti-religious and anti-morality discrimination.37 Masterpiece
Cakeshop’s constitutional repudiation of the commissioner’s remarks in this sense
reads not as self-condemnation but rather as expiation, a release achieved not by
formally apologizing and repudiating the pro-lesbian-and-gay constitutional opinions
that many religionists and moralists found insulting, hurtful, and plainly wrong, but
rather by cutting short their replication in this case, which underscores their ongoing
constitutional importance and the challenges and imperatives of state accommodations
of them.
If this is right, Masterpiece Cakeshop involves a return to thinking that guided
Justice Kennedy’s first major pro-lesbian-and-gay rights opinion, Romer v. Evans,
which like this new ruling, of course, involved Colorado’s anti-discrimination rules
and state-based discrimination related to them.38 Just as Romer disavowed what was
widely taken as the open season for anti-lesbian and anti-gay discrimination
announced by the Supreme Court’s earlier ruling in Bowers v. Hardwick,39 which
sanctioned making homosexuals criminal outcasts, Masterpiece Cakeshop repudiates
the reverberations sent out from the Supreme Court’s pro-lesbian-and-gay rulings
from Romer on, most notably Obergefell, and the suggestion many perceived in those
cases that they reflected an elevation of secular liberal political values over and with
whatever effects on religion and traditional morality the people and governors of a
given jurisdiction would allow. Masterpiece Cakeshop’s correspondence with
Romer’s limiting logics is thus almost predictably visible in various expressions
Masterpiece Cakeshop uses, including its suggestion that the commissioner’s
statements “implying that religious beliefs and persons are less than fully welcome in
Colorado’s business community” are inconsistent with a wide and welcoming view of
35 See Janet Halley, Sexuality Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 183,
195 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva Siegel eds., 2003) (describing gay panic as “a way of
punishing someone else for desires that are properly one’s own”). See also Cynthia Lee, The
Gay Panic Defense, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 471, 475 (2008) (discussing “gay panic”).
36

See supra note 33 and accompanying text.

37 Compare this to the perspective expressed in United States v. Windsor, where the Court’s
opinion describes the evolution both of general thinking and, more concretely, public sentiment
in New York State on same-sex marriage, a description that also might be taken as an account
of Justice Kennedy’s own. 570 U.S. at 763–64.
38

Romer, 517 U.S. at 623–24 (describing Colorado law as it existed at the time).

39

478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986).
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political community, belonging, and equal concern and respect on display in Romer,
here turned to protect people of faith and moralists from the exuberant operations of
the liberalism promoted by the Court’s pro-LGBT jurisprudence.40 While the Court’s
pro-LGBT caselaw unmistakably prohibits faith-based and moral views about
homosexuality and the unequal treatment of lesbians and gay men from defining the
outputs of democratic political processes—requiring the state to treat lesbians and gay
men just like their cross-sex counterparts—Masterpiece Cakeshop teaches that the
cases in that line in no way stand for the proposition that conservative people of faith
and their religions, or traditional moralists and their moralities, may be subject to
treatment as political outcasts who must endure insulting, disparaging, hurtful, and
discriminatory treatment by lesbians, gay men, and their political allies, whom the
Court’s pro-lesbian-and-gay rights decisions have given a boost. Equality, not
hierarchy, is Masterpiece Cakeshop’s message in this respect. Faith and morality may
operate in the constitutionally animus-based and/or irrational ways the Court’s cases
had declared, but calling faith and morality out for those possibilities doesn’t, pro
tanto, amount to a warrant for the hateful disrespect and discrimination that the
Colorado civil rights commissioner showed Phillips, dubbing religion a “despicable
piece[] of rhetoric,” maybe “the most despicable . . . that people can use to . . . to hurt
others.”41 If Justice Kennedy’s Masterpiece Cakeshop opinion aggressively attacks on
this point, and if those attacks bear the hallmarks of a projection that distances the
opinion from the ideas that the commissioner expressed, this may be a reason why:
Saying things this way preserves the ground that the Court’s earlier pro-LGBT
decisions cleared and claimed while simultaneously clarifying that those cases will
not operate to authorize an open season on religionists or moralists who agree with
Phillips. Of course, if this is what Masterpiece Cakeshop is about, if it is designed in
this way to secure Justice Kennedy’s pro-LGBT legacy into the future, it may be seen
to involve a full-circle return to the seemingly humble origins of Justice Kennedy’s
pro-LGBT rights jurisprudence in Romer v. Evans.42 Or—and this line of thought may
be more accurate—it may mean that Masterpiece Cakeshop contains the signs of
personal melodrama, even psychodrama, of a sort that has characterized important
strands of Justice Kennedy’s jurisprudence, revealing Masterpiece Cakeshop to be,
40

Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1729 (2018).

41

Id.

Saying this this way, of course, is to talk about Justice Kennedy’s LGBT rights
jurisprudence during his tenure on the Supreme Court. Formally, his LGBT rights jurisprudence
began earlier, when he was on the Ninth Circuit. See, e.g., Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788,
792 (9th Cir. 1980) (opinion by Kennedy, C.J.) (upholding as rational against constitutional
attack a Navy rule that served as predicate for discharging enlisted persons with “otherwise fine
performance record[s]” who “admitted engaging in homosexual acts”); see also, e.g., Sullivan
v. I.N.S., 772 F.2d 609, 609–10 (9th Cir. 1985) (opinion by Kennedy, C.J.) (affirming decision
by Board of Immigration Appeals to deny an application by a gay male Australian to suspend
his deportation from the U.S. on the grounds, inter alia, that it would cause “extreme hardship”
to him and to the U.S. citizen man he had married after they “obtained a marriage license and
participated in a marriage ceremony conducted by a minister in Colorado”); cf. also United
States v. Smith, 574 F.2d 988, 989 (9th Cir. 1978); Singer v. U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 530
F.2d 247, 248 (9th Cir. 1976) (opinion of Jameson, J.), vacated sub nom. McDonald v. United
States, 429 U.S. 1033 (1977); Soc’y for Individual Rights, Inc. v. Hampton, 528 F.2d 905, 906
(per curiam) (9th Cir. 1975).
42
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psychologically anyway, maximally egotistical and personally immodest, about
Justice Kennedy and his role in history as much as about the rights and interests the
case involves.43 On this view, the question to ask is how likely it would be that an
egoistic decision like this would also turn out, on close inspection, to be
jurisprudentially minimalist.
Precisely at the point where this question opens up, Masterpiece Cakeshop doubles
down more fully to expose the sweep of its formal holding on anti-religious
discrimination. The process unfolds as the opinion draws out for condemnation yet
another aspect of the Colorado civil rights commissioner’s brief remarks. Beyond
quoting the commissioner’s characterization of religion as “despicable” “rhetoric,” the
Court’s opinion explains that “[t]he commissioner even went so far as to compare
Phillips’ invocation of his sincerely held religious beliefs to defenses of slavery and
the Holocaust.”44 The opinion doesn’t deny that slavery and the Holocaust were at
times defended in religious terms—nor could it—but it does issue an extremely stern
rebuke.45 “This sentiment is inappropriate for a Commission charged with the solemn
responsibility of fair and neutral enforcement of Colorado’s anti-discrimination law—
a law that protects discrimination on the basis of religion as well as sexual
orientation.”46 One sign of the emotional intensity that is actually moving beneath the
surface of the Court’s seemingly wholly affectless scolding is the parapraxis it
commits. Justice Kennedy’s opinion says that Colorado’s anti-discrimination law is
“a law that protects discrimination on the basis of religion as well as sexual
orientation.”47 But that is exactly the opposite of what Colorado’s anti-discrimination

Compare the depiction of Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Obergefell v. Hodges as
found in Justice Antonin Scalia’s dissent in the case. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584,
2627–28, 2629–31, 2630 n.22 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also, e.g., Rosen, supra note
4.
43

44

Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1729.

45 Sketches of the relevant point, with sources, are in Stephen M. Feldman, Having Your Cake
and Eating It Too? Religious Freedom and LGBT Rights, 9 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 35, 52–
56 (2018), and Murray, supra note 27, at 276–77.
46 Masterpiece Cakeshop, No. 16–111, slip op. at 14 (June 4, 2018). This is the original
language from the Court. The development of this language in subsequent versions of the
Court’s opinion is traced infra note 47.
47

Id. (emphasis added). The italicized language appears in the initial slip opinion issued on
June 4, 2018, and in the revised, hence corrected, slip opinion issued that same day. Compare
Masterpiece Cakeshop, No. 16–111, slip op. at 14 (June 4, 2018), with Masterpiece Cakeshop,
No. 16–111, slip op. at 14 (June 4, 2018) (rev. slip op.). The language was finally corrected in
the revised slip opinion issued on June 13, 2018. Masterpiece Cakeshop, No. 16–111, slip op.
at 14 (June 13, 2018) (rev. slip op.). The full sentence now officially reads: “This sentiment is
inappropriate for a Commission charged with the solemn responsibility of fair and neutral
enforcement of Colorado’s anti-discrimination law—a law that protects against discrimination
on the basis of religion as well as sexual orientation.” Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1729.
The textual indications on this passage notwithstanding, it remains true that a typographical
error, even on a significant point, twice missed, can be just and only that, even if, as here,
attending to the emotional intensity of the text in its original form gives rise to a different
reading.
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law does. Colorado law does not “protect[] discrimination on the basis of religion [or]
. . . sexual orientation.” It offers protections against discrimination on these grounds.48
After condemning and repudiating the commissioner’s remarks—and thus issuing
a bold warning to all government officials, who are now on a renewed and heightened
notice not to say hateful, hence discriminatory, hence unconstitutional, things about
the religious views of people of faith or, one presumes, about traditional morality—
the Court chastises those who remained silent in the face of this discriminatory
likening of Phillips’s faith to support for slavery or Nazism or both. 49 Formally, the
opinion mobilizes the refusal of any government official at the time of the remarks or
later, in subsequent legal proceedings, to disavow what the commissioner said. 50 It
treats all this silence as part of the matrix of constitutional considerations for declaring
what the commissioner put on the record, hence what the state did and then didn’t do,
to be constitutionally offensive: harm not only to Phillips and Masterpiece Cakeshop
but also to the nation and our shared national values as reflected in the Constitution.
Thus does the Court’s decision observe: “For these reasons [involving both the initial
statement likening Phillips’s invocation of his religion to support for slavery and the
Holocaust, and the silence in its wake], the Court cannot avoid the conclusion that
these statements cast doubt on the fairness and impartiality of the Commission’s
adjudication of Phillips’ case.”51
This overstated conclusion—at once both banal and marvelous, the Court’s
conclusion being, after all, defined entirely by its choice—is immediately paired with
an observation that reveals its looming insecurity as a ruling that’s compelled. While
the essence of the Court’s case that the commission proceedings lacked the “fairness
and impartiality” required by the Constitution has been fully made by this point in the
opinion, the Court shores up this conclusion by adding some additional weight to it.
The Court notes the comparatively different treatment Phillips received at the
Commission’s hands from cases involving “other bakers who objected to . . . requested
[custom-made] cake[s] on the basis of [their] conscience[s]” but who, unlike Phillips,
“prevailed before the Commission” against discrimination claims.52 If these cases and
their comparison to Phillips’s loom large in exchanges found in the other opinions in
the case,53 they function in the majority opinion’s argument as a supplemental set of

48

As described supra note 47, this is the position expressed in the current version of the
opinion. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1729.
49 A refinement of this point, on the obligation of government officials, which takes account
of Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018), appears below. See infra notes 70–72 and
accompanying text.

This excludes Supreme Court oral arguments, where Justice Kennedy asked the state’s
representative for and effectively got the disavowal that he was after, if too late. See Transcript
of Oral Argument at 51–57, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16–111) (discussing
the point).
50

51

Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1730.

52

Id.

53 Compare Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1732–34 (Kagan, J., concurring) (discussing
and comparing the cases), with Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1734–40 (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring) (same).
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considerations—a constitutional add-on—that amounts to yet “[a]nother indication of
[anti-religious] hostility” at the Commission, which had, in its essential form, been
established based on the record of the administrative proceedings in the case. 54

1. An Assessment
The tactical bid to view Justice Kennedy’s Masterpiece Cakeshop opinion as a
narrow, shallow, and modest ruling largely depends upon the sense that the Court’s
conclusion is closely tethered to the record, hence tailored to the facts of the case,
hence how manageable the decision’s requirement is. It seems very likely now that
public officials at public hearings in Masterpiece Cakeshop’s wake will not slip up so
readily and talk about religion in the ways the commissioner at the second public
hearing in this case did nor, for that matter, remain silent in the face of such nowobviously and unconstitutionally offensive remarks. Initially, there’s reason to wonder
how exactly it is that altering and superintending the speech and silence practices of
public officials across the country in such a highly centralized and coordinated fashion
like this lends itself as an act of power to being described as modest. In other
comparative terms, it may prove true that Masterpiece Cakeshop maps a future in
which it is seen to have picked absurdly low-hanging constitutional fruit the likes of
which will not be seen again for some time, if ever.
That possibility holds, but not as a superficial one-off proposition. The Court’s
analysis of the record reflects a deeper, indeed an aggressive, normative solicitude for
claims of anti-religious bias by state actors, a normativity that’s complexly situated
within and related to a larger vision of the import of constitutionally safeguarded
political pluralisms. In this sense, even those who highlight Masterpiece Cakeshop’s
minimalism as being intimately bound up with the record have to recognize that the
normative points of view that coalesced and moved the Court to read the record in
what seemed to so many a surprising, even misguided, way, do so in something of the
spirit of wish-fulfillment. They want Masterpiece Cakeshop, with its reconstruction
of the record as containing proof positive of anti-religious discrimination, to be a
minimalist decision, even as they also have a sense, hence on some level know, that
the normativities driving it suggest it can’t be or anyway stay that way. If the sorts of
seemingly anodyne remarks in the record, all of which can be understood as stating a
liberal view of the facts of how religious and moral convictions and practice must
yield in the face of anti-discrimination norms, are readily construed as constitutionally
illicit state action, how will anti-discrimination norms not give way as a matter of

54

Id. at 1730 (majority opinion) (emphasis added). Reinforcing this point and its
understanding is how the Court restates the basis for its conclusion a bit later on, where these
other cases make no appearance within the Court’s basic account of why the Free Exercise
Clause was violated, and only operate as an add-on: “The official expressions of hostility to
religion in some of the commissioners’ comments—comments that were not disavowed at the
Commission or by the State at any point in the proceedings that led to affirmance of the order—
were inconsistent with what the Free Exercise Clause requires. The Commission’s disparate
consideration of Phillips’ case compared to the cases of the other bakers suggests the same. For
these reasons, the order must be set aside.” Id. at 1732. Accord Feldman, supra note 45, at 42–
43 (expressing a similar view on the structure of this part of the Court’s decision).
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constitutional right to religious views and moral values in other respects? 55 In this
sense, the effort to minimize the doctrinal significance of Masterpiece Cakeshop may
be one way to avoid coming to terms with the fact that if what the Court says about
the Commission proceedings is right—if what was said on the record, rounded out by
silence, is anti-religious discrimination—then a great many liberals and progressives
who share those views might be potential discriminators, too, who should check their
own anti-religious impulses lest they act on them in ways amounting to unlawful
private, or, depending on their statist authorities, state practice. Masterpiece
Cakeshop’s ostensible minimalism must be deeply psychologically satisfying for
those decidedly and proudly faithless liberals and progressives who, either openly or
secretly, look down their noses at people, particularly conservatives, of faith and
traditional moralists, or who otherwise feel justified within their positions of
constitutional safety to exercise political power—including, at times, the massive
powers of the state—over their religious and moralistic enemies to check their
vanquished views in the public realm.
Herein lies the worry: Lurking in Masterpiece Cakeshop may be the seeds of a
larger heuristic that sharply lines up against the worldview that many liberals and
progressives rightly understand Obergefell to have embraced and deployed. Should
Masterpiece Cakeshop be anything other than a minimalist decision, the constitutional
liberalism of the Court’s lesbian and gay rights jurisprudence may soon be subject to
even more instability and challenge than it was previously or was otherwise thought
to face.56 Following that, of course, or even before it, other aspects of existing civil
rights structures may come under the same pressures.57
More immediately, but no less auspiciously, to the extent Masterpiece Cakeshop
is serious about its disapproval of anti-religious discrimination by the state and about
its commitment to ensuring that political and legal, including adjudicative, processes
subject to the First Amendment’s religious freedom strictures are not to be
constitutionally suspect because “doubt” has been “cast . . . on the[ir] fairness and
impartiality,”58 the Court’s decision in the case creates the conditions for conservatives
of faith and for traditional moralists to insist upon constitutional inquiries in a range
of cases in which their rights to act in conformity with their beliefs are limited by the
government, testing the adequacy of the government’s justifications.59

55

Saying this is to imagine different sorts of epistemologies within which this view holds. It
is not to say that describing religion as “despicable” “rhetoric,” much less analogizing
conservative religious views to those supporting slavery or the Holocaust, are, as a matter of
fact, anodyne. There is a separate question on this line whether even if they are not, they warrant
the constitutional conclusion Masterpiece Cakeshop reaches, and the remedy the Supreme Court
orders in the case.
56 See Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 922 F.3d 140 (3d Cir. 2019), cert. granted, ___U.S.L.W.
___ (U.S. Feb. 24, 2020) (No. 19-123).
57

This obviously includes women’s reproductive rights.

58

Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1730.

59 The results of these inquiries may not always be what conservatives of faith and traditional
moralists might want, but the Court’s opinion in Masterpiece Cakeshop may nevertheless be
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Consistent with Masterpiece Cakeshop’s teaching, the press here may be made in
relation to stray comments in the record and to punctuated silences about them, all of
which may serve as grounds for a constitutional cause of action collateral to first-order
legal proceedings. Nominally and formally, Masterpiece Cakeshop breaks no new
legal ground here. State-based, anti-religious discrimination has long been verboten,
at least on the books and at least insofar as the religions and moral values are
mainstream. What Masterpiece Cakeshop does, though, is demonstrate the Court’s
now-activated willingness to perform its sensitivities to claims of anti-religious or
anti-morality bias in ways that show the Supreme Court to be in session—it’s open for
business—when it comes to pro-religion and pro-morality understandings of religious
and moral freedom claims.60
This is not to say that Masterpiece Cakeshop could not be held to its apparent
context. The decision, it might be said, is only for the unusual case in which the
constitutional imperatives of fairness and impartiality toward religion and morality
have been breached in anti-discrimination proceedings, which true to their own
underlying commitments must be exquisitely fair, neutral, and beyond even the
appearance of discrimination as between religion and irreligion.
There’s more to say about this argument, but for now, one obvious problem with
it is that the First Amendment’s religious non-discrimination principle on which
Masterpiece Cakeshop sits—the basis for the Court’s declaration that Jack Phillips
and his cakeshop, by extension, suffered state-based anti-religious discrimination—is
not in principle limitable or limited to the anti-discrimination law setting. In every
case in which religious-based or morality-based discrimination is advanced as a
challenge to a governmental action, in every case in which state fairness and neutrality
vis-à-vis religion or morality is potentially implicated, the First Amendment’s
religious freedom guarantees are potentially in play. All state actors involved in
official actions must now choose their words and silences with respect to religion and
morality with constitutionally-sensitized care. Even casual remarks that to some
liberal or progressive ears may sound utterly innocent, normatively innocuous, or
otherwise harmless, may be held to be constitutionally beyond the pale, judged not (or
no longer) by secularized liberal or progressive sensitivities and standards, but from
within religious or moral worldviews as grounds for declaring a constitutional taint to
governmental action. If so, Masterpiece Cakeshop may have announced the advent of
a new era of “constitutional political correctness” respecting religion and morality.61

distinctively empowering, giving them the opportunity to make strategic and tactical calls about
when to seek judicial review and vindication of their rights claims. See supra note 56.
60 Cf. Samuel Issacharoff, Judging in the Time of the Extraordinary, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 533,
540 (2010) (“Simply put, federal courts [after the 2000 election, in the era of Bush v. Gore]
were open for business when it came to adjudicating election administration claims, and the
post-2000 era witnessed an immense growth in election-related litigation”). Thanks to Dan
Tokaji for noting the parallel thought.

A similar point using the language of “etiquette” is suggested in Kendrick & Schwartzman,
supra note 27, at 135 (“In our view, the Court erred by elevating matters of etiquette—the
importance of appearing respectful and considerate—over giving a reasoned justification for
resolving conflicts between religious liberty and antidiscrimination law.” (internal citation
omitted)).
61
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The articulation of a reasonable faithful person or a reasonable moralist standard of
and for First Amendment adjudications might not be far behind.
While these prospects may generate a preliminary sense of dread among some
liberals and progressives, they may also illuminate why many liberal and progressive
audiences have not sought to attend more carefully and openly to the opinion’s deeper
resonances.
Still, to state what may initially sound a counterintuitive point, these highly
negative prospects may also contain within them the seeds of much happier future
news. Unless Masterpiece Cakeshop involves the abandonment of neutral principles
of constitutional adjudication, its sensitivities to religious and moral perspectives as a
basis for judging “doubt” about the “fairness and impartiality” of governmental
proceedings are part and parcel of a ruling that also brings with it an announcement of
a new era for adjudicating all manner of constitutional anti-discrimination claims that
are or might be leveled against state actors involved in enforcing or adjudicating the
enforcement of otherwise neutral and generally applicable legal rules.
There’s no mystery about why this is. If the state processes of administration and
adjudication must remain free of “doubt” about “the[ir] fairness and impartiality” 62 in
relation to the operation of neutral and generally applicable legal rules with respect to
religion and morality, and if that doubt is to be judged from within the perspective
from which it is launched, there’s no reason to suppose Masterpiece Cakeshop’s ruling
on a religious-based right to non-discrimination shouldn’t apply consistently and with
equal force to other kinds of constitutionally grounded anti-discrimination claims. The
constitutional anti-discrimination norms of the First and Fourteenth Amendments
being on a par with one another, the prospect that the case sets forth, of first-order
legal proceedings being “set aside” in their entirety because of record evidence of
statements and silences amounting to religious-based or morality-based
discrimination, well, who could possibly miss the legal opportunities that this should
open up?63 What lawyer seeking to challenge adverse governmental action, whether
in a civil or a criminal setting, will not, indeed, should not, seize upon Masterpiece
Cakeshop’s teaching to assail stray remarks and silences of governmental actors, while
saying of them—judged from the perspective of the claimant’s group—that they
demonstrate a discriminatory attitude that casts “doubt” on the “fairness and
impartiality” of state proceedings in ways that violate the Constitution?
Think here, perhaps most obviously, about various claims of discrimination based
on race, ethnicity, national origin, sex, sexual orientation or identity, and maybe
gender identity and expression, either alone or at their intersections, and how legal
records of proceedings and other aspects of legal processes can be scoured and
dissected for remarks that, to the uninitiated, might seem wholly innocuous, but that
viewed from a sympathetic perspective, as in Masterpiece Cakeshop, particularly
when strung together, tell a story of discrimination at least as persuasive as the one
Masterpiece Cakeshop tells. Cards on the table: Even if Masterpiece Cakeshop’s story
of anti-religious discrimination is not understood to be altogether compelling, and for
many it isn’t, it still sets a strikingly low threshold, easily crossed, in countless other
62

Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1730.

63

Needless to say, Masterpiece Cakeshop runs its religious freedom protections through the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2020

19

366

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:347

cases involving remarks that, to liberals and progressives, will sound much more
clearly like they are evidence of other sorts of discrimination the Constitution
presently outlaws.64
All of this depends on the unexceptionable proposition that Masterpiece Cakeshop
is announced within a rule of law system in which its own commitment to neutrality
and generality of constitutional and legal rules is both not at all and also always in
doubt. Assuming Herbert Wechsler’s views still find a receptive audience on the
Supreme Court, it stands to reason that the more robustly the Court is inclined, as in
Masterpiece Cakeshop, to treat statements like those during the Colorado Civil Rights
Commission’s hearings as reflecting constitutionally actionable anti-religious bias, the
more the decision throws open the door to a broad array of anti-discrimination
challenges to first-order legal proceedings.65 This narrow, shallow, and modest little
decision is thus an invitation to second-order re-litigation that seeks to set aside firstorder legal proceedings on constitutional anti-discrimination grounds. The question to
ask when liberals and progressives are overheard cabining Masterpiece Cakeshop is
why? Given their own and the Court’s own rule of law commitments, why aren’t they
shouting “Charge!”?66
Especially when Masterpiece Cakeshop sets the evidentiary bar for making out a
discrimination claim where it does, and arguably as low. When, at the very least,
everything that any government official says in his or her or their official capacities
and in public on the record is in play as part of a constitutional discrimination suit. 67
Harder questions might soon involve the operative sweep of Masterpiece Cakeshop’s
discriminatory-statement or approving-silence rule. When it does, the questions to be
asked may begin with why only statements by public officials made in public and on
the record count? What’s special about what is audibly recorded and placed on an
official transcript? After Masterpiece Cakeshop, the pressure should soon be on to
64 Consider in this regard Serial: You’ve Got Some Gauls, CHICAGO PUBLIC RADIO (Sept. 20,
2018), https://serialpodcast.org/season-three/2/youve-got-some-gauls. This move is available
notwithstanding the ways in which many readers of Masterpiece Cakeshop take the decision to
be one that broadly cuts in favor of religious conservatives. See generally, e.g., Berg, supra note
9.

Herbert Wechsler’s standard on this score remains standard. See generally Herbert
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).
Importantly, it has not only been the critical legal studies set that warned against taking
Weschler’s neutral principles too seriously. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, The Law According to
Yale, in POWER AND POLICY IN QUEST OF LAW, ESSAYS IN HONOR OF EUGENE VICTOR ROSTOW
417, 417 (Myres S. McDougal & W. Michael Reisman eds., 1985) (recalling how Eugene
Rostow “chided [him] for taking Wechsler’s account of ‘neutral principles’ so seriously.”).
65

66

This suggestion, directed at the Court, is in Lawrence G. Sager & Nelson Tebbe, The
Reality Principle, 34 CONST. COMMENT. 171, 178 (2019) (“Now the Court should extend that
approach beyond religious cases, and make discriminatory motivation against subordinate
groups presumptively unconstitutional.”).
67

Along these lines, consider Buck v. Gordon, No. 1:19-CV-286, 2019 WL 4686425, at *1,
*11, *15 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 26, 2019) (focusing on statements by Michigan Attorney General
Dana Nessel while on the campaign trail and linking subsequent official actions by Nessel as
Attorney General to her earlier remarks in ways that liken them to statements adjudicated in
Masterpiece Cakeshop).
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seek to hold minitrials about the meaning of an “inaudible” that’s officially recorded
in a proceeding’s transcript but which those in attendance can attest had relevance to
a discrimination claim. It is hard to see—if the “doubt” about the “fairness and
impartiality” of a proceeding is where the constitutional game is—why proceedings
in conference (or for that matter, a jury room, say) should not likewise be fair game.
Ditto unofficial statements by public officials, say, to the media or on social media.
Why shouldn’t they count as evidence of discrimination that casts doubt on the
fairness and impartiality of a state proceeding? If the constitutional concern is what
Masterpiece Cakeshop says it is—“doubt” about “the fairness and impartiality” of
governmental proceedings—why shouldn’t all those remarks count as evidence every
bit as much as silence that never makes its way onto the record? At some point, a
supervening line must be and will be drawn to make this rule workable. 68 But if the
line isn’t principled, if it improperly applies to some but not all similarly situated
discrimination claims, Masterpiece Cakeshop should be overturned—as an arbitrary,
a political, and/or an unprincipled ruling. And if overturning Masterpiece Cakeshop
is in fact the goal, as it is for many liberals and progressives, why relent so easily and
accept the bid that this is a minimalist, fact-bound decision? Once the initial daze of
this ruling, which many didn’t see coming, finally wears off, liberals and progressives
may cease relinquishing what could be retooled as a powerful anti-discrimination
weapon.69
To be sure, Masterpiece Cakeshop may or may not prove to be a principled
decision. For some, it has already plainly shown itself not to be, and for understandable
reasons. Very quickly on the heels of this decision, the Court—in the first major
opportunity available to it in the same Term—refused to take the principle of the case
seriously and to apply it to governmental action that would’ve proven beyond any
doubt its principle has sharp teeth that bite, cutting deep. To say this is to be thinking
about Trump v. Hawaii, where the facts in evidence in the record seemed to many
liberals and progressives, and to some conservatives, much more clearly than in
Masterpiece Cakeshop, an unassailable indication that governmental action, in the

68 For one example, see 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, No. 16–CV–02372–MSK, 2019 WL
4694159, at *911 (D. Colo. Sept. 26, 2019) (rejecting a “pre-enforcement challenge” to
Colorado’s public accommodations law based on statements made by members of the Colorado
Civil Rights Commission adjudicated in Masterpiece Cakeshop).
69 A similar press might involve the question of whether the relevant proceedings must entail
something at least as legally, if not also socially, significant as a civil anti-discrimination ruling,
which, of course, is not criminal, though it may partake of some of the attributes of it within
regulatory logics and the social imagination. Think here of the ways in which, for example, sex
discrimination rules in the context of Title IX proceedings, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2018), on college
campuses often operate with and struggle against a criminal law cast. If the stakes of the
proceedings are high enough, the consequences severe enough, it might be that discriminatory
statements on the record or silences related to them become actionable across the board, or it
might be that different rules are put in play. These ideas follow from Masterpiece Cakeshop’s
holding’s teaching, read against the backdrop of our rule-of-law system’s rules of regularity and
equal treatment, with their constitutional expressions—but the text of the Court’s opinion in the
case doesn’t provide all that many helpful clues, finally, on how they should be resolved. The
Court’s order in the case is certainly telling of the possibilities notwithstanding the effects on
Craig and Mullins or the public at large in relation to the vindication of anti-discrimination
claims.
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form of President Donald J. Trump’s “travel ban,” was traceable to anti-religious,
specifically, anti-Muslim, sentiment.70 How, if the remarks by a nameless state
commissioner and the silences by other commissioners and later by other state officials
who reviewed the Commission’s decision—how if all that was so obviously antireligious discrimination violative of the First Amendment could the national travel
ban involved in Trump v. Hawaii stand in light of Donald J. Trump’s and others’ antiMuslim remarks and the loud silences in their wake? Did they not, to many people’s
ways of thinking, cast “doubt” on the fairness and neutrality of the governmental
processes that produced the positive law rule being challenged in the case? This was
at least partly, if not exactly, what Justice Sonia Sotomayor had in mind when, in the
course of her Trump v. Hawaii dissent, she tapped on Masterpiece Cakeshop as
precedent that required the conclusion that the travel ban could not withstand a First
Amendment constitutional analytic.71
What to make of Trump v. Hawaii as a case that reveals something about
Masterpiece Cakeshop’s meaning? Does Trump v. Hawaii already teach that
Masterpiece Cakeshop is unprincipled, the empty personal preference politics of the
Justices at its core? Perhaps it does. There’s no point in strenuously denying it.
It is also possible, however, indeed it is quite easy, to distinguish Trump v. Hawaii
as a case about presidential powers operating at their height, at the intersection of
foreign affairs powers and immigration in a distinctive way. 72 Everyone realistically
knew that, at a certain point, then-candidate Trump’s anti-Muslim remarks, revealing
the anti-Muslim motivations behind his travel bans, would eventually be washed out
by rules of regular order involving the Executive Office and intergovernmental
processes in the executive branch. Everyone realistically knew about the inter-branch
reluctance the U.S. Supreme Court would manifest in relation to a request for a
declaration that a sitting President of the United States had, constitutionally speaking,
manifested unlawful animus or irrationality toward those of the Muslim faith.

70 A careful expression of this view is in Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2433 (2018)
(Breyer, J., dissenting). For a more direct account, see infra note 71 and accompanying text.
71

In her dissent in Trump v. Hawaii, Justice Sotomayor observes that Masterpiece
Cakeshop’s
principles should apply equally here. In both instances, the question is whether a
government actor exhibited tolerance and neutrality in reaching a decision that
affects
individuals’
fundamental
religious
freedom.
But
unlike
in Masterpiece, where a state civil rights commission was found to have acted
without “the neutrality that the Free Exercise Clause requires,” the government
actors in this case will not be held accountable for breaching the First Amendment’s
guarantee of religious neutrality and tolerance. Unlike in Masterpiece, where the
majority considered the state commissioners’ statements about religion to be
persuasive evidence of unconstitutional government action, the majority here
completely sets aside the President’s charged statements about Muslims as
irrelevant.
Id. at 2447 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
72 See, e.g., id. at 2409 (majority opinion) (locating Presidential action “in the context of
international affairs and national security,” and noting the propriety of judicial deference in this
setting); id. at 2419–20 (same, while noting separation of powers concerns).
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The point here is not to get lost in digression, as significant as it absolutely is. It is
instead to affirm the strength of the operative norm pushing the Supreme Court in
Trump v. Hawaii, even the Court’s liberals, to see the dignity of the office of the
President of the United States in a context like the one the travel ban litigation touched
on, and to imagine the Constitution requires greater deference to a processed travel
ban, indeed much greater deference, than the comments of a state administrative
apparatchik, or the silences related to it, by those who are all in the Supreme Court’s
direct constitutional line-of-command. Trump v. Hawaii doesn’t treat Masterpiece
Cakeshop’s anti-discrimination rule as controlling, as many believed it should have,
but that refusal needn’t (doesn’t) (shouldn’t) be imagined to cut short the operation of
an otherwise still quite broadly principled understanding and application of
Masterpiece Cakeshop. One version of the doctrinal schema might thus look like this:
Over here is Masterpiece Cakeshop, with its anti-discrimination rule operating as a
powerful and properly principled ruling, and over there, at the far, outer edge of that
rule’s operation, is Trump v. Hawaii. If that’s how the cases are seen to relate to one
another, and this isn’t to validate either decision, there’s still ample ground on which
Masterpiece Cakeshop’s anti-discrimination rule can and should, as a matter of neutral
principles, function. All that ground is abandoned, all that ground is given up,
however, if Masterpiece Cakeshop is taken to be a narrow, shallow, and modest ruling.
Gone with that understanding is the opportunity to leverage the boomerang-like
quality of Masterpiece Cakeshop as a case about religious discrimination benefitting
many others who belong to other subordinated groups protected by the Constitution
who have constitutionally grounded anti-discrimination claims to make.

B. Masterpiece Cakeshop’s “Shadow Rulings”
Argument to this point has operated by calling the case for reading Masterpiece
Cakeshop as a narrow, shallow, and modest opinion into question by focusing on the
opinion’s central holding that Jack Phillips and Masterpiece Cakeshop were the
victims of unconstitutional state discrimination on the basis of religion. Here the
understanding of the law of the case is expanded based on legal propositions—call
them “shadow rulings”—found within Masterpiece Cakeshop that carry demonstrable
authoritative legal force. As those rulings come into focus, the reasons for doubting
the constitutional channel that Masterpiece Cakeshop cuts is narrow, shallow, or
modest are amplified.
At the outset, it bears repeating that Masterpiece Cakeshop expressly tells its
readers that it is bracketing the “difficult questions” and the deep and broad clashes of
values that the case involves.73 That is partly true. Masterpiece Cakeshop doesn’t
openly air, examine, and settle those “difficult questions” to their fundaments. But the
suggestion entails some misdirection, a ruse. What the opinion brackets, it also
detectably unbrackets—and engages—in important respects.
As Masterpiece Cakeshop characterizes the “difficult questions” it purports to be
placing beyond its reach, it sketches a picture of the U.S. Kulturkampf—with its
recognizable friend/enemy dynamics and partisan, identity-based positions reflecting
very different ways of life—that the Court’s earlier pro-lesbian-and-gay rights
decisions weighed in on. The picture of the Kulturkampf in Masterpiece Cakeshop is
73

Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723 (2018).
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basically the same one supplied by Justice Antonin Scalia in Romer v. Evans, if
normatively updated to function in a new time.74 In one corner, the “difficult
questions” in Masterpiece Cakeshop involve the ongoing struggles for recognition of
the liberty, the equal dignity and worth, and the first-class citizenship status of “gay
persons who are, or wish to be, married.”75 The total victory of the right to marry
project over the basic terms of LGBT rights within this description is unmistakable.
In the other corner are the religious and speech liberty claims advanced by
conservative religionists and traditional moralists whose faithful and moral visions
remain steadfastly opposed to the right-to-marry-centered lesbian and gay rights
program. Thus does the Court’s opinion in Masterpiece Cakeshop frame the conflict
it involves in these highly partisan, oppositional, and concretely personal terms: The
rights and interests of gay persons who were or who wished to be married, like the gay
male couple in the case, Craig and Mullins, with their bids for full and equal access to
public life reflected both in their marriage vows and their claims under Colorado’s
state accommodations law, are pitted against the rights and interests of Phillips and
his cakeshop, the stand-ins for the constitutional rights of faithful conservatives and
traditional moralists who wish to practice and live their sincerely held views and
values and, recalling the First Amendment artistic freedom claim in the case, to speak
artistically through their faithful, moral work.
The Court’s framing of the contest that Masterpiece Cakeshop involves, while not
unproblematic, is not without its uses. 76 High among them is how the Court’s
understanding of the deep and difficult questions the case sits atop is broadly
continuous with how the partisans involved in the case and the broader publics to
which they are responsive and related have likewise tended to view the case, its issues,
and their implications. Indeed, the line-up of the parties and their social identities
subtend the full range of legal and political engagement with the issues that the case
involves outside the constitutional judicial decisional context.
As significantly, the Court’s framing of the difficult questions the case involves
and their partisan-sidedness tracks the Court’s own way of keeping score in relation
to the central ruling and the shadow rulings in the case, which benefit the different
sides of the enduringly deep clashes through offerings that are plainly designed as
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Court has mistaken
a Kulturkampf for a fit of spite. The constitutional amendment before us here is not the
manifestation of a ‘bare . . . desire to harm’ homosexuals, but is rather a modest attempt by
seemingly tolerant Coloradans to preserve traditional sexual mores against the efforts of a
politically powerful minority to revise those mores through use of the laws.” (citation omitted)).
74

75

Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1723.

Not unproblematic in the sense that it leaves to the margins the rights of “gay persons”
who wish to have nothing to do with marriage, as well as of the equal stature and rights of
lesbians, bisexuals, transfolk, and many others with whom they’re allied. It also brackets the
deeper considerations of substantive equality to which LGBT constitutional rights are related.
No less significantly, this perspective is not unproblematic in the sense that it misses the ways
in which people of faith don’t always line up against lesbians and gay men and LGBT equality,
and that even within those communities are found religiously faithful people, and even some
conservative religionists and traditional moralists. See supra note 3. This, of course, also means
that there are LGBT people (and of course conservative religionists and traditional moralists)
on both sides of the Kulturkampf the Court describes.
76
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magnets inviting all the Kulturkampf’s players to identify with the opinion, the Court,
and the Constitution by extension, while recognizing their shared and convergent legal
authority finally to settle the deep clash of values the Kulturkampf involves within a
larger shared national project of Americanness. Neither “side” in the ongoing culture
wars—which are cultural wars, after all—emerges singularly victorious in the case.
No side, with the Court’s aid, vanquishes its foe via the sword of constitutional
justice.77 Far from it, the Court’s opinion doesn’t openly command the warring parties
to beat their own swords into ploughshares.78 What it does do is announce
constitutional promises that invite the parties to accept Masterpiece Cakeshop as
staking out its own reasonable and reasonably balanced accommodations of highly
divergent and antagonistic positions—accommodations that everyone might accept
and respect going forward, de-escalating the conflict and eliminating its most highly
contested aspects from the realm of ordinary law and politics. The war that politics is,
is subtly but recognizably coded as dangerous to the national peace.79
Reflecting these broad aspirations, Masterpiece Cakeshop’s practice of
constitutional lawmaking is both smooth and sticky. Smooth in the serene sense that
Masterpiece Cakeshop means to reduce some of the enduring partisan frictions that
might otherwise manifest, flaring up, both legally and politically in potentially socially
problematic ways. It is sticky, by contrast, in the sense that the decision announces
legal positions that, in their authoritative reasonableness, are meant to hold the Court
to a neutral course somewhere in the middle between, without picking, the
Kulturkampf’s sides, when the Court is asked to flesh out some other aspects of the
decision’s deeper shades of meanings in future cases. As it happens, this stickiness
also supplies what amount to reasons for lower courts and other governmental and
nongovernmental readers to attend to, and to abide, its call for reasonableness. The
multi-sided position mapping Masterpiece Cakeshop does in the shadow of its
religious discrimination ruling is lawmaking in Holmes’s predictive sense. 80

1. The Pro-LGBT Rulings
Begin with what Masterpiece Cakeshop delivers to the Court’s model of lesbians
and gay men—“gay persons who are, or wish to be, married”—along with other “gay
persons” and not-gay others who are nominally situated on this side of the case’s
clash.81 (This opinion is short on intersectional thinking: It doesn’t actively imagine
religious and moral liberals or lesbian and gay conservative religionists or traditional
moralists.) Represented by Craig and Mullins, whose anti-discrimination claim against

77

There are more than two sides, obviously, even if the Court doesn’t recognize them.

78

For this line of thought, see infra Parts II.B–II.D.

This isn’t meant as any kind of categorical embrace of Carl Schmitt’s views on politics.
See generally CARL SCHMITT, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL (George Schwab trans., 1996).
79

80 See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897) (“The
prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by
the law.”).

See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723
(2018).
81
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Phillips and his cakeshop suffers defeat, they receive other rewards, indeed significant
treasure, on the way to that disposition.
At the broadest level, and without forgetting how the Court’s recognition of
Phillips’s constitutional anti-discrimination claim may give them a boost, too,
Masterpiece Cakeshop enthusiastically and repeatedly endorses the decisions in which
the Court has previously announced pro-LGBT equality, dignity, and rights-based
victories. Victories, of course, that reached their high watermark in Obergefell v.
Hodges, and that have promised lesbians and gay men constitutional rank as first-class
citizens entitled to fully equal treatment under law. That line of cases and the
principles they have announced are, in fact, both the occasion for Masterpiece
Cakeshop, and, notwithstanding the victory Phillips achieves in the case, its ongoing
doctrinal teaching.
There is plenty to criticize in this, and not only from conservative religious or
traditionally moralistic points of view. Powerful critiques have already been offered
of the normativities that undergird and animate the Court’s pro-lesbian-and-gay
rulings, variously focusing on how these gains have been accomplished as a result of
the Court’s endorsement of ideologically driven and hierarchically inflected thinking
about sex, sexuality, race, ethnicity, and class, among other grounds.82 Recognizing
the formal equality conventionalism of existing lesbian and gay rights under the
federal Constitution, hence the constitutional parity between same-sex and cross-sex
relationships and marriages, and lesbians and gay men and heterosexuals more
generally, which Masterpiece Cakeshop fortifies, there is no denying the widely
recognized significance and value of the decision’s reaffirmation of the Court’s
lesbian and gay rights jurisprudence by those who have in the past and by those who
may in the future wish to arrange their lives in relation to these normative intimacyfocused marks, and by those who likewise see that the politically liberal state can have
no good reason for nonneutrally excluding lesbians and gay men and same-sex couples
from the traditional institutions of public and private life.
While, from one perspective, the gain here may appear minimal and formalistic—
exactly what one would not just insist upon but take for granted based on ordinary
applications of stare decisis—Masterpiece Cakeshop’s reaffirmation of the Court’s
existing lesbian and gay rights jurisprudence mustn’t be too quickly dismissed. For
Masterpiece Cakeshop to make clear that the Supreme Court’s lesbian and gay rights
caselaw is robustly good law is highly significant. This is not simply because of the
powerful dissents filed from that positive jurisprudence, including in Obergefell,
which insisted in different ways, often in eruptive rhetoric, that none of these cases is
constitutionally legitimate, all, and perhaps none more so than Obergefell, being
wholly lawless power grabs by Justices described as hellbent on dominating the nation
82 These perspectives are variously reflected in, among other sources, Katherine M. Franke,
The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1399 (2004); R.A.
Lenhardt, Race, Dignity, and the Right to Marry, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 53 (2015); Alexander
Nourafshan & Angela Onwuachi-Willig, From Outsider to Insider and Outsider Again: Interest
Convergence and the Normalization of LGBT Identity, 42 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 521 (2015);
Praatika Prasad, More Color More Pride: Addressing Structural Barriers to Interracial LGBTQ
Loving, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. ONLINE 89 (2018); Russell K. Robinson, Marriage Equality &
Postracialism, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1010 (2014); Marc Spindelman, Tyrone Garner’s Lawrence
v. Texas, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1111 (2013).
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and its politics through imperial and imperious acts of judicial will that have forced
lesbian and gay rights—including a right to same-sex marriage—on an American
people that had not democratically supported them.83
Notably, Obergefell’s slim, one-vote margin of decision and its anti-originalist
methodology placed it and the rights it protects—and in a way, potentially, all the
cases it built on—squarely in the cross-hairs of a majority of the Supreme Court that,
even as Masterpiece Cakeshop was being decided, was on the precipice of a
conservative lurch away from the centering Justice Kennedy had provided since
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s retirement (and sometimes before).84 Against this,
Masterpiece Cakeshop’s approval of Obergefell and the Court’s earlier pro-lesbianand-gay rights jurisprudence by extension have the look and feel of an institutional
commitment that entails an important compromise. Justices who dissented from
Obergefell (or who might have been expected to had they been on the Court when it
was decided) have now signaled, by joining Justice Kennedy’s Masterpiece Cakeshop
opinion and by staying their hands in separate opinions filed in the case, where they
might have reserved judgment on the prospect of revisiting the Court’s lesbian and
gay rights jurisprudence, that this body of constitutional law has garnered the entire
Court’s authoritative respect. Whatever concerns existed about Obergefell’s ongoing
authority after the 2016 presidential elections, Masterpiece Cakeshop gives reasons
for thinking they may be, at least somewhat, put to rest. The entire Court—save Justice
Kavanaugh, Justice Kennedy’s replacement, who may have his own reasons to honor
Justice Kennedy’s lesbian and gay rights legacy jurisprudence—has now openly
joined an opinion that figures Obergefell and its understanding of the right to marry
as settled constitutional law. What’s more, this perspective is powerfully endorsed by
an opinion that prominently highlights the significance of official silences in the face
of spoken words as being constitutionally dispositive.85

83

The Obergefell dissents are critically engaged along these lines in Marc Spindelman,
Obergefell’s Dreams, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 1039 (2016) [hereinafter, Spindelman, Obergefell’s
Dreams], but both Chief Justice John Roberts’ dissent, and, more vividly on the surface of the
text, Justice Antonin Scalia’s dissent make the relevant points. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges,
135 S. Ct. 2584, 2612, 2621, 2626 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (emphasizing Obergefell’s
anti-democratic and extra-constitutional grounding); id. at 2626, 2627, 2629–31 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (same).
84

Recognizing that Obergefell is anti-originalist as to method and outcome, as the Obergefell
dissents point out, on which, see generally Spindelman, Obergefell’s Dreams, supra note 83,
the majority opinion in the case does not give up the cause of linking the reasons for its holding
to history, including constitutional history. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584,
2593–94 (2015) (noting “transcendent importance of marriage” in “the annals of human
history,” commenting on its transformative powers “[s]ince the dawn of history,” and
recognizing how the claims are part of an understanding of history as living); id. at 2595
(observing that marriage’s history “is one of both continuity and change”); id. at 2598
(commenting that the Founders “did not presume to know the extent of freedom in all of its
dimensions, and so . . . entrusted to future generations a charter protecting the right of all persons
to enjoy liberty as we learn its meaning”); id. at 2598–602 (reasoning from the constitutional
protections accorded to cross-sex marriage that same-sex marriages are just like it in terms of
marriage’s basic attributes).
85

See supra text accompanying notes 49–51.
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However superficially uninteresting Masterpiece Cakeshop’s adherence to
principles of stare decisis may seem, the controversial nature of the Supreme Court’s
lesbian and gay rights jurisprudence and Masterpiece Cakeshop’s endorsement of it is
nevertheless a major achievement. Nothing in Masterpiece Cakeshop prevents the
winds of uncertainty about the future of the Court’s lesbian and gay rights
jurisprudence, including Obergefell, to begin to turn again, particularly if the Supreme
Court begins to cut back on individual rights decisions in the closely doctrinally
related area of reproductive rights. But in a ruling that technically did not require it,
Masterpiece Cakeshop’s assurances that the Supreme Court jurisprudence of lesbian
and gay rights, including Obergefell, is sound, is part of the law of the case that must
not be missed or ignored. The constitutional rights of those inside the LGBT
communities—including the right to marry—remain rights of equal dignity, respect,
and first-class citizenship rank. So teaches Masterpiece Cakeshop.
And that’s hardly all that Masterpiece Cakeshop offers to lesbians and gay men.
Related to the way it secures the existing constitutional infrastructure of lesbian and
gay rights, Masterpiece Cakeshop makes clear that the Court remains constitutionally
committed to the basic structures of existing anti-discrimination laws.86
Masterpiece Cakeshop’s express insistence that it is not weighing in on the
“difficult” question of how to settle the deep clash of civic equality and religious or
moral values notwithstanding, the opinion describes the longstanding practice of
translating constitutional equality norms into positive law, anti-discrimination rules as
constitutionally “unexceptional”—even in the face of First Amendment religious
liberty challenges to it.87 Indeed, Masterpiece Cakeshop returns to this theme over and
86

A more emphatic articulation of the point, which reaches the conclusion in its own way, is
in NeJaime & Siegel, Religious Exemptions and Antidiscrimination Law in Masterpiece
Cakeshop, supra note 2, at 203: “Masterpiece Cakeshop is not a narrow opinion that avoids
fundamental questions about the relationship between antidiscrimination law and religious
liberty; rather, the opinion offers a resounding answer to a full-bore challenge to public
accommodations law.”
87 Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1723, 1728. The same holds true in the face of First
Amendment speech-based challenges on behalf of artistic freedom, on which see infra Part
I.B.3. Recalling the double meaning of the “unexceptionality” of these anti-discrimination rules,
their non-extraordinariness might render them either safeguarded against or distinctively
vulnerable to constitutional challenge, on the thought that there’s nothing unusually special
about them. Noting this vulnerability may be prophetic, though the text of Masterpiece
Cakeshop reads as seeking to stabilize, not undermine, the protections against discrimination
that anti-discrimination laws provide lesbians and gay men. See, e.g., id. at 1728 (“It is
unexceptional that Colorado law can protect gay persons, just as it can protect other classes of
individuals, in acquiring whatever products and services they choose on the same terms and
conditions as are offered to other members of the public.”). Accord NeJaime & Siegel, Religious
Exemptions and Antidiscrimination Law in Masterpiece Cakeshop, supra note 2, at 208
(describing the Court’s opinion as “treat[ing] lesbian and gay individuals as full members of the
national community deserving of equal protection from discrimination,” and noting that “[t]he
Court accomplishes this by analyzing the case as presenting an ordinary question of public
accommodations law”); Sager & Tebbe, supra note 66, at 174 (characterizing as “constitutional
bedrock” Masterpiece Cakeshop’s observation that “it is a general rule that [religious and
philosophical] objections do not allow business owners and other actors in the economy and in
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over again, always more or less to the same basic effect, as the deep logic of the
opinion itself suggests. Just as religious and moral views and values must not interfere
with neutral and general constitutional rules of lesbian and gay equality—including in
the marriage setting—and just as the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause provides
no religious freedom exceptions to those constitutional obligations, so, too, in the
context of anti-discrimination norms: Legislative commitments to the first-class
citizenship status of lesbians and gay men and their rights to equal dignity and respect,
as expressed in positive law rules of neutral and general applicability, hold against
First Amendment religious freedom challenges to them.
An initial sense of this perspective emerges even as Masterpiece Cakeshop is
found saying, early on, it won’t be engaging the “difficult” questions involving the
deep clashes of public values around equality and religious liberties the case entails.
As it says this, the opinion goes out of its way to highlight the “difficulties” it believes
would attend announcing a valid religious freedom claim as a defense to the ordinary
operations of a public accommodations/anti-discrimination regime like Colorado’s.
The permutations of First Amendment free exercise claims in this setting, the Court
explains, “seem all but endless.”88 Endless they might be, were the Court ever to
recognize that a right to religious freedom conditions, hence limits, the exercise of
neutral and generally applicable anti-discrimination protections under law. But the
problem the Court is identifying at this juncture goes beyond its implicit configuration
of a problem of judicially manageable (or unmanageable) standards in the face of the
possibility of readily proliferating religious liberty claims. Those constitutional
challenges must be set against the highly serviceable and simple rule of regularity that
has governed in this arena, and generally, for some time. As the Court characterizes
the normal constitutional rule: “The Court’s precedents make clear that the baker, in
his capacity as the owner of a business serving the public, might have his right to the
free exercise of religion limited by generally applicable laws.” 89
This use of “might”90—the baker “might have his right to the free exercise of
religion limited by generally applicable laws”91—may initially sound like a hedge on
what “the Court’s precedents [otherwise] make clear[.]”92 Viewed this way, it is
interesting that the Court declines at this precise textual moment to cite the most
obvious and relevant precedent for its point, Employment Division, Department of

society to deny protected persons equal access to goods and services under a neutral and
generally applicable public accommodations law” (quoting Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct.
at 1727)).
88

Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1723.

89

Id. at 1723–24.

90

Id. at 1724.

91

Id.

92

Id. at 1723.
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Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith93 or any other decision announcing the
constitutional rule that “[t]he Court’s precedents make clear.” 94
One possible explanation for this elision arrives in Justice Neil Gorsuch’s separate
concurring opinion. Justice Gorsuch’s opinion emphasizes the controversy that Smith
has engendered “in many quarters”95 as a prelude to its own careful description of
Smith’s scope. As the concurrence puts it, providing an opening for just the sort of
exception Masterpiece Cakeshop potentially involved, “this Court held that a neutral
and generally applicable law will usually survive a constitutional free exercise
challenge.”96
Looking at the Court’s Masterpiece Cakeshop opinion in light of Justice Gorsuch’s
concurrence, it could be that the majority opinion’s studious avoidance of Smith and
the family of cases associated with it is an element of what Walter Murphy felicitously
dubbed “judicial strategy.”97 It could be part of an underlying project that responds to
sensitivities that Justice Gorsuch’s separate opinion or one or more of the other justices
making up the Court’s majority expressed, a vote-getting or vote-holding move.
Another understanding of the majority opinion’s elision of Smith and the
precedents to which it’s related is also in sight. When Masterpiece Cakeshop observes
that Phillips-the-baker “might”98 have his religious freedom rights curtailed by the
state through its anti-discrimination laws, it may well be doing nothing more than
characterizing Smith’s rule while carefully noting that it operates in part by giving the
state a constitutional permission about how it legislates against discrimination.
Consistent with Smith, the state must not purposefully discriminate against religion
when enacting neutral anti-discrimination rules of general applicability. But those
laws “might” nevertheless contain within them safe harbors for the free exercise of
93 Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Smith is cited by
the majority opinion in its description of the Administrative Law Judge’s ruling in the case.
Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1726. It is also cited in the Court’s description of
proceedings in the Colorado Court of Appeals. Id. at 1727.
94

Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1723.

95

Id. at 1734 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).

96

Id. (emphasis added).

97

See generally WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY (1964). Consider
Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 139 S. Ct. 634, 637 (2019) (mem.) (Alito, J., concurring in
the denial of certiorari) (discussing Smith as having “drastically cut back on the protection
provided by the Free Exercise Clause”). See also Linda Greenhouse, The Court and the Cross,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/14/opinion/supreme-courtreligion-first-amendment.html (“The court’s most conservative justices — Samuel Alito,
Clarence Thomas, Neil Gorsuch, and Brett Kavanaugh — are currently trolling for a case that
would provide a vehicle for reinterpreting the Free Exercise Clause to give the same robust
protection for believers as the statute [the Religious Freedom Restoration Act], in the court’s
view, currently does. Achieving that goal means overturning a 1990 precedent, Employment
Division v. Smith[.]”). See also, e.g., Laycock, Broader Implications of Masterpiece Cakeshop,
supra note 2, at 201 (“Some religious conservatives look forward to Smith being overruled. That
could happen; four Justices recently invited litigants to explicitly present the question.”).
98

Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1723–24.
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religion, which function to limit the anti-discrimination rubric’s ordinary sweep.99 The
Court here, then, may simply be expressing the obvious: that states might, as Colorado
did, enact neutral and general public accommodations rules that govern all businesses
serving the public without exception. Business owners like Phillips, whose faith might
counsel action that would violate public accommodations rules, might in those
circumstances be required to abide by the neutral and general rules which regulate
them “in [their] capacit[ies] as the owner[s] of . . . business[es] serving the public.” 100
In the alternative, the states “might” instead choose to carve out exceptions in their
public accommodations statutes for religious or moral views and values, enabling
those who sincerely adhere to them, say, to have a valid defense against what would
otherwise be a claim or liability for unlawful discrimination. Seen this way, the
Court’s opinion is a simple and straightforward invocation and endorsement of Smith
and its teaching.
Although this may sound strange, both possibilities may be right in this instance.
It might both be significant and not significant at all that Masterpiece Cakeshop avoids
invoking Smith and the cases related to it by name at this moment when the Court
could obviously lean on their authority. That it doesn’t flags the enduringly significant
issue of Masterpiece Cakeshop’s meaning in relation to Smith. On this score, there’s
much more to Masterpiece Cakeshop than its invocation (not citation) of Smith’s rule
as both “clear” and well-settled law.
Among the more potent facts in evidence in Masterpiece Cakeshop is the way the
opinion builds on and reinforces Smith’s basic structure, and in particular, Smith’s
view that the state may regulate religious and moral practices along with their secular
counterparts without running afoul of the First Amendment—so long as it produces
and adheres to neutral rules of general applicability that don’t purposefully
discriminate against religious and moral conduct, or religious or moral actors, because
of their religious or moral views and values.
Masterpiece Cakeshop’s basic alignment with this understanding of Smith is easily
obscured by the Court’s own representation of its decision in the case, amplified by
those who see it as a narrow, shallow, and modest decision, involving only what is
sometimes regarded as an exception to Smith’s rule: a stand-alone anti-religious
discrimination claim against the state of Colorado.101 The opinion’s idea here is that
99 Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 669 (2010) (“CLS . . . seeks not parity
with other organizations, but a preferential exemption from Hastings’ policy. The First
Amendment shields CLS against state prohibition of the organization’s expressive activity,
however exclusionary that activity may be. But CLS enjoys no constitutional right to state
subvention of its selectivity.”); id. at 694 n.24 (“The question here, however, is not whether
Hastings could, consistent with the Constitution, provide religious groups dispensation from the
all-comers policy by permitting them to restrict membership to those who share their faith. It is
instead whether Hastings must grant that exemption.”).
100

Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1723–24.

101

See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546–47 (1993).
Lukumi is cited in the majority opinion, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1730, 1731,
including for the important proposition “that the government, if it is to respect the Constitution’s
guarantee of free exercise, cannot impose regulations that are hostile to the religious beliefs of
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Colorado breached its constitutional obligation to avoid religious discrimination when
its agents, during the course of enforcement proceedings involving what happens to
have been the state’s public accommodations laws, revealed their anti-religious bias
while in different ways also remaining inappropriately silent in the face of it.
What this account of Masterpiece Cakeshop achieves in simplicity it loses in its
capacity to explain how Masterpiece Cakeshop reaffirms and extends the promises of
Smith and its rules.
The thinking here is not complex. Masterpiece Cakeshop teaches that laws of
general applicability must not only be neutral in the abstract and in their initial
promulgation, but that they must steadfastly remain neutral throughout the course of
their actual operations. When they do not, when they “even ‘subtl[y] depart[] from
neutrality’ on matters of religion”102—as the record in Masterpiece Cakeshop
indicates to the Court is what took place in this case—the state will be held to have
violated its “obligation of religious neutrality”103 under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.
This shift in perspective here is conceptually small, but significant in terms of its
implications. Seen this way, Masterpiece Cakeshop is not merely about the
constitutional wrongfulness of statements and silences amounting to state
discrimination against a person of faith, much as that is involved in the case.
Masterpiece Cakeshop is an object lesson about both the constitutional wrongfulness
and the constitutional propriety of state laws written consistent with Smith and how
those laws function in action. Masterpiece Cakeshop is very strict with the state in
order to exact compliance with the constitutional guarantee of state neutrality with
respect to religion under Smith. When the state truly remains neutral the ways that
Smith and now Masterpiece Cakeshop instruct that it must, it may continue to bar
discrimination in public accommodations through a unitary and general rule of
conduct that governs “business[es] serving the public”—even when they’re owned
and operated by people of deep religious faith or by traditional moralists of a different
stripe.104 Masterpiece Cakeshop hammers the state proceedings in the case in a way
that effectively defends the ongoing constitutional tenability of anti-discrimination
regimes like Colorado’s that regulate, while seeking to guarantee, broad equal access
to public accommodations on various non-discrimination grounds.
While this is partly an argument from—and of—interpretive atmospherics,
passages emerge at various points in Masterpiece Cakeshop that condense and
sediment the understanding.105 In one important passage, for instance, in which the

affected citizens and cannot act in a manner that passes judgment upon or presupposes the
illegitimacy of religious beliefs and practices.” Id. at 1731. The opinion then clarifies that “even
‘subtle departures from neutrality’ on matters of religion” are “bar[red],” id., continuing by
explaining that, “[h]ere, this means that the Commission was obliged under the Free Exercise
Clause to proceed in a manner neutral toward and tolerant of Phillips’ religious beliefs.” Id.
102

Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1731.

103

Id. at 1723.

104

See id. at 1724, 1727–29.

105

See, for instance, supra text accompanying note 98.
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Court’s text is working overtime to keep up the appearance of solidarity with both of
the ways of life it understands to be warring in the case, the Court remarks that “[i]t is
unexceptional that Colorado law can protect gay persons, just as it can protect other
classes of individuals, in acquiring whatever products and services they choose on the
same terms and conditions as are offered to other members of the public.”106 This is
the Court speaking plainly to what it regards as the Constitution’s, hence the positive
law’s, “normal science”: Positive law civil rights protections are part and parcel of our
shared political life and in accord with its deepest values.107 So long as these rules
satisfy conditions of religious neutrality, they are not subject to constitutional doubt.
“Unexceptional” means just that. Here the Court illustrates the difficulty that religious
liberty arguments recommending constitutional limits on what is otherwise
unexceptional will and should face in the courts. So far, Smith and anti-discrimination
rules enacted and enforced consistent with it, hold.
Leading arguments for Phillips’s position in Masterpiece Cakeshop affirmed
without calling into question the authority of these basic constitutional and positive
law conventions, treating them as axiomatic in our constitutional regime. Thus did
supporters of Phillips’s position have to try to thread what they sought to describe as
a very small eye of a very sharp needle, mounting religious liberty claims that would
not blow a big constitutional hole through public accommodations rules like
Colorado’s. Consistent with this thinking were ideas in the case about how public
accommodations rules might apply to the off-the-shelf baked goods that religious
bakers made, but not to those goods that were custom-made for events like
weddings.108 Only the custom-made items, not “premade baked items,” were to be
given First Amendment religious liberty protections.109
This purportedly circumscribed religious liberty claim even in this purportedly
circumscribed form involved a roll-back of Smith’s authorization of state action
106

Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1728.

On “normal science,” see Kathryn Abrams, Introduction, The Distinctive Energies of
“Normal Science,” 9 ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 1, 5 (2011) (citing Angela P. Harris, What
Ever Happened to Feminist Legal Theory?, 9 ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 12 (2011), which
itself draws the metaphor from THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS
(1962)).
107

108 Compare Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1726 (“The investigation found that
Phillips had declined to sell custom wedding cakes to about six other same-sex couples on this
basis. The investigator also recounted that, according to affidavits submitted by Craig and
Mullins, Phillips’ shop had refused to sell cupcakes to a lesbian couple for their commitment
celebration because the shop ‘had a policy of not selling baked goods to same-sex couples for
this type of event.’”), with Brief of Petitioners at 9, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719
(2018) (No. 16–111) (“These limitations on Phillips’s custom work have no bearing on his
premade baked items, which he sells to everyone, no questions asked.”), and with Masterpiece
Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1740 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(noting that “the Colorado Court of Appeals resolved [a] factual dispute [about “whether
Phillips refused to create a custom wedding cake for the individual respondents, or whether he
refused to sell them any wedding cake (including a premade one)”] in Phillips’ favor.”).
109 Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1728; Brief of Petitioners, supra note 108, at 9
(“These limitations on Phillips’s custom work have no bearing on his premade baked items,
which he sells to everyone, no questions asked.”).
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regulating religious practice consistent with neutral rules of general applicability.
Understanding this, Masterpiece Cakeshop shoots back against this position with
respectful constitutional doubt. A “decision in favor of the baker” 110 that created a
new, constitutionally grounded religious freedom exception to the state’s public
accommodations rules “would have to be sufficiently constrained, lest all purveyors
of goods and services who object to gay marriages for moral and religious reasons in
effect be allowed to put up signs saying ‘no goods or services will be sold if they will
be used for gay marriages,’ something that would impose a serious stigma on gay
persons.”111
The Court’s careful locution technically leaves open the prospect that a
“sufficiently constrained” claim of just this sort might be proposed to and accepted by
the Court in a future case. To succeed, the Court would have to perceive, as it did not
in Masterpiece Cakeshop, a meaningful constitutional offramp. Emphasizing the
Court’s expressive care here risks missing the degree to which Masterpiece Cakeshop
itself discounts the prospect of the Court finding, then affirming, such a “sufficiently
constrained” argument. The Court, after all, had before it the best and most
“constrained” arguments that supporters of religious liberty, representing Jack Phillips
and Masterpiece Cakeshop, could come up with. Faced with those arguments,
constructed by some of the cultural conservative movement’s best and brightest
lawyers, the Court was not moved to accept them. Presumably, the Court knew what
it would be committing itself to doing if it did so. It would have been starting itself
down a path that would immediately commit it to limiting Smith, hence undermining
its foundations, potentially paving the way of its overruling, while also—this is
important in light of what Masterpiece Cakeshop says—authorizing a return to an
open season of public discrimination against gay marriage that, in the Court’s words,
“would impose a serious stigma on [lesbian and] gay persons.” 112
In the age of Obergefell—which Masterpiece Cakeshop preserves, hence
continues—First Amendment religious freedom ought not be understood to include a
constitutional right to practice anti-lesbian and anti-gay discrimination that the
Constitution forbids the state to impose. Just as lesbians and gay men, married and
not, are themselves constitutionally guaranteed freedom from state discrimination in
a range of aspects of state-regulated life, they may also be granted, hence enjoy, broad
and basic anti-discrimination protections that shore up their constitutional equality,
dignity, and liberty rights—free from judicial interference in the name recognizing
and vindicating First Amendment rights to religious or moral free exercise.113
All this in Masterpiece Cakeshop is a function not only of the Court’s own general
understandings of the relationship between legal and constitutional equality and
religious freedom norms, but also, more particularly, as a function of the meaning and
implication of the Supreme Court’s lesbian and gay rights jurisprudence, a body of
law that, much to the bitter disappointment of some faithful conservatives and
110

Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1728.

111

Id. at 1728–29.

112

Id. at 1729.

113

But see Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 643, 659 (2000). This makes Dale an
outlier.
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traditional moralists, has effectively blocked the operation of religious and moral
views and values in the political, hence the legal, realm, where they long supported
laws and legal rules that actively discriminated against and stigmatized lesbians and
gay men. In vital respects that Masterpiece Cakeshop reaffirms, the Supreme Court’s
lesbian and gay rights jurisprudence, including Obergefell, has, after all, announced a
highly politically liberal view of the state’s normative relation to lesbian and gay rights
and lesbians and gay men. Nothing may stop religious or moral views on the status of
homosexuality from being expressed in the public arena, but those views, however
else they circulate, cannot become the basis for anti-lesbian and anti-gay state
regulation. It is partly with views like these in mind that Masterpiece Cakeshop
proposes that: “Our society” (and not just the Court) “has come to” recognize that
rules of law, including those that are religiously or morally driven, that would treat
“gay persons and gay couples . . . as social outcasts or as inferior in dignity and worth”
impinge upon the freedoms lesbians and gay persons must be allowed “in the exercise
of their civil rights.”114 Courts and other governmental actors are duty-bound to give
the civil rights and freedoms lesbians and gay men are entitled to both “great weight
and respect,” respect that isn’t cross-cut or diminished by constitutional respect for
religious views and moral values.115
This being the deeply liberal structure of the Court’s lesbian and gay rights
jurisprudence, now reaffirmed by Masterpiece Cakeshop, it stands to reason that this
constitutional rights framework would find structurally analogous expression in the
positive-law anti-discrimination setting. As the Court notes, the state is authorized to
regulate private actors in ways that conform to the constitutional rules of civil society
that the state itself must abide. By extension, just as constitutional norms of lesbian
and gay equality rights—rights the Court has given expression in both neutral and
generally applicable ways—are not subject to an override by the state in the name of
religion or of morality, those claims having no constitutional force against lesbian and
gay rights in the political realm, there is likewise to be no constitutionally based
religious freedom exception that would cut short the operation of positive law antidiscrimination rules for reasons of faith or morality. This understanding of what
Masterpiece Cakeshop proposes exfoliates the Court’s position that positive law antidiscrimination rules, including when they bar anti-gay discrimination by private
actors, are “unexceptional” and remain “unexceptional” when applied to, hence
regulate, faithful and moral action on the same terms applied to all other forms of
public conduct. Nor, one might think, could it be otherwise, if the structure of
constitutional governance rules is effectively to ensure lesbians and gay men get the
equal dignity and worth, first-class citizenship rights, and individual liberty they
deserve.
To repeat, this does not mean that people acting from their faith-based or moral
commitments who stand opposed to homosexuality and to same-sex intimacies and
relationships may not hold to their views and express them in the public arena.
Obergefell expressly confirms that right and nothing in Masterpiece Cakeshop takes

114

Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1727.

115

Id.
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it away.116 But expression is one thing and translation of that expression into
discriminatory action is another. So, as faithful conservatives and traditional moralists
have no First Amendment religious right to translate their opposition to homosexuality
into policy that would serve to govern, so, too, they may not govern lesbians and gay
men through their interpersonal and public conduct in those jurisdictions that, like
Colorado, have legally constrained it. The First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause is
in this respect not a source of a political right: No right to translate religious or
traditional moral views and values against homosexuality into law and no right to
translate them into a legal exception to the operation of neutral and generally
applicable anti-discrimination laws that conform to the demands of Smith. Though
deeply politically liberal in its orientation, this approach to the rights of the faithful
and of traditional moralists is no warrant to discriminate against them in the
enforcement of existing anti-discrimination rules. And while some very particular and
very limited constitutional incursions on the rights of lesbians and gay men may be
tolerated in order to protect the rights of the faithful and of traditional moralists—more
about which momentarily—the general pattern set that Masterpiece Cakeshop
confirms, broadly but not rigidly and not without exception to balance it out, is deeply
pro-lesbian-and-gay.
Recognizing that Masterpiece Cakeshop does not finally settle these matters in all
their particulars, indeed, acknowledging that the opinion formally leaves open the
narrow question of whether there might be some “sufficiently constrained” Free
Exercise right that may yet be articulated that will not cut too deeply into the regular
operation of public accommodations and other anti-discrimination laws, the Court’s
opinion in the case insists on the basic security of both constitutional and positive law
anti-discrimination claims that lesbians and gay men enjoy, if not as commonly as
many would like.117 Consistent with Masterpiece Cakeshop, no argument will prevail
against these claims of right that does not preserve them in their basic and broad
operation, lest the Court begin to unwind its lesbian and gay rights jurisprudence,
allowing private actors acting for religious or moral reasons to stigmatize lesbians and
gay men by excluding them from ordinary aspects of public life. From this starting
point, it would be easy to imagine other politically based, anti-gay attacks being
defended in the name of religious freedom from the Court’s own constitutionally
grounded anti-discrimination rules. Masterpiece Cakeshop promises the Court won’t
walk this path.

116 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015) (“The First Amendment ensures
that religious organizations and persons are given proper protection as they seek to teach the
principles that are so fulfilling and so central to their lives and faiths, and to their own deep
aspirations to continue the family structure they have long revered. The same is true of those
who oppose same-sex marriage for other reasons. In turn, those who believe allowing same-sex
marriage is proper or indeed essential . . . may engage those who disagree with their view in an
open and searching debate.”).
117 For some of these limits, consider Adam Liptak, Supreme Court to Decide Whether
Landmark Civil Rights Law Applies to Gay and Transgender Workers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23,
2019, at A1. See infra note 210.
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2. The Pro-Faith and Pro-Traditional-Morality Rulings
All that is what lesbians and gay men—and others concerned with civil rights, civil
liberties, and civil justice—receive. What about faithful conservatives and traditional
moralists? What does Masterpiece Cakeshop give them?
In general terms, to return to Masterpiece Cakeshop’s central holding, the Court’s
opinion promises that constitutionally unexceptional public accommodations and antidiscrimination regimes like Colorado’s will be meaningfully neutral both on their face
and in operation. These regimes must not come at the expense of faithful conservatives
or traditional moralists and their own constitutional entitlements to equal dignity,
respect, and full membership in political community. Masterpiece Cakeshop
announces that the Supreme Court is now on watch in a renewed, activated way over
the vast operations of the legal system, prepared to protect faithful conservatives and
traditional moralists from the vicissitudes of state discrimination against them because
of their religious and moral views, values, and beliefs. Liberal secular views and
sensitivities, which may in certain respects themselves be constitutionally required,
must not blunt the state’s and its agents’ capacities for understanding and treating
conservative religionists and traditional moralists with equal concern and respect—
even, or perhaps especially, when they are charged with violating anti-discrimination
rules. But these promises, which include the elevation of a conservative religious and
moralistic perspective to the level of a constitutional norm that constrains the
deployment of state power, are not the only promises that Masterpiece Cakeshop
makes to them.
Perhaps most significantly, over and above the central ruling in the case, is how
Masterpiece Cakeshop concretely delivers a First Amendment Free Exercise ruling on
the rights of clergy to practice their faith when serving as civil marriage officiants.
The articulation of this rule—part of a long-assumed axiom of First Amendment
religious liberty—marks an important outer limit of the Supreme Court’s pro-lesbianand-gay jurisprudence,118 and one that also potentially supplies a foothold against it
for any future attempt seeking to claw back pro-lesbian-and-gay constitutional gains.
Masterpiece Cakeshop’s declaration about the rights of clergy serving as civil
marriage officiants arrives against the backdrop of Obergefell. Although Justice
Kennedy’s majority opinion in Obergefell went out of its way to insist that its rightto-marry ruling was no knock against religion, a number of its readers, building on the
Obergefell dissents, saw it as a deeply politically liberal decision the secular liberal
impulses of which were insensitive, indeed hostile, to religion and traditional
morality.119 At the sharpest edges of these concerns was the prospect that Obergefell’s
118

See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Douglas Laycock et al. in Support of Petitioners at 30,
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574) [hereinafter Laycock,
Obergefell Brief] (indicating that the “broader principle” on which Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical
Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (2012), “rests” “plainly covers [a]
religious body’s definition of marriage and its willingness or unwillingness to solemnize or
celebrate a marriage, or provide the space for doing so.”).
119 See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2594, 2607 (making the point that the opinion intends respect
for religious views and values). For perceptions of Obergefell’s actual insensitivity and hostility
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“transformation” of civil marriage, “a keystone” of the social order, might fully
secularize it, and, in the process, diminish or eliminate the clergy’s rights to be
involved with it on faithful terms.120
Alarmist as they may sound, these concerns are within Obergefell’s doctrinal
reach in ways that Justice Antonin Scalia anticipated during oral arguments in the
case.121 Obergefell’s central holding, constitutionally prohibiting the state from
differentiating between same-sex and cross-sex couples for civil marriage purposes,
technically operates by limiting the state’s authority over civil marriage through cases
brought against various state agents. That Obergefell’s limits on the state’s authority
over civil marriage apply equally to state and state agents alike was dramatically
reinforced after the decision came down when various state actors from different
jurisdictions, objecting to the ruling, sought to evade its strictures on religious and/or
moral grounds.122 The official decisions variously requiring those agents to submit to
Obergefell’s authority spotlighted a prospect that could independently be perceived:
that clergy who receive their legal authority to consecrate civil marriage from the state,

to religion and traditional morality expressed by the Obergefell dissents, see, for example, id.
at 2625 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (discussing some of the “serious questions about religious
liberty” the majority opinion raises, and observing that “[t]he First Amendment guarantees . . .
the freedom to ‘exercise’ religion. Ominously, that is not a word the majority uses.”); id. at
2638–39 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting Obergefell’s threats to religious liberty); id. at 2642
(Alito, J., dissenting) (suggesting Obergefell will “be used to vilify Americans who are
unwilling to assent to the new orthodoxy” and leveraged to “stamp out every vestige of dissent,”
except perhaps “whisper[ing] their thoughts in the recesses of their homes”). An impassioned
sense of the secular, anti-religious stakes of Obergefell, traceable to the goals of the
“homosexual rights advocates” behind it, is found in Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Wreckage of
Obergefell, FIRST THINGS, Oct. 2015, at 33, 36 (“If same-sex marriage is, as the Court has now
said, a fundamental constitutional liberty, those who resist it are like segregationists resisting
Brown v. Board of Education—forces of evil to be extirpated. Civil rights laws provide the
bulldozer for eliminating such views. . . . The[] goal of [“[h]omosexual rights advocates”] is to
stigmatize, delegitimize, and quickly extinguish opposition to the new norm, especially dissent
grounded in religious conviction. They avowedly seek to run traditional religious views off the
field.”).
120 The quoted language is from Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2595 (“These and other
developments in the institution of marriage over the past centuries . . . worked deep
transformations in its structure, affecting aspects of marriage long viewed by many as
essential.”); id. at 2590 (“[M]arriage is a keystone of the Nation’s social order.”).
121

See Transcript of Oral Argument at 23–27, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (No. 14–556).

122 See, e.g., BILLY CORRIHER, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, A HANDFUL OF ELECTED STATE
JUDGES CONTINUE TO DENY MARRIAGE EQUALITY (2015), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/11/30105912/JudgesMarriageDefiance-brief2.pdf; The Editorial Board,
Illegal Defiance on Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/10/opinion/illegal-defiance-on-same-sex-marriage.html
(collecting a few examples).
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might, as state agents in this limited respect, be similarly compelled to recognize that
Obergefell was their “Ruler,” too.123
Prominent among the forms of resistance to these prospects were state law reform
efforts expressly authorizing clergy generally licensed by state law to perform civil
marriages to refuse to do so in cases of same-sex marriage.124 One problem with these
measures was how they flouted what many understood to be Obergefell’s command.
Problematically, they imagined the state retained the authority even after Obergefell
to license (at least some of) its agents to do what it itself could not: discriminate for
religious and/or moral reasons between same-sex and cross-sex couples who wished
to marry.125
Against the prospects of the unconstitutionality of these measures, which
underlined the case for Obergefell’s threat to the rights of clergy acting as civil
marriage officiants, many remained certain that nothing in Obergefell generated any
actual instability around the free exercise rights of clergy to refuse to perform civil
marriages in contravention of their faith. Those who saw matters this way found
support in the comprehensive responses offered to Justice Scalia’s concerns at the time
he expressed them. After he first raised a question at oral arguments about ministerial
rights to refuse participation in same-sex marriages, Justices Stephen Breyer and Elena
Kagan joined cause to remind him and those who shared his concerns that the clergy
had in fact long been understood to enjoy a First Amendment free exercise right not
to celebrate marriages for couples of different faiths.126 That being the case, their
remarks suggested, any decision in Obergefell affirming the right to marry for samesex couples would surely not operate to restrict clergy rights to decide whether to
solemnize those marriages. When Justice Scalia even more pointedly asked, “You
agree that – that ministers will not have to conduct same-sex marriages?,” Mary
Bonauto, for the petitioners, responded unhesitatingly and unequivocally: “If they do
not want to, that is correct. I believe that is affirmed under the First Amendment.” 127
123 See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2627 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Today’s decree says that my
Ruler, and the Ruler of 320 million Americans coast-to-coast, is a majority of the nine lawyers
on the Supreme Court.”).
124 See, e.g., H.B. 1706, 217th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2016); H.B. 36, 132d Gen. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2017). Perspective on religious accommodations measures in
antidiscrimination statutes is found, among other works, in Andrew Koppelman, Gay Rights,
Religious Accommodations, and the Purposes of Antidiscrimination Law, 88 S. CAL. L. REV.
619 (2015) [hereinafter, Koppelman, Gay Rights, Religious Accommodations, and
Antidiscrimination Law], and Douglas NeJaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars:
Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516 (2015).
125
A version of this argument is in Testimony Regarding H.B. 36 Before the H.
Cmty. & Family Advancement Comm., 132d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(Ohio
2017)
(statement
of
Prof.
Marc
Spindelman),
https://moritzlaw.osu.edu/faculty/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2017/02/Spindelman-IPtestimony-H.B.36.pdf.
126

See Transcript of Oral Argument at 26–27, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (No. 14–556)
(comments by Justice Stephen Breyer and Justice Elena Kagan).
127

See Transcript of Oral Argument at 27, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (No. 14–556) (question
by Justice Scalia and answer by Mary Bonauto).
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Bonauto cited no Supreme Court authority for this “belief,” but that was because there
was none at hand to cite for the point. The First Amendment free exercise rule she
invoked was so axiomatic that no Supreme Court case had ever had to declare and set
its boundaries.128 Just the same, Bonauto’s view, which Chief Justice Roberts
curiously characterized as a litigation “concession,” as though there might still be
some doubt about it, expressed a clear, if not the only, vision of the constitutional
landscape that Obergefell took as background when it was decided.129 Seen this way,
Obergefell’s silence on the rights of clergy to refuse to perform same-sex marriages
was predictable but in an entirely uninteresting sense. It meant nothing and did nothing
to call the pre-existing rights of clergy into doubt. All the Sturm und Drang about
Obergefell’s implications for the clergy’s constitutional freedom was a distraction
that, viewed critically, was either a political strategy to whip up a base in opposition
to Obergefell, a wildly irrational reading of the decision, or, maybe, both.
What these critical registers achieve from a certain point of view they achieve by
not acknowledging, and even evading, how Obergefell, as its dissents attested,
conduced to a phenomenology of upheaval, groundlessness, and doubt. As the dissents
maintained, Obergefell’s decision to “order[] the transformation of a social institution
that ha[d] formed the basis of human society for millennia” did not have the look and
feel of a measured constitutional ruling that took the next logical step in the course of
the Supreme Court’s evolving lesbian and gay rights jurisprudence.130 Instead, it
appeared to involve the production of what the dissents saw as a radical,
unprecedented, revolutionary rupture that, as an act of pure judicial will, broke faith
with the past, raising the wonder Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent expressed: “If an
unvarying social institution enduring over all of recorded history cannot inhibit
judicial policymaking, what can?”131 This ruling, in which the Supreme Court
arrogated to itself the power to be the nation’s and the nation’s people’s “Ruler,” not
only banished conservative religious views and traditional moral values from their
place within the public square, where their traditional understanding of marriage as
the union of one man to one woman as husband and wife could hold sway in law, but
it also threatened to closet them so that they might only speak their “old beliefs” in
“whispers,” as Justice Alito’s dissent put it, “in the recesses of their homes[.]”132 In
these and other ways, the Obergefell dissents depicted Obergefell as revolutionary in
the sense of turning the world upside down in a grand act of theft—“[s]tealing this

128 Consider the precise locution of the remarks found in the amicus brief Douglas Laycock
filed in Obergefell, Laycock, Obergefell Brief, supra note 118 at 30 (indicating that “broader
principle” on which Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, 565
U.S. 171 (2012), “rests” “plainly covers [a] religious body’s definition of marriage and its
willingness or unwillingness to solemnize or celebrate a marriage, or provide the space for doing
so.”).

Transcript of Oral Argument at 36, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (No. 14–556) (“We have
a concession from your friend that clergy will not be required to perform same-sex
marriage[.]”).
129

130

The quoted language is from Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2612 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).

131

Id. at 2622.

132

The quoted language is from Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2627 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“Ruler”), and id. at 2642 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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issue from the people”—in ways that meant that all bets were off on what the Supreme
Court would or wouldn’t or could or couldn’t possibly do next.133 This was not a
Supreme Court that could be counted on to recognize the histories and traditions of
the American people, including people of faith, as constitutional ballast. So, yes,
Obergefell’s silence around the constitutional rights of clergy to refuse to involve
themselves in same-sex civil marriages might be meaningless. It might precisely signal
Obergefell left them untouched and intact. But the silence could also be a wink to
“homosexual rights advocates” who proffered a litigation concession recognizing the
constitutional rights of clergy while harboring dreams of “stigmatiz[ing],
delegitimiz[ing], and quickly extinguish[ing] opposition to the new [pro-homosexual]
norm [that Obergefell announced], especially dissent [to it] grounded in religious
conviction,” all in the hopes of “avowedly seek[ing] to run traditional religious views
off the field.”134 If the traditional definition of marriage didn’t stop the Obergefell
Court from doing what it did, why would an axiom about the free exercise rights of
the clergy in relation to traditional marriage fare any better? If Obergefell did not
intend to sow doubts around the rights of clergy after Justice Scalia brought them up,
it could very easily have followed the lead of some earlier same-sex marriage rulings
that pretermitted worries like these with only a few, direct words.135 Recognizing its
choice not to utter them, Obergefell left open the possibility that its silence on the
clergy’s rights—whatever the Court’s original intention behind it—could later be
filled up with anti-religious content that would have the practical effect of compelling
clergy to perform civil marriages they did not wish to, or of practically pushing them
out of the civil marriage business altogether. Hence the phenomenology that
Obergefell produced for some: of upheaval, groundlessness, and doubt.
Masterpiece Cakeshop firmly and finally puts these possibilities—however
remote or imminent they once were—to rest.136 Without being required to,
Masterpiece Cakeshop clarifies retrospectively that Obergefell implied no
abandonment of constitutional respect for our country’s longstanding commitment to
133

The quoted language is from Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2612 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).

134 Paulsen, supra note 119, at 36. Many will have trouble recognizing Paulsen’s “homosexual
rights advocates” and their views, particularly those lesbians and gay men who have deeply
faithful commitments and the many others who themselves do not but who nevertheless are
deeply dedicated to ensuring that faithful commitments and those who hold them get their full
constitutional respects. Cf., e.g., CHRISTIAN DE LA HUERTA, COMING OUT SPIRITUALLY: THE
NEXT STEP (1999).
135 See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 452 (Cal. 2008) (“no religious officiant will
be required to solemnize a marriage in contravention of his or her religious beliefs”); Goodridge
v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 965 n.29 (Mass. 2003) (observing that “[o]ur decision
in no way limits the rights of individuals to refuse to marry persons of the same sex for religious
or any other reasons”).
136

On the inevitability, consider the positions mapped out in the Masterpiece Cakeshop
litigation in Brief of Agudath Israel of America as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at
3, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2017) (No. 16111) (arguing that “under the reasoning of the court below, the state could even force an
Orthodox rabbi to preside at a wedding of two men, or of a Jew and a non-Jew”), and the answer
in Brief for the Central Conference of American Rabbis et al. as Amici Curiae at 22–23,
Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111) (explaining that there is “no basis” for
concerns like this in light of Obergefell, with its references to religious liberty).
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religious liberty, and specifically, no diminution or elimination of the clergy’s free
exercise rights in relation to civil marriage. Masterpiece Cakeshop reaffirms
Obergefell’s promise of the right to marry, but this time around as a promise that is
subject to an important caveat for the free exercise rights of clergy acting under color
of state law. They are told that they may continue to choose which civil marriages to
perform—including same-sex, cross-sex, or both—consistent with their faith.
Masterpiece Cakeshop licenses clergy to treat cross-sex and same-sex couples and
marriages differently for religious and/or moral reasons, assuring them the
constitutional right to do what the state from which their civil marriage authority
derives must not do for itself. If and when the clergy exercise this right and
discriminate against same-sex couples and same-sex marriages, their actions will not
be chalked up to the state as unconstitutional state action under Obergefell.137
Masterpiece Cakeshop structures this announcement in simple and direct, if
situationally qualified, terms:
When it comes to weddings, it can be assumed that a member of the
clergy who objects to gay marriage on moral and religious grounds could
not be compelled to perform the ceremony without denial of his right to the
free exercise of religion. This refusal would be well understood in our
constitutional order as an exercise of religion, an exercise that gay persons
could recognize and accept without serious diminishment to their own
dignity and worth.138
In saying this, Masterpiece Cakeshop’s constitutional assumption effectively
recognizes what the Court regards as a reasonable accommodation of conflicting
constitutional values. Past its awkward conditionals, the passage delivers present-tense
declarations that readers are urged to accept as constitutional fact. “When it comes to
[the] weddings” of same-sex couples, the right to marry is constitutionally protected,
but “it can [still] be assumed” that religious officiants need not involve themselves in
consecrating these civil marriages under state law.139 Members of the clergy who
refuse to be involved in same-sex marriages cannot “be compelled” to do so without
violating their “right[s] to the free exercise of religion.”140 In “our constitutional
order,” these refusals are constitutionally safeguarded “exercise[s] of religion” that
“gay persons could”—meaning, in context, will have to—“recognize and accept.”141
Protecting the rights of clergy not to involve themselves in same-sex marriages does
not violate lesbian women’s and gay men’s constitutional rights. For the Court
certainly, if not for everyone else, this is a modest, reasonable constitutional
adjustment that must be made consistent with the traditions of our pluralistic
137 Important insights on state action doctrine works are in Don Herzog, The Kerr Principle,
State Action, and Legal Rights, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2006).
138

Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1727 (2018).

139 Id. Nothing in Masterpiece Cakeshop formally precludes states from de-conferring
authority on the clergy to officiate civil marriages. It clarifies only that Obergefell’s
constitutional rule on civil marriage “can be assumed” not to require them to use the civil
marriage authority they receive from the state in contradiction of their faith. Id.
140

Id.

141

Id.
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constitutional system and that should be acceptable to “gay persons” since there is no
“serious diminishment to their own dignity and worth,” or their basic legal rights.142
So far, Masterpiece Cakeshop has proven to be right: No serious resistance to these
First Amendment restrictions on the constitutional right to marry has yet emerged.
In making this announcement about the constitutional free exercise rights of the
clergy not to officiate same-sex marriages that the state itself must recognize,
Masterpiece Cakeshop is, of course, once again weighing in on precisely the
“difficult” terrain it indicates at the outset it is not going to decide. The Court does so
in a way that suggests a certain symmetry is its guide. The Court is seeking to construct
a neutral balance between the rights and respect accorded to the two “sides” involved
in the deep clash of values the case implicates. Just as conservatives of faith “might
have [their] right[s] to the free exercise of religion limited by generally applicable
laws”143 when those laws operate in truly neutral ways, so lesbians, gay men, and
same-sex couples “might have [their own constitutional] right[s]”144 diminished, albeit
not in any “serious” way, in the face of a limited range of free exercise claims by
clergy consistent with their “moral and religious” views and values.145 The Court is
asking conservatives of faith and traditional moralists, along with “gay persons,” to
“recognize and accept” these cross-party checks on their constitutional rights as part
of what it means to live together in a pluralistic constitutional community.146
While the Court’s articulation of this “assumption” about the rights of clergy to be
state agents and still to use their state-conferred powers in ways that are consistent
with their faith is technically only that, to imagine this is nonbinding dicta instead of
a binding rule of law that lower courts should and will follow and that the Supreme
Court in a future case would, too, is to give short shrift to the practical gravity of this
declaration in a Supreme Court opinion such as this.147 Here is the Supreme Court
making a constitutional commitment to clergy who lead communities of faith and
moral values. There are no easy take-backs with a constitutional assumption like this
one, about as solemn a constitutional promise as any the Supreme Court might make
as a matter of secular constitutional faith.
Herein lies a key point to understanding the authoritative status in law of
Masterpiece Cakeshop’s other shadow rulings. Recognizing the cross-cutting balances
animating the opinion and the ways it affirms the rights of those the Court sees on both
sides of the controversy, Masterpiece Cakeshop’s various shadow rulings may be
regarded as all having the same basic legal stature: not formal holdings, but something
closer to that than to what the language of dicta would conventionally suggest. These
are promises that emerge from the Constitution, that covenant Justice Kennedy
famously understood to run from generation to generation of Americans, which the

142

Id.

143

Id. at 1724.

144

Id.

145

Id. at 1727.

146

Id.

147

Id. (noting that the relevant rights of the clergy “can be assumed”).
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Court has repeatedly stood prepared to make good on, and, as Justice Kennedy put it
elsewhere, whose meaning may become clearer as time and understandings change.148
Seen in this light, and surveying all the legal ground that Justice Kennedy’s
Masterpiece Cakeshop opinion claims and occupies and presumably is ready to
defend, and even without forgetting all the aspects of the “difficult questions” the case
presents that the Court does not in any way address, it is time to ask once more: Exactly
how is this a narrow, shallow, and modest ruling?

3. The First Amendment Speech Arguments for Artistic Freedom
The overarching thrust of the argument to this point has been that Masterpiece
Cakeshop is a wider, deeper, and less modest decision than it has regularly been
understood to be. That argument is about to be extended, but first it needs to be
acknowledged that the majority opinion in the case doesn’t claim as much ground as
it might have. This isn’t intended as an observation on how the Court could have done
more to fill out and rule on aspects of the case it does decide. It is, rather, a way of
focusing attention on the Court’s treatment of the other First Amendment claims
presented in the case: claims that variously circled around the notion that Phillips is a
custom cake artist whose artistry, which is in service of his faith, enjoys First
Amendment speech protections that guarantee him the artistic freedom to decide
whether or not to use his talents to create custom-made cake commissions for samesex marriage celebrations and to do so free from the pain of violating the state’s antidiscrimination laws.149
As background, Philips’s artistic speech freedom claims emerged in a distinct
range of doctrinal terms. His merits brief alone features the claims as a stand-alone
work-up of the import of artistry as a distinctive form of speech, as a compelled-speech
claim, as an expressive conduct argument, and within the context of content and
viewpoint discrimination bids.150 All these expressions advanced the notion that
148 On the Constitution as “covenant,” see Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 901 (1992) (“Our Constitution is a covenant running from the first generation of Americans
to us and then to future generations. . . . We accept our responsibility not to retreat from
interpreting the full meaning of the covenant in light of all of our precedents.”). For more on
the Constitution as a document with a changing meaning in the context of lesbian and gay rights,
see, for example, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015) (“History and tradition
guide and discipline this inquiry [into fundamental rights] but do not set its outer boundaries. .
. . The nature of injustice is that we may not always see it in our own times. . . . When new
insight reveals discord between the Constitution’s central protections and a received legal
stricture, a claim to liberty must be addressed.”); id. at 2603 (“Indeed, in interpreting the Equal
Protection Clause, the Court has recognized that new insights and societal understandings can
reveal unjustified inequality within our most fundamental institutions that once passed
unnoticed and unchallenged.”).
149

See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1723.

Brief of Petitioners, supra note 108, at 17 (“The Free Speech Clause protects both
expression and expressive conduct. This Court must initially decide whether Phillips’s custom
wedding cakes are artistic expression.”); id. at 19 (“Phillips’s custom wedding cakes are his
artistic expression because he intends to, and does in fact, communicate through them.”); id. at
150
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there’s something about art and artistry, with their special emphasis on expression,
hence communication, that the First Amendment speech clause, with its values and
doctrinal forms, should be understood to countenance and protect. 151
Equally salient as a shared feature of these various constitutional expressions of
the idea that Phillips’s artistry is protected as First Amendment speech is how they
relied on the standard secular language of other speech rights, an orientation that all
constitutional rights share. But if First Amendment protections themselves were
secular in their basic form, in content they were not. For Phillips, the speech right to
artistry is religious. His artistry is indissolubly bound up with his faith. In Phillips’s
briefs, this is a point of pride, as when it is said that he uses his artistry—from the
earliest stages of his artistic process to the deployment of his talents in preparing a
finished work: a custom-made cake—for the glory of his God.152 Wedding cakes, his
papers argued, are distinctive not only in their historical and present-day social
meanings, but, in Phillips’s artistic-religious view, because weddings celebrate
marriage, which definitionally involves the union of one man and one woman as
husband and wife, a sacred union that “exemplifies the relationship of Christ and His
Church,” and that accordingly manifests and furthers “God’s design.”153 The Heavenly
23 (“Phillips’s creation of custom wedding cakes at least qualifies as a form of expressive
conduct.”); id. at 27–28 (“[T]he Commission directly interfered with Phillips’s artistic
discretion” and “forced him to express views different from his own.”); id. at 35 (“Ordering
citizens to engage in unwanted artistic expression is such an affront to the First Amendment
freedoms that no less than strict scrutiny will do.”); id. (“Phillips triggered CADA only because
he addressed the topic of marriage through his art . . . Penalizing an artist because of the topics
on which he has chosen to speak is decidedly content based.”); id. at 36 (“Going beyond mere
content discrimination, the Commission has engaged in viewpoint discrimination . . . [because]
the Commission’s order here requires Phillips to express ideas diametrically opposed to his
own.”). For an incisive take on the artistic freedom arguments in the case, see Robert Post, What
About the Free Speech Clause in Masterpiece?, TAKE CARE BLOG (June 13, 2018),
https://takecareblog.com/blog/what-about-the-free-speech-clause-issue-in-masterpiece.
See
also James Hart, When the First Amendment Compels an Offensive Result: Masterpiece
Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 79 LA. L. REV. 419, 427–36 (2018)
(arguing that Masterpiece Cakeshop involves compelled speech and viewpoint discrimination).
151 It may thus be that, in a certain sense, describing Phillips’s custom cake-making as art,
including for constitutional purposes, gives it both expressive, and so distinctive First
Amendment, legs, while also functionally serving to limit its still otherwise potentially
sweeping (and so not unproblematic) scope. Thanks to Dan Tokaji for conversation on this
point.
152

See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4–6, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil
Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16–111) (discussing the relation between
Phillips’s “religious conviction” and his wedding celebration cakes).
153 Id. at 6; id. at 5–6 (“Of any form of cake, wedding cakes have the longest and richest
history. In modern Western culture, the wedding cake serves a central expressive component at
most weddings and is traditionally served at the reception celebrating the couple’s union . . . .
[It] forms the centerpiece of a ritual in which the couple celebrates their marriage by feeding
each other cake and then sharing cake with their guests. Only a wedding cake communicates
this special celebratory message . . . .” (citations omitted)); see also Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138
S. Ct. at 1724 (“Jack Phillips is an expert baker[.] . . . Phillips is a devout Christian. He has
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Father looms here as the Great Creator, the Author of All Things—making him,
among all else, The Artist of Artists. There being consonance, harmony, and beauty
in the dynamic unity of Phillips’s art and faith, a unity that is revealed in the good
work of his wedding cakes, his refusal on religious scruples “to use his creative talents
to design and create cakes that violate his religious beliefs” is but another way he
submits in his devotion and “honors God.”154 Preferring not to is not resistance for
resistance’s sake, but art’s, which in Phillips’s case, makes it also for religion’s.155
Central as his God is to Phillips’s artistry, faith is not, for constitutional purposes,
offered up as a necessary condition for the exercise of the First Amendment right
claimed on his behalf, here, again, a secular right to speech protections for his art,
which liberate it from state anti-discrimination regulation.
The apparent overlap between Phillips’s First Amendment speech claims to artistic
freedom and his First Amendment claims to religious freedom makes it easy to
imagine these arguments have no meaningful independence of terms.156 There may
be truth to that as a matter of litigation tactics, but the protections for artistic freedom
that Phillips sought, transcend creativity’s inspirational source as well as its aims.
Hence the alliance Phillips’s arguments tried to build with artists everywhere, be they
faithful or faithless, as with his merits brief’s ominous warning early on that “a ruling
against Phillips [on First Amendment speech grounds] threatens the expressive
freedom of all who create art or other speech for a living.”157
While the First Amendment claims for artistic freedom were leading arguments in
the Supreme Court litigation phase of Masterpiece Cakeshop—they were featured as
the principal arguments in Phillips’s paper submissions, and, perhaps more
importantly, they grounded the federal government’s arguments in the case—Justice
Kennedy’s majority opinion downgrades them to claims of relatively minor textual
significance.158 They are found dwelling more or less at the operative margins of the
Court’s official text.159
What little Masterpiece Cakeshop ventures to say about the First Amendment
speech protections for artistic freedom, it says while regularly keeping their precise
explained that his ‘main goal in life is to be obedient to’ Jesus Christ and Christ’s ‘teachings in
all aspects of his life.’ And he seeks to ‘honor God through his work at Masterpiece Cakeshop.’
One of Phillips’ religious beliefs is that ‘God’s intention for marriage from the beginning of
history is that it is and should be the union of one man and one woman.’ To Phillips, creating a
wedding cake for a same-sex wedding would be equivalent to participating in a celebration that
is contrary to his own most deeply held beliefs.” (citations omitted)).
154

Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 150, at 5.

155

Id. at 5–6.

156

One version of the thought would be that the First Amendment religious freedom claims
“really” drive both.
157

Brief of Petitioners, supra note 108, at 3.

158 See, e.g., Brief of Petitioners, supra note 108, at i, 16–37; Brief for United States as
Amicus Curiae at 9–33, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16–111).
159 On these claims being pushed to the margins of Masterpiece Cakeshop, see, in addition
to aspects of the opinion discussed in the text, for example, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct.
at 1723, 1726.
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doctrinal variations blurred in their focus, and while regarding their central impulse—
that the First Amendment protects speech that includes artistic freedom in state-powerlimiting ways—with an admixture of openness, sympathy, but, finally, discernibly
active doubt.160
Early on, Masterpiece Cakeshop remarks that “[t]he free speech aspect of this case
is difficult[.]”161 In the context of Phillips’s First Amendment speech claims for artistic
freedom made to the Court, which the Court’s opinion duly acknowledges, this
suggestion indicates the Court finds it “difficult” to accept the claims outright.162
Explaining why, the Court observes that “few persons who have seen a beautiful
wedding cake might have thought of its creation as an exercise of protected speech.”163
It is hard to read this passage and not surmise the Court is at least partly talking about
itself. Among those “few persons” anyway, may have been a few of the Justices who,
like others, before Masterpiece Cakeshop may never have thought about
constitutionally protected speech when they saw a beautiful wedding cake, which they
then proceeded to eat. One doesn’t eat words like that.
Ordinarily, the Court’s response to a previously unheard-of position like this First
Amendment speech claim, particularly as the source of a binding rule of constitutional
law that would forever bind and govern the nation, would be in the form of swift and
certain dismissal. But the Court resists and pulls its punch. “[F]ew persons” who have
ever “seen a beautiful wedding cake might have thought” of its artistic creation as
constitutionally safeguarded free speech, but that, Masterpiece Cakeshop indicates,
160 An exception arises in the Court’s treatment of the religious liberty argument. See
Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1730 (“The treatment of the other cases and Phillips’ could
reasonably be interpreted as being inconsistent as to the question of whether speech is involved,
quite apart from whether the cases should ultimately be distinguished.”). See also infra note
185.
161

Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1723.

162 There are two passages in which the Court unambiguously recognizes the relationship
between Phillips’s First Amendment speech claims and how they’re grounded in his argument
in notions of artistic freedom. The first arrives as the Court discusses proceedings below. Id. at
1726. The second arrives as the Court is discussing Phillips’s argument to the Court. Id. at 1728
(“He argues that he had to use his artistic skills to make an expressive statement, a wedding
endorsement in his own voice and of his own creation. As Phillips would see the case, this
contention has a significant First Amendment speech component and implicates his deep and
sincere religious beliefs.”). This second passage is discussed in greater detail below. See infra
text accompanying notes 167–175.
163 Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1723; accord Brief of American Unity Fund & Profs.
Dale Carpenter & Eugene Volokh as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 9, Masterpiece
Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16–111) (“[C]ake-making—even cake-making for ceremonial
occasions (such as weddings and birthdays)—lacks any . . . longstanding legal recognition as
an expressive medium. . . . [T]he absence of any case law protecting the expressiveness of cake
baking suggests that it has not been regarded in our constitutional tradition as a medium of
expression. That makes cake baking distinct from long-recognized mediums of expression such
as writing, singing, or photography.”); Post, supra note 150 (“Phillips’ claim that his free speech
rights were infringed faced the obvious objection that baking is a simple provision of services
rather than a medium for the communication of ideas.”). For contextualized, critical engagement
with Carpenter and Volokh’s position, see ANDREW KOPPELMAN, GAY RIGHTS VS. RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY? THE UNNECESSARY CONFLICT (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 71–72, 81–82).
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might turn out to be all that’s required to do the constitutional trick.164 “This,” the
Court flatly observes, “is an instructive example, however, of the proposition that the
application of constitutional freedoms in new contexts can deepen our understanding
of their meaning.”165
This statement, with its “is,” is remarkable. In a decision affecting the rights of
lesbians and gay men written by Justice Kennedy, it also feels portentous. The
language of the Court’s instruction conjures the familiar sound of the Court ringing
this very bell in its earlier pro-lesbian-and-gay rights decisions as they proudly, if not
uncontroversially, broke new constitutional ground, stoking the forces of living
constitutionalism.166 What’s more, and more disconcerting, the massively obvious
social differences between the claims of liberty involved in those lesbian and gay
rights cases and in this one do not register at all at this point in the opinion. The social
movement work, the organizing, the actions, the contests, the setbacks, the
regroupings, not to forget the study, the thinking, and the writing, along with all the
other struggles and bodily tolls during the long, dark years of homosexuality’s
outlawry and the national debates about it all, all of which finally moved the country
and then the Court to recognize the liberty, equality, and first-class citizenship claims
of lesbians and gay men, are now lined up in a comparative way with a breezy idea
fronted in litigation that has not been the subject of any national debate, hence testing,
and that could not have been, because, as the Court itself authoritatively says, “few
persons” had even thought or heard of the idea animating it before now. But no matter.
The prospects of constitutional reform are anyway tacitly potentially equated.
Masterpiece Cakeshop formally declines to opine on the merits of any of the First
Amendment speech claims involving artistic freedom, but that declination is attended
by a courtly openness to the very ideas that the Court officially refuses to accept. For
now.
Masterpiece Cakeshop reaffirms its openness to the idea of First Amendment
protections for artistic freedom later on. During a larger discussion emphasizing the
constitutional, legal, and citizenship status of lesbians and gay men, which
underscores the existence and “unexceptional” nature of anti-discrimination laws, the
Court acknowledges that Phillips “claims” his artistry is protected as a First
Amendment speech matter.167 Notice how the opinion’s text, which goes out of its
164

Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1723.

165

Id.

166 See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015) (“The nature of injustice is
that we may not always see it in our own times. The generations that wrote and ratified the Bill
of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment . . . entrusted to future generations a charter protecting
the right of all persons to enjoy liberty as we learn its meaning.”); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558, 578–79 (2003) (“[T]hose who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment . . . knew times can blind us to certain truths and
later generations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to
oppress. As the Constitution endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles in
their own search for greater freedom.”).
167 Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1728. The text at this point raises a prospect that this
talk of the “unexceptional” nature of anti-discrimination law undercuts ideas that see this large,
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way to flag Phillips’s association of protected speech and art, shifts its own perspective
while describing Phillips’s position:
[Phillips] argues that he had to use his artistic skills to make an expressive
statement, a wedding endorsement in his own voice and of his own creation.
As Phillips would see the case, this contention has a significant First
Amendment speech component and implicates his deep and sincere
religious beliefs. In this context the baker likely found it difficult to find a
line where the customers’ right to goods and services became a demand for
him to exercise the right of his own personal expression for their message,
a message he could not express in a way consistent with his religious
beliefs.168
The opinion’s sensibilities here are nuanced and become increasingly fictive,
hence literary. The opinion’s observations, which finally figure the Court not simply
as repeating Phillips’s argument objectively but discovering it operating in Phillips’s
head, is scarcely epistemically modest in any meaningful jurisprudential sense.
Narratively speaking, its qualities are imagined and omniscient. Past its qualification
(“the baker likely found it difficult . . .”), the opinion proceeds as though the Court has
direct access to the baker’s interiority, his perspective, his thoughts, and more,
including how belief in the Spirit touches his heart and organizes his faithful
obligations in relation to law.169 In this respect, the opinion temporarily performs a
complete merger with Phillips through an identification with him, a multiples-in-one
union that reads as an indication not only of an openness to Phillips’s speech claim,
but a highly identified, hence sympathetic, engagement with it, as well. Clearly, the
Court is seriously contemplating his position, imagining affording his artistry First
Amendment speech protections, just as Phillips asked.170
What this means for how far Masterpiece Cakeshop is willing to go on Phillips’s
First Amendment speech and artistry arguments will become clearer soon enough, but
before getting to that there’s the question of why the opinion goes out of its way to
identify itself with Phillips in relation to his First Amendment speech claims and their
protections for artistic expression. One prospect of what, in fact, is undoubtedly an
complex body of law as having constitutional stature. See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE
PEOPLE, VOLUME 3: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2018); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN
FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2013). Here, by
contrast, they may be thought to be no different than unexceptional laws, like traffic ordinances.
Recognizing this possibility, the weight of the opinion seems to run closer to Ackerman’s view
than this one, without finally settling anything. Just so, there is also a comparison on all this to
Hosanna Tabor, in which anti-discrimination norms were not, to say the least, heavily weighted
in the face of religious liberty claims. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v.
EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 196 (2012) (“When a minister who has been fired sues her church alleging
that her termination was discriminatory, the First Amendment has struck the balance for us. The
church must be free to choose those who will guide it on its way.”). See also discussion supra
Part I.B.1.
168

Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1728.

169

Id. (emphasis added).

170

The good news here is that the opinion, written by Justice Kennedy, makes this at least in
part a same-sex merger?
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over-determined answer is that the Court’s convergence with Phillips has less to do
with the Court’s own normative view of the claims he’s made than it is about a
majority of the Court being comfortable offering what may be regarded as anodyne
expressions of openness and identification with, and an understanding of, Phillips’s
position. After all, two of the Justices who join the Court’s opinion basically accept it.
The story here is judicial strategy all over again.171
This much, as a partial explanation, comes into view through Justice Clarence
Thomas’s concurring opinion, joined by Justice Neil Gorsuch, which validates and
normalizes what it dubs Phillips’s “free-speech claim” far in excess of the majority’s
identification with Phillips and his views.172 The concurrence gets, accepts, and would
have the Court deliver Phillips constitutional First Amendment speech protection for
his art. The concurrence endorses the view that Phillips’s custom cake making—
“creating and designing custom wedding cakes”—is “expressive conduct,” a
conclusion it reaches via a line of thought emphasizing and accepting that Phillipsthe-baker should be seen constitutionally as Phillips-the-baker-artist whose cakeshop
is an artistic studio proudly held out to the world as such and whose artistic creations
result from a highly intentional artistic process.173 Thus: “Phillips’ creation of custom
wedding cakes is expressive. The use of his artistic talents to create a well-recognized
symbol that celebrates the beginning of a marriage clearly communicates a
message.”174 This message, the concurrence maintains, is altered by the state’s public
accommodations law, which “[f]orc[es] Phillips . . . to, at the very least, acknowledge
that same-sex weddings are ‘weddings’ and [to] suggest that they should be
celebrated—the precise message he believes his faith forbids.”175 Both against, but
also in a sense with, this thinking, which the concurrence rounds out and defends, the
majority opinion’s willingness to be open to, and sympathetically to identify with,
Phillips and his position may operate as a kind of transference in which the Court
wishes to perform a limited solidarity with the views expressed in Justice Thomas’s

171

See generally MURPHY, supra note 97.

172 See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1740 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment); see also, generally, id. at 1740–48. See also, e.g., Brief for United
States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 158, at 8 (“The law compels Phillips to design and create
a custom wedding cake for a same-sex couple, if he would do the same for an opposite-sex
couple. A custom wedding cake is a form of expression, whether pure speech or the product of
expressive conduct. It is an artistic creation that is both subjectively intended and objectively
perceived as a celebratory symbol of marriage.”).
173 Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1742–44 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
174

Id. at 1743. An illuminating counterpoint is in WENDY BROWN, Speaking Wedding Cakes
and Praying Pregnancy Centers, in IN THE RUINS OF NEOLIBERALISM: THE RISE OF
ANTIDEMOCRATIC POLITICS IN THE WEST 123, 137 (2019) (Phillips’s wedding “cakes carry . . .
religious meaning for him, though not necessarily for others and thus not necessarily when they
‘speak’ wedding at the events they adorn. Phillips himself speaks, then, not through his art, but
through his willingness or refusal to provision for events he believes to be divinely ordained or
condemned.”).
175

Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1744 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment).
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concurrence. If so, the Court may have ultimately done so for itself, as a way to draw
Justice Thomas’s vote and hold it in the Court’s opinion’s fold.
Still, there are different kinds of openness and identificatory sympathy, and
indications in Masterpiece Cakeshop are that, on the other side of them in the case are
discernible reserves of constitutional doubt. This is the indication that comes through
the opinion as it releases its temporary identification with Phillips in order to turn to
an explanation for why the Court thinks he was “not unreasonable” in making the
choice he did to refuse Craig and Mullins the custom wedding celebration cake that
they wanted at the time they wanted it.176 What’s about to materialize is a highly
temporized constitutional speech gambit that shows the dynamism of rules in an
evolving constitutional ecosystem.
The Court’s Masterpiece Cakeshop opinion explains that Phillips’s decision not to
use his artistry to create the custom wedding cake Craig and Mullins wanted may have
been understandable at the time of his refusal. This is a function, as the Court describes
it, of Phillips’s concern with the expressive meaning and the value of making the
couple the custom cake they desired for their marriage celebration. Syntactically, the
opinion’s account is agonized. Noting that Phillips’s “actions leading to the refusal of
service . . . occurred in the year 2012[,]” the Court timestamps the refusal as occurring
both before Colorado legalized same-sex marriage and before the Court’s rulings in
United States v. Windsor and Obergefell v. Hodges.177 The opinion goes on to remark:
Since the State itself did not allow those marriages to be performed in
Colorado, there is some force to the argument that the baker was not
unreasonable in deeming it lawful to decline to take an action that he
understood to be an expression of support for their validity when that
expression was contrary to his sincerely held religious beliefs, at least
insofar as his refusal was limited to refusing to create and express a
message in support of gay marriage, even one planned to take place in
another State.178
Leaving aside how the Court re-identifies itself with Phillips in this passage, even
seeming to confuse its own authority to declare what this law is with his authority to
“deem” his own refusal of service “lawful,” more significant for present purposes is
the proliferation of subordinate clauses in the Court’s account. With their various
qualifications, they indicate the Court is pumping the brakes on its own thinking.
Slowed down a bit to restate it, the Court’s notion is straightforward, if also surprising.
Since at the time Phillips refused to make Craig and Mullins the custom wedding cake
they wanted they did not have a right to marry under Colorado law or the federal
Constitution, there’s “some force” to the idea it was understandable—more exactly:
“not unreasonable”—for Phillips to have imagined that using his artistry the way that
Craig and Mullins wanted him to might well have been taken to send a message of
support for their marriage or the right-to-marry project, “the precise message,” as
Justice Thomas’s concurrence puts it, that Phillips “believes his faith forbids.”179 One
176

Id. at 1728 (majority opinion).

177

Id.

178

Id.

179

Id.; id. at 1744 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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implication of this position—or just a click away from it—would seem to be that
Phillips may have acted lawfully, consistent with his rights at the time he refused this
service. How this is so should become more apparent presently.
On a technical, objective level, the Court’s perspective is pure speculation, ipse
dixit, nothing more. It delivers a retrospective verdict on the then-once-would-havebeen social meaning of Phillips making a custom wedding cake for a same-sex
wedding celebration situated at that time, in that place, and in that setting—an
eventuality, to be clear, that never came to pass—and it delivers that verdict without
citing any authority for this never-eventuated action’s expressive meaning. Bracketing
those concerns, the opinion’s point is easily allowed as more or less right as a loose
conversational observation seeking to describe how some people back in 2012 in
Colorado might reasonably have understood Phillips’s use of his artistic skills had he
agreed to use them in the ways that Craig and Mullins asked and against his own faith.
Noteworthy about this thinking in Masterpiece Cakeshop is less its historically
situated, but counterfactual, hermeneutics than how, on reflection, it shows the Court’s
opinion is suggesting—through an imbedded negative logic—that Colorado law
having now changed to recognize same-sex marriage, and Windsor and Obergefell
having now been decided, it is no longer reasonable for Phillips or anyone else to think
that his willingness to use his artistry to make a custom cake for gay fellas like Craig
and Mullins sends any message of support for them, their marriage, or the right to
marry, more generally.180 Whatever Phillips’s inspiration as an artist and whatever
180 Here one might think of some of the individualized discriminatory options that some who
sought to resist the march of civil rights historically availed themselves of. See, e.g., JUDITH
ROLLINS, ALL IS NEVER SAID: THE NARRATIVE OF ODETTE HARPER HINES 197 (1995) (offering,
as part of an account of the “very first day of testing” by Judy and Betty Chenevert “at a number
of restaurants on Highway 71” before they learned the technique of it, that there was “no telling
what those angry crackers might have put in their food. At one restaurant, they saw the man spit
into their Cokes and they didn’t drink them. But what might have been put in their food at other
restaurants that they didn’t see? Spit or worse.”); JORDANA Y. SHAKOOR, CIVIL RIGHTS
CHILDHOOD 152 (1999) (“Many blacks in Greenwood preferred to continue to hang out on
Johnson Street. The right to vote was one thing; eating alongside resentful whites was another.
Those who could afford it had to wonder whether eating a nice juicy steak was worth possibly
receiving burnt food or meals that might have spit or something worse seasoning them.”). A
return that some might regard as doing rough justice is described in William Serrin, Jesse
Jackson: ‘I Am . . .’ Audience: ‘I Am . . .’ Jesse: ‘Somebody’s Audience: ‘Somebody,’ N.Y.
TIMES (July 9, 1972), https://www.nytimes.com/1972/07/09/archives/jesse-jackson-i-amaudience-i-am-jesse-somebody-audience-somebody.html (“Always, Jackson was defiant. As a
young man, when he worked as a waiter in the Jack Tar Hotel in Greenville, S.C., and whites
did not tip him, Jesse would spit into their soup or salad before he brought it to the table, and
watch with enjoyment as whites ate gobs of saliva as though it were, say, oil and vinegar
dressing.”). Relatedly, in the context of homophobically inflected discourses, there are the
straight nightmares of gay men discussed to dramatic effect in DOUGLAS CRIMP, Randy Shilts’s
Miserable Failure, in MELANCHOLIA AND MORALISM: ESSAYS ON AIDS AND QUEER POLITICS
118–19, 124 (2002) (describing homophobic fantasies about “gay foreigners attending health
conferences” and gay waiters and salad dressing). Along similar lines, see also James E.
Robertson, The Rehnquist Court and the “Turnerization” of Prisoners’ Rights, 10 N.Y. CITY L.
REV. 97, 111–12 (“The Ninth Circuit . . . deferred to defendants’ explanation for excluding
HIV-positive inmates from serving food to the mainline population. The defendants asserted
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artistic message of faith he may intend to convey through his art, its received social
meaning as expression, at least so far as the Court is presently concerned, is to be
understood in the context and against the backdrop of a politically liberal
constitutional regime in which marriage is marriage is marriage. Constitutionally
speaking, all marriages are alike. Same-sex marriage has ceased being a term of
political contest and meaning in constitutional terms. There are not real weddings and
“weddings” in scare quotes as in Justice Thomas’s concurrence.181 This, of course,
helps explain why many, disagreeing with Justice Thomas’s concurrence, presently
believe that Phillips’s custom-made wedding cakes don’t have any constitutionally
cognizable expressive dimension at all, and why they don’t indicate any kind of
support for the right to marry, or dissent from it, that the First Amendment’s speech
clause protects. Not least of all in view of positive law obligations of equal treatment,
themselves consistent with constitutional norms of equality as set forth in Obergefell,
a wedding cake, without more, is just a wedding cake.
From a different angle of vision, Masterpiece Cakeshop’s observations on the “not
unreasonableness” of Phillips’s idea that making a custom cake for Craig and
Mullins’s wedding celebration in 2012 would send a message of support for same-sex
marriage against his faith resonate quite well, if not exactly perfectly, with elements
of the Court’s First Amendment “expressive conduct” doctrine.182 Here, the majority’s
silence speaks in ways that put its opinion at odds with Justice Thomas’s
concurrence.183
That disagreement obtaining, it is easy to imagine why the majority does not come
out and say what the logic of its historical hermeneutics may be taken to imply: that
no reasonable observer would now take Phillips to be supporting same-sex marriage
when, consistent with the obligations of state law, themselves consistent with the
state’s own constitutional equality obligations, he uses his artistry to make a couple
like Craig and Mullins a custom wedding celebration cake. But if the Masterpiece
Cakeshop majority opinion is constrained, free only to leave its views implicitly
submerged in its text to be discovered or not via close and careful reading, Justice
that they had catered to inmates’ ‘think[ing] the worst—that . . . [HIV-positive food servers]
will bleed into the food, spit into the food, or even worse. This . . . could lead to ‘violent actions’
against HIV-positive food servers.”).
181 Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1744 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment) (“Forcing Phillips to make custom wedding cakes for same-sex marriages
requires him to, at the very least, acknowledge that same-sex weddings are ‘weddings’ and
suggest that they should be celebrated—the precise message he believes his faith forbids.”).
182

See infra note 183.

Although Justice Thomas’s concurrence recognizes that, “[o]f course, conduct does not
qualify as protected speech simply because ‘the person engaging in [it] intends thereby to
express an idea,’” Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1742 (Thomas, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment) (citing United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968)), it
immediately goes on to add: “To determine whether conduct is sufficiently expressive, the Court
asks whether it was ‘intended to be communicative’ and, ‘in context, would reasonably be
understood by the viewer to be communicative.’” Id. (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative NonViolence, 468 U.S. 288, 294 (1984); see also id. at 1742–44 (discussing related aspects of the
doctrinal point). For a sharp response to the concurrence’s mobilization of these doctrinal
points, see KOPPELMAN, supra note 163 (manuscript at 75–77).
183
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Thomas’s concurrence, by contrast, is free to express its disagreement with the
implications that follow from the majority opinion’s text and thoughts. And it does. It
swings away directly at the logical implications of what the majority says, repudiating
the idea that “Obergefell v. Hodges somehow diminish[es] Phillips’ right to free
speech.”184 Notice, though, what else this suggests: That Masterpiece Cakeshop has
nodded toward approval for the kernel of an argument that indicates that Phillips once,
as late as 2012 and maybe later, until Obergefell, may have had a right to free speech
that protected his artistry just the way he claimed in Masterpiece Cakeshop. At least
that view in the Court’s view has “some force.” That qualification plus the careful use
of the double negative—“not unreasonably”—separates the opinion from any
retrospective ruling, but its care suggests the Court sees and can imagine itself
embracing that possibility—or might have. What result in Masterpiece Cakeshop if its
litigation timeline had been such that it had arrived at the Court before Windsor and
Obergefell?
While Masterpiece Cakeshop arcs in these directions, suggesting no speech
protections now obtain for artistry that once might have been protected, it is striking
that, in making the points it does, the decision keeps all the potentially associated First
Amendment doctrinal scaffolding—involving expressive conduct and compelled
speech, principally—far away from the page.185 Still, the passage isn’t wholly lacking
in all authoritative supports. The cases Masterpiece Cakeshop does cite as it works its
way through this subtle line of thought have, to a number, a decidedly pro-lesbianand-gay cast to them: Windsor, Obergefell, and state court rulings from Colorado that
the Court takes to have authorized bakers back in 2012 to refuse “to create cakes with
decorations that demeaned gay persons or gay marriages.”186 The weight of authority
in this setting, which partly cuts in the direction of an erstwhile right to speech that
might have given the Phillips of 2012 a constitutional right to refuse a public
accommodation as he did, now points in the opposite direction, which happens to be
the same direction as the implicit logic of what the Court writes: In the balance of
competing interests, the Court is against, not with, Phillips’s First Amendment speech
claims for artistic expression. The Court occupies that ground as a way of vindicating
the constitutional rights that its decisions, including Windsor and Obergefell,
announced, the overall significations of which are not to be demeaned any more than
lesbians and gay men themselves are through a First Amendment rule exempting
Phillips and other artists from anti-discrimination rules.
Temporized and tempered thinking like this, found in the cool silences of
Masterpiece Cakeshop’s text, doesn’t produce the sound, excitement, drama, or the
184 Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1747 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment) (citation omitted).
185

Saying this this way is meant to consider that moment in Masterpiece Cakeshop when the
Court, in a highly specific factual setting, contemplates the prospects of a speech claim based
on a discriminatory viewpoint problem. Id. at 1730 (majority opinion) (“The treatment of the
other cases and Phillips’ case could reasonably be interpreted as being inconsistent as to the
question of whether speech is involved, quite apart from whether the cases should ultimately be
distinguished.”). In saying what it does on this front, the Court seems to be expressly leaving
open the prospect of at least certain viewpoint-based and maybe content-based discriminations.
The argument in the text should be read with this qualification in mind.
186

Id. at 1728.
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certainty of a gavel dropping and the loud announcement of a ruling against Phillips
on First Amendment speech and artistic freedom grounds. It’s a much subtler gesture
of power, filled with meditative cues that appear only through a search into recesses
of the Court’s text. Masterpiece Cakeshop doesn’t expressly accept or reject Phillips’s
First Amendment speech arguments for artistic protection, indeed, it expressly
indicates it’s not passing on them, which leaves the Court at liberty to rule on them
however it may in some future case. Masterpiece Cakeshop, however, indicates that
this Court isn’t having them, certainly not the way Justice Thomas’s concurrence is.
Once upon a time, yes . . . perhaps (the arguments back then had “some force”), but
no longer. For the majority, views and constitutional arguments, and so positive law
and constitutional rights and rules, can wax and wane.187
This all points to a different reading and explanation of the Court’s mergeridentification with Phillips. It is more than a psychologically curious demonstration of
sympathies with and for him and his position. What it also is, is an active
demonstration that the Court has heard, understood, and appreciated his speech
arguments for artistic freedom under the First Amendment, and that it has heard,
understood, and appreciated where they—and he—were coming from, especially at
the time he refused to use his artistry to make Craig and Mullins the custom cake to
celebrate their wedding that they wanted, when the Court—if it had been asked to do
so—might have confirmed them. In this respect, Masterpiece Cakeshop’s treatment
of Phillips’s First Amendment speech claims for artistic freedom reflects not largesse,
187 The same conclusion is confirmed by an additional textual check found in what
Masterpiece Cakeshop says as it draws this section of discussion to a close, where it offers a
remark previously encountered in the context of Phillips’s Free Exercise claim. By this point, it
is clear that a passage capping a discussion that in part involves Phillips’s First Amendment
speech bids may carry with it both implications for both his speech/artistry and his religious
liberty claims. With that in mind, here’s the relevant language from the case:

[A]ny decision in favor of the baker would have to be sufficiently constrained, lest
all purveyors of goods and services who object to gay marriages for moral and
religious reasons in effect be allowed to put up signs saying “no goods or services
will be sold if they will be used for gay marriages,” something that would impose a
serious stigma on gay persons.
Id. at 1728–29.
As before, if in different ways here, the best arguments for a limited right to free speech in
the form of artistry that could be mustered at the time of Masterpiece Cakeshop were in fact
supplied to the Court. Considering those arguments as presented on the paper, oral arguments
in the case publicly revealed how deeply concerned the Justices were about their ability to find
meaningful and principled limits for the First Amendment speech protections for Phillips’s
artistry that they were being asked to approve. (The same basic point is made early on in the
Court’s opinion in relation to both First Amendment speech and religious liberty claims. Id. at
1723.) Unremarkably, Masterpiece Cakeshop mentions no argument that could serve those
purposes to its exacting standards without creating a constitutional exception to the state’s antidiscrimination rules that would, in practical consequence, “impose a serious stigma on gay
persons” by allowing them to receive unequal treatment in the public sphere. Id. at 1729.
Evidently, the Court felt uncompelled to enter the doctrinal fray by registering this point even
more emphatically than it has, and if it did, it might have disturbed the finely wrought balance
required to build and sustain a supermajority opinion in a controversial case like Masterpiece
Cakeshop.
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politesse, or etiquette simply, but something deeper, more in the model of an idealized
case disposition by an institution of the government managed by agents in a politically
liberal constitutional regime, who, when making binding rules of law backed by the
state’s coercive powers, are supposed to provide public justifications for their
decisions that address those whom their rules will govern as rational, autonomous
citizens whose comprehensive worldviews are, if not as governance rules, deserving
of respect.188
If, as seems likely, the First Amendment speech arguments for protecting artistic
freedom return to the Court, they are returned at their bringers’ peril.189 Judging from
Masterpiece Cakeshop, they face a significant risk of loss. Insofar as Masterpiece
Cakeshop is the indication, what these arguments may be expected to encounter is a
Court that, while maintaining formally that it has not decided the First Amendment
speech issues Phillips raised, has deeply wrestled with them and finally produced a set
of thoughts that, however provisionally, are inconsistent with them as ways to
vindicate protections for artists, including artists of faith. A new theory, a new
principle, new arguments with new limits, and/or a materially changed politico-legal
context could gain First Amendment speech protections for artistic freedom a different
hearing. They could also produce a different result than in Masterpiece Cakeshop.
So much is always a possibility under a living Constitution—the kind of
Constitution that Masterpiece Cakeshop demonstrates yet again that we live under.
For now and the foreseeable future, the First Amendment speech arguments for the
artistic freedom of artists like Phillips-the-artist-of-faith and others do not command a
majority of the Supreme Court.
Perhaps this goes without saying, but recalling some of what Oscar Wilde taught
about aesthetics and the perils of certainty about the interplay of surface and depth, it
seems worth confirming that this depth sounding of the opinion is a deeper and more
textually engaged way of reaching a conclusion that, in rough form, can immediately
be read off the surface of the ruling’s basic decisional architecture.190 Justice Thomas’s
concurrence in the case formally supplied any Justice who wished to take advantage
of it a chance to indicate his or her support for First Amendment speech protections
for artistry like Phillips’s.191 Justice Gorsuch was the only taker.

188
For thoughtful thoughts on etiquette and Masterpiece Cakeshop, see Kendrick &
Schwartzman, supra note 27, at 133. A sharp and accessible introduction to public justification,
including John Rawls’s idea of it, is in Public Justification, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY
(Edward
N
Zalta
ed.,
Spring
2018
ed.),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justification-public/.
189

See, e.g., Klein v. Or. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 139 S. Ct. 2713 (2019) (mem.)
(remanding the case “in light of Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civ. Rts. Comm’n.”). Other
cases will certainly arise to enable the issue’s return to the Supreme Court.
190 OSCAR WILDE, The Preface, in THE PICTURE OF DORIAN GRAY 3 (Michael Patrick Gillespie
ed., 2007) (“All art is at once surface and symbol. / Those who go beneath the surface do so at
their peril. / Those who read the symbol do so at their peril.”).

“His” or “her” only, because there’s no “their” there yet, on which, see Jessica A. Clarke,
They, Them, and Theirs, 132 HARV. L. REV. 894 (2019).
191

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol68/iss3/5

56

2020]

MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP’S HOMILETICS

403

II. THE POLITICAL HOMILETICS OF THE TEXT
Now that all of Masterpiece Cakeshop’s cross-cutting substantive holdings are in
sight, it’s almost time to offer a final assessment of how the opinion should be
understood in terms of narrowness, shallowness, and modesty. First, though, these
remarks on two broadly different, but related types of instruction the opinion gives—
one properly legal, the other moral-political—that arrive just as the opinion draws to
a close. Having considered them on their own terms, in their variations, one of them
is reconfigured as an aesthetic proposition to see what sorts of prospects it holds.

A. Tolerance by Courts
Having reached this point with Masterpiece Cakeshop, all that’s left to consider in
a formal sense is its final substantive passage. This last, climatic moment in the text
arrives, obviously enough, after its holding and shadow holdings have been issued.
Unlike other similarly placed passages in other Kennedy opinions that have gone on
to become famous, the drama of this one is not simply a function of its textual position,
where it crystallizes key teachings the opinion means to give in one final burst.192 In
addition to being the endcap to this particular decision, this passage is also the endcap
to Justice Kennedy’s writing on his legacy issue of lesbian and gay rights while
speaking for the Court. His public letter of resignation would arrive later, but by the
time Masterpiece Cakeshop came down, he certainly knew these were going to be his
final words on the jurisprudential subject that, perhaps more than any other, would
define his positive career as an Associate Justice.193 The significance of these remarks
and their capacity to do the work that they’re about to be shown to be doing thus should
not be doubted.
Curiously, as a matter of style, Masterpiece Cakeshop’s final remarks, despite their
significance, eschew classic Kennedy grandness. This absence subtly colors them with
an eerily deflated, melancholic air. The remarks, comprised of a single sentence with
three subordinate clauses that constantly slow the reader down, are laconic, its
language, if anything, spartan, maybe a tad meditative. Content-wise, the passage
commences by addressing nobody in particular, hence everyone in general, weighing
in on nothing so much as the general situation Masterpiece Cakeshop has implicated
and resolved, if not, as it points out, for the last time. No sooner does the opinion start
filling the details of that situation in than, in its second breath, the reader notices that
the text, without announcing what it’s doing, has shifted direction. It has begun
specifically addressing itself to courts, which are being given marching orders about
how they should consider and resolve cases like Masterpiece Cakeshop in the future.

192 See, for example, the concluding substantive paragraphs in Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.
Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015), and Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 559, 578–79 (2003).
193 Masterpiece Cakeshop was handed down on June 4, 2018, and Justice Kennedy’s public
announcement arrived on June 27, 2018. Letter of Resignation from Anthony M. Kennedy,
Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Donald J. Trump, President, U.S. (June 27, 2018),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/press/Letter_to_the_President_June27.pdf. See also
Michael D. Shear, Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy Will Retire, N.Y. TIMES, June 28,
2018, at A1.
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The template is, of course, one that Masterpiece Cakeshop itself sets. The Court
comments:
The outcome of cases like this in other circumstances must await further
elaboration in the courts, all in the context of recognizing that these disputes
must be resolved with tolerance, without undue disrespect to sincere
religious beliefs, and without subjecting gay persons to indignities when
they seek goods and services in an open market.194
Note with precision where and how Masterpiece Cakeshop is prophesying disputes
in “cases like this in other circumstances” will be “resolved” in the future.195 “[T]hese
disputes” are going to be settled “in the courts”—courts that are being instructed to
reflect upon and perform the single-word mantra—“tolerance”—that the opinion
immediately proceeds to give specific content.196 The substance here arrives not in an
affirmative sense—“Tolerance, Tolerance shalt thou pursue”—but through two
injunctive commands issued in succession both in the form of thou-shalt-not’s.197 The
language of the commands places them comfortably within the Constitution’s dialect
of negative rights, which, presumably, is their source. The first commandment, which
sounds in the registers of the First Amendment, holds that courts shall not show
“undue disrespect to sincere religious beliefs.”198 The second, which sounds in the
registers of the Fourteenth Amendment, maintains that courts shall not “subject[] gay
persons to indignities when they seek goods and services in an open market.”199 Taken
together, these commandments reflect and convey what the opinion has effectively
already, earlier made clear: the basically equal constitutional stature of these two ways
of life. Here, courts are to afford them equal respects—show them tolerance—by
avoiding the Scylla of anti-religious discrimination and the Charybdis of anti-gay
sentiment as they do their job of “resolv[ing]” “cases like this in other circumstances”
and “elaborat[ing]” their “outcome[s].”200
194

Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1732 (2018).

195

Id.

196

Id.

197

See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Remarks for Touro
Synagogue (Newport, Rhode Island): Celebration of the 350th Anniversary of Jews in America
(Aug.
22,
2004)
(available
at
https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/speeches/viewspeech/sp_08-22-04) (“The security I
feel is shown by the command from Deuteronomy displayed in artworks, in Hebrew letters, on
three walls and a table in my chambers. ‘Zedek, Zedek, tirdof’ ‘Justice, Justice shalt thou
pursue,’ these art works proclaim; they are ever present reminders of what judges must do ‘that
they may thrive.’”).
198

Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1732.

199 Id. It is presently of no moment, though it is not insignificant, that the indignities that “gay
persons” might otherwise suffer are harms that, in this passage, collapse traditional distinctions
between economic and non-economic rights. The implications, traceable at least to United
States v. Windsor, 580 U.S. 744 (2013), and back again, are potentially far-reaching.
200 Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1732. Insofar as these rules are constitutionally
grounded, they, of course, also apply to other state actors, including legislators, hence implicate

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol68/iss3/5

58

2020]

MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP’S HOMILETICS

405

Notwithstanding the evident care the opinion has taken to produce its multiple nonaffirmative locutions, the commandments it winds up issuing when carefully parsed
are almost amusingly non-neutral as between the ways of life that they point to.
Masterpiece Cakeshop tells courts that “these disputes must be resolved . . . without
undue disrespect to sincere religious beliefs.”201 The implication of this phrasing
would ordinarily be that some “disrespect to sincere religious beliefs” may itself not
be undue.202 Meantime, Masterpiece Cakeshop’s second commandment, that “these
disputes must be resolved . . . without subjecting gay persons to indignities when they
seek goods and services in an open market,” is, within the limits of the marketplace
that it sets, perfectly categorical.203 “[G]ay persons,” which includes both lesbian
women and gay men (the gendered erasure is subtle, but apparent), are to suffer no
indignities in this respect.204 In this, the second commandment contrasts not only the
first, but also that moment earlier in the opinion when the Court secures First
Amendment protections for clergy who’d like to refuse to perform same-sex civil
marriages when doing so contravenes their faith. While granting them that right,
Masterpiece Cakeshop affirms this is a practical “diminishment” of lesbians’ and gay
men’s rights by telling them they must lump it anyway, because this isn’t a “serious
diminishment to their own dignity and worth.”205 In relation to economic freedom, the
rights of “gay persons” must not be subjected to indignities.206 Economic equality,
hence justice, for them is fully insured.
This asymmetry readily lends itself to an understanding in which Masterpiece
Cakeshop’s final passage is offering courts its parting instruction on how they’re to
resolve the question the case centrally involves, but formally evades, but then actually
provides instruction on. Here the Court’s opinion recapitulates the impulse of its
earlier thinking. In suggesting that the rights of sincere religious believers may be
given due disrespects, while the rights of lesbians and gay men not to suffer indignities
in the marketplace is categorical, the opinion tips its hand on the outcome it wants to
see in a future case: public accommodations regimes hold against constitutional claims
to religious exception.
It’s dangerous business to try to read the passage as ordering any more broadly
binding instruction than that. Masterpiece Cakeshop, which otherwise takes such
“the drafting of legislation,” on which, in this setting, see NeJaime & Siegel, Religious
Exemptions and Antidiscrimination Law in Masterpiece Cakeshop supra note 2, at 205, 221–
24. Of course, it is true that how and why courts decide as they do and not simply what they
decide on the bottom-line is key to the successful judicial avoidance of these constitutional
obstacles.
201

Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1732.

202

Id.

203

Id.

204

Id.

205

Id. at 1727.

Id. at 1732. This doesn’t mean to foreclose the prospect that “the Court makes clear that
exemptions must be limited to protect gays and lesbians not only from material but also from
dignitary harm.” NeJaime & Siegel, Religious Exemptions and Antidiscrimination Law in
Masterpiece Cakeshop, supra note 2, at 215.
206
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pains to remain scrupulously “fair and neutral” between the parties, so as to avoid
committing the same mistake the Colorado Civil Rights Commission did, cannot at
precisely this point in the opinion be ventilating an active and more general preference
for “gay persons” and their ways of life over “sincere religious belie[vers]” and
theirs.207 Right? Right. This indicates that what the Court means when it refers to
“cases like this in other circumstances” and “these disputes” in this passage, it doesn’t
have in mind cases of a broad set to which Masterpiece Cakeshop belongs: cases that
involve clashes between and among religious conservatives and traditional moralists,
on the one hand, and lesbians and gay men, on the other.208 It is talking in a more
bounded sense about Masterpiece Cakeshop as a case that involves a clash between
these forces and the constitutional values that protect them on the turf of antidiscrimination law.209 If this is right, a direct line might be drawn from Masterpiece
Cakeshop to the proper resolution of the Title VII cases now before the Supreme
Court, on the meaning of its sex discrimination protections.210 Figured as the latest
front in Kulturkampf—and who would seriously deny that they are?—Masterpiece
Cakeshop teaches that the victories go to lesbians and gay men, perhaps by extension
to those who are transgender or otherwise gender nonconforming. As marketplace
regulations, they are to suffer no indignities. How’s that for a departing bequeath?

207

Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1729, 1732.

208

Id.

209 Even there, though, where the lesson of Masterpiece Cakeshop in principle should be that
federal anti-discrimination protections are interpreted in accordance with the evolving
constitutional status of lesbians and gay men as citizens of first-class rank, letting them in on
Title VII’s sex discrimination protections, over and against religious conservatives and
traditional moralists who would argue for a more conservative interpretive approach, it may be
the connotative rather than the denotative meaning of this final passage that is the more enduring
rule, now that Justice Kennedy has left the Court. Certainly, some of the Justices who signed
the Court’s Masterpiece Cakeshop opinion were more inclined to a view that would take the
final passage of Masterpiece Cakeshop as instructing courts, within the limits of the
Constitution’s negativity, to demonstrate tolerance by both reflecting it toward the parties and
their ways of life and by announcing results that seek to keep them in conditions of equipoise.
If so, the rule of Masterpiece Cakeshop could be taken to be that lesbians and gay men can
receive the protections of anti-discrimination law without First Amendment exceptions to it
being created in cases where discriminators discriminate because of their sincere religious or
moral beliefs. But to preserve the balance, that rule will only obtain where legislators, through
law-making, have crafted the operative anti-discrimination rule that courts are being asked to
affirm.
210 Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct.
1599 (2019); Bostock v. Clayton Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 723 F. App’x 964 (11th Cir. 2018), cert.
granted sub nom. Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019); EEOC v. R.G. &. G.R.
Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2018), cert. granted in part, 139 S. Ct. 1599
(2019). A primer on the cases is in Amy Howe, Court to Take Up LGBT Rights in the Workplace
(Updated) (Apr. 22, 2019), SCOTUSBLOG, https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/04/court-totake-up-lgbt-rights-in-the-workplace/. More in depth analysis of these cases as they were
litigated at the Supreme Court is in Marc Spindelman, The Shower’s Return (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol68/iss3/5

60

2020]

MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP’S HOMILETICS

407

B. Toward a Political Morality: Minima and Maxima (Or: A Moral Politics
of Sibling Love Introduced)
Lest it already be forgotten, Masterpiece Cakeshop’s final passage isn’t only
an instruction for courts. The passage only becomes that after starting out as a general
address to no one, hence everyone, about the general situation that the case implicates.
Of chief rank in this general class of the everyone that’s being addressed are
Masterpiece Cakeshop’s readers whose rights, welfare, and political prospects are
most immediately and directly affected by the ruling. By this point, everyone knows
who they are.
Masterpiece Cakeshop, though, is actually in no official position to speak to the
parties whose ways of life its decision rules with the same authoritative voice used to
instruct courts in the Court’s chain-of-command and that operate as the state’s
Constitution-bound wings. This, as a rule, is because the Court’s constitutional
authority is limited to negative instructions involving the state or, more capaciously,
state action. For all the tremendous powers this affords the Court to manage parties
and their ways of life, it is not officially empowered to boss them around. This doesn’t
mean the Court is bereft of ways to give instructions to the parties themselves, only
that it must do so in a different and unofficial mode. When it does this in Masterpiece
Cakeshop, what it does is to leverage the moral-political impulses that guide and shape
its own conduct and the authoritative constitutional rules it formally announces in the
direction of generating moral-political exhortations that are to function by willing
private acquiescence in the vision the Court has for how they should conduct
themselves as they pursue and seek to vindicate their ways of living in the public and
political realms.211 To speak of this undertaking, then, is to speak of Masterpiece
Cakeshop’s moral-political homiletics: its constitutionally inspired, but ultimately
extra-constitutional, and, indeed, extra-legal teachings in political morality, which it
recommends for the parties’ use on the field of politics that its substantive holdings
don’t displace.212

211

This is to reverse the standard translation of moral into constitutional questions that Robin
West has described, among other places, in Robin West, Katrina, The Constitution, and the
Legal Question Doctrine, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1127, 1131 (2006) (noting the easy, but
problematic, constitutional-cultural translation of “substantial moral questions about
governance” into “‘Constitutional’ questions” and the way this thus turns these moral questions
into “questions of law awaiting judicial resolution”). Here, Masterpiece Cakeshop, without
forgetting how it involves legal questions “awaiting judicial resolution,” id., also tracks the
possibility of pressing them back into questions of governance for politics themselves.
Reframed in terms that Jamal Greene has wonderfully put into play, this may be both a pathosbased and an ethical argument. Jamal Greene, Pathetic Argument in Constitutional Law, 113
COLUM. L. REV. 1389, 1390–91 (2013).
212 In this respect anyway, Masterpiece Cakeshop may be taken not only to reflect “a specious
neutrality,” but also to attempt to “affirmatively nurture democratic culture” in a way that
recognizes “political community.” Feldman, supra note 45, at 60–61.
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As seen both in Masterpiece Cakeshop’s final passage and across the larger sweep
of the opinion, this instruction in political morality delivers in at least two forms: one
minimal, one maximal.213
The minima of Masterpiece Cakeshop’s instruction in political morality are readily
articulated: They’re the private party version of Masterpiece Cakeshop’s final
passage’s teaching on tolerance, defined with reference to those two thou-shalt-not’s,
understood here not in terms of their precise, technical limits, which matter as
authoritative, constitutional rules for courts, but rather as general mandates in a
political morality of nonmalfeasance. The broad moral sensibilities that the thou-shaltnot’s entail sound in themes of tolerance as a type of political respect. A Golden Rule,
they speak to a political morality by which those who are struggling to protect and
defend their ways of life against unwanted incursions by their political foes may
commence a phase of political combat that operates not lawlessly but “in a respectful
fashion that can work in our pluralist society.”214 Political enmity needn’t be dropped
entirely, though it could be somewhat smoothed around its sharpest edges enough so
that each side to the Kulturkampf recognizes that they and their opposing numbers are
all members of a larger political community whose health, as a vessel that contains
them and their politics and their political disputes, is a matter of general, including
their own, political interest that must not be taken entirely for granted—like clean air.
In this sense only, and as antithetical to a Schmittian notion of what politics is, these
minima imply not just tolerance and respect but also friendship in a political sense.215
As thinkable as these politics may be in those terms, they’re still likely to be greeted
with, at best, ambivalence, including a deep aversion to them born of, among other
things, the deep wounds and deep distrust that have been an enduring part of the
Kulturkampf and that have even come to be baked into the identities of its warring
camps. This makes the politics of friendship as a modification of the politics of
enmity—or the politics of politics—acceptable only if the parties are prepared to
relinquish the established constructions of who they, socially speaking, are.216 This

213 This may or may not imply the operation of a spectrum. Given the practical resistance
both these points are, by turns, likely and certain to face, the conceptualization of the middle
may not matter all that much at just this point.
214

Joshua Matz, Fury and despair over the Masterpiece Cakeshop ruling are misplaced, THE
GUARDIAN (June 6, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/jun/06/furydespair-masterpiece-cakeshop-ruling-misplaced. Others have also seen a pluralist vision with
aspirations for “peaceful coexistence between the LGBT and faith communities” at work in the
case. Robin Fretwell Wilson, Common Ground Lawmaking: Lessons for Peaceful Coexistence
from Masterpiece Cakeshop and the Utah Compromise, 51 CONN. L. REV. 1, 6 (2019); id. at
11–12 (noting that “Masterpiece Cakeshop’s signal contribution was its call for a new pluralism
that ‘leaves space for everyone,’” and then providing some description of it).
215 The locus classicus is SCHMITT, supra note 79. For examples of modern reflections on
older themes of political or civic friendship that move in decidedly non-Schmittian directions,
see DANIELLE S. ALLEN, TALKING TO STRANGERS: ANXIETIES OF CITIZENSHIP SINCE BROWN V.
BOARD OF EDUCATION 9–24, 101–59 (2004), and see also Sibyl A. Schwarzenbach, On Civic
Friendship, 107 ETHICS 97, 98–99 (1996) (commenting preliminarily that “political friendship”
is “a necessary condition for genuine justice” and linking “civic friendship” to traditions of
women’s lives involving reproduction).
216

See the qualification in supra note 79.
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isn’t impossible, naturally, but it isn’t nearly as easy as from outside of these
perspectives it can sound.
While the minima of Masterpiece Cakeshop’s moral-political homiletics appear
and can practically be read off the surface of Masterpiece Cakeshop’s text, they travel
in the decision with a set of maximal conditions that are discoverable deeper in the
structure of the text: in the opinion’s active performance of them.217 Nobody should
be surprised to hear at this point that Masterpiece Cakeshop is not a decision that, for
its own part, shows only a bare minimum level of tolerance defined as nondisparagement, non-disrespect, or non-indignity, toward the parties. The Court’s
actual treatment of the parties’ ways of life is far more robust and generous than that.
So, too, then, the maximal version of moral-political instruction that Masterpiece
Cakeshop offers.
Begin here by briefly returning to the pose that Masterpiece Cakeshop strikes
toward the ways of life involved in the case. The Court’s stance toward these
constitutionally countenanced, competing ways of life isn’t one of a detached,
distanced, affectless rationality by which the Court mechanically and hierarchically
goes about issuing rules that in their robotic way dispense legal justice. The Court’s
stance toward the case and the lives the parties lead is marked by more thoughtful,
affective investments. The Court elaborates its own thinking in the case by means that
are both creative and sensitive. It generates, then seals, distinctive relationships with
the parties and with others who share their ways of life. These relationships involve
connection, identification, and, recall, even forms of psychological and literary merger
with the parties in ways that give the Court the ability, however fleetingly, to be in
another’s shoes walking his path, as part of its own process of giving voice both to
arguments and the substantive rulings it issues.218 In other words, Masterpiece
Cakeshop gets professionally and textually intimate with the parties in a way that far
surpasses the “tolerance” its opinion formally and finally names.
The way that Masterpiece Cakeshop exceeds the minima that it makes binding on
other courts suggests the Court is aware of its own exertions and sees them as elements
in a supererogatory performance. The Court may think it cannot realistically expect
future courts to be as welcoming to such wildly divergent ways of life, or to be as fully
engaged with them, as it itself is. This might be hubris or it might just be a frank
recognition of the range of investments and sympathies that other courts may have in
cases like this, which may duly limit their capacity or willingness to achieve
Masterpiece Cakeshop’s own model heights. Comparisons aside, the Court’s
treatment of the parties in the case may help to explain why so many of its readers,
who live the case’s opposing ways of life, experience it the way that they have and do:
feeling seen, recognized, heard, understood, esteemed, known, and cared for, to the
point of being held by the Court’s attentions and its ministrations, which ensure they

The notion that the Court’s opinion’s performative dimensions are pedagogical is also
found in Matz, supra note 214, which, Berg, supra note 9, at 160, quotes approvingly on this
point.
217

218 It is this that partly makes the Court’s command to lower courts to follow in its footsteps
seem so problematic: Requiring this kind of relationship with the parties will assuredly be easier
for some judges than for others, who may wish nothing so much as to resist it.
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are constitutionally protected, safe, against what they themselves take to be, and what
the Court appreciates as, harmful and discriminatory political predations.
Figured this way, Masterpiece Cakeshop refuses to adopt, as Obergefell, Windsor,
and Lawrence before it all did, the rhetorical posture of the fearsome figure of Lady
Justice with her blindfold on, balancing her scales without being able to see who the
parties are, her monumentally lethal sword, so dangerous, powerful, and ominous, in
her other hand, a figure nightmares can be made of.219 Masterpiece Cakeshop prefers
instead a different performance of masculinity, the rhetorical posture of which is that
of the Father Judge who, needing no sword other than his wisdom, approaches and
decides the case in ways that epitomize conviviality in political community and that,
by example, encourages the parties to conduct themselves thus.220 So much does this
Father Judge love the parties who have brought this dispute before him to resolve that,
in his final remarks, as a fatherly judicial bequeath, he wills them to receive a modest
version of the exemplary treatment he has given them.
Suppressed, but still evident, is the subtle message that this disjunction implies. If
the parties are to escape the constant warfare of Kulturkampf into freedom to live their
respective ways of life the ways they wish, if they are to find the sort of full-bodied,
loving fatherly treatment that the Father Court has showed them in this case, they must
look not outward to courts but inward to themselves. Following the Court’s opinion’s
lead, they can—and should—seek each other out the way that Masterpiece Cakeshop
itself has. Recalling their equality to one another and their shared relation to the Father
Court, the offering is in the form of a political morality of sibling, like paternal, love,
the sole means of full release unto freedom from the political warfare that has become
an element, hence part of the meaning and practice, of these ways of life.221 Tolerance
and rules of forbearance aren’t nothing, are very important, certainly against a baseline
of a limitless Hobbesian war of all against all. They are also limited, regularly, to being
tickets to an eternal return to courts. In order to achieve another way of living, the
parties to this dispute and ones like it will have to dig deeper and reach for more. This
is seriously difficult work, but Masterpiece Cakeshop shows it can be done, and how,
by providing an object lesson in the possibilities of growth that surpasses a formerly
well-defined and well-bounded self, a self that has been steeped in a way of life and
the certainties of the world that go along with it. Remember the line that Justice
Kennedy’s opinions have repeatedly intoned in different ways about how “times can
222
blind us to certain truths,” a sentiment Masterpiece Cakeshop echoes, too? Those
who live the simultaneously loving and warring ways of life at odds in Masterpiece
219 These rhetorical postures, including Lady Justice’s phantasmatic horrors, are sketched in
Spindelman, Obergefell’s Dreams, supra note 83, at 1094–1108.
220 JEROME FRANK, Getting Rid of the Need for Father-Authority, in LAW AND THE MODERN
MIND 243–52 (1930).
221

Others have read this passage in similar ways as speaking about certain values of political
pluralism and conviviality. Matz, supra note 214; Berg, supra note 9, at 156; Aaron M. Streett,
Supreme Court Review: An Analysis of Masterpiece and Janus, 23 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 311, 312
(2018–2019) (“In Masterpiece, Justice Kennedy similarly sought to forge a national
compromise in which the dignity of gay and lesbian persons is respected, while sincere religious
beliefs are protected and not equated by the government to bigotry”).
222

Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003).
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Cakeshop may benefit from this teaching. If in other instances it has mostly been
aimed to reveal how one can grow past homophobic versions of a self, the lesson, in
principle, runs in any number of directions, and it involves a revelation of the
importance of the moral-political value of fraternity as an aid in that process.
Masterpiece Cakeshop’s moral politics of sibling love holds out the prospect—for
those who wish to take it—of giving religious conservatives, traditional moralists, and
lesbian and gay men and their allies, all, an opportunity to get their individual and
collective sense of fraternity—and sorority—back.
Masterpiece Cakeshop’s instruction in a moral politics of sibling love notably
tracks highly traditional and romantic sensibilities about “the family” and what it is or
should be.223 These sensibilities don’t originate in Masterpiece Cakeshop, though its
expression of them broadly concords with ideals of marriage, family, family life, and
familial love on display elsewhere in Justice Kennedy’s constitutional
jurisprudence.224 Famously, this constellation of sensibilities has underwritten Justice
Kennedy’s lesbian and gay rights jurisprudence, nowhere more dramatically than in
its right-to-marry decisions. Masterpiece Cakeshop brings this tradition forward into
the present tense while charting a course for its operation in its own aftermath, after
Justice Kennedy has left the Court. Scarcely inevitable, it might be thought to have
been predictable enough, that in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Justice Kennedy’s romance

223

The normativity of sibling love as a model for moral-political relations is challenged in
part by work recognizing and engaging its dark sides, including its classically deeply gendered,
horizontal, violent, and sexual dimensions, on which, see, for example the different
permutations discussed in JULIET MITCHELL, SIBLINGS: SEX AND VIOLENCE 1–31, 111–29 (2003)
(reflecting on aspects of the topic). On some of the problematics of the traditional political
conception of fraternity, see, for example, CAROLE PATEMAN, The Fraternal Social Contract, in
THE DISORDER OF WOMEN: DEMOCRACY, FEMINISM AND POLITICAL THEORY 33 (1989)
(providing an account that “reveals that the social contract is a fraternal pact that constitutes
civil society as a patriarchal or masculine order”), and CAROLE PATEMAN & CHARLES W. MILLS,
CONTRACT AND DOMINATION 134–99 (2007) (discussing the social contract at the intersection
of race and gender). Cf. generally Courtney Megan Cahill, Same-Sex Marriage, Slippery Slope
Rhetoric, and the Politics of Disgust: A Critical Perspective on Contemporary Family
Discourse and the Incest Taboo, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1543 (2005) (engaging the incest taboo for
its role in and against the struggles for lesbian and gay equality, particularly same-sex marriage).
See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2600 (2015) (“But marriage also confers
more profound benefits. By giving recognition and legal structure to their parents’ relationship,
marriage allows children ‘to understand the integrity and closeness of their own family and its
concord with other families in their community and in their daily lives.’”) (citing United States
v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 772 (2013)); id. at 2608 (“No union is more profound than marriage,
for it embodies the highest ideals of love, fidelity, devotion, sacrifice, and family. In forming a
marital union, two people become something greater than once they were. As some of the
petitioners in these cases demonstrate, marriage embodies a love that may endure even past
death.”); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1996) (“The mother who
carries a child to full term is subject to anxieties, to physical constraints, to pain that only she
must bear. That these sacrifices have from the beginning of the human race been endured by
woman with a pride that ennobles her in the eyes of others and gives to the infant a bond of love
cannot alone be grounds for the State to insist she make the sacrifice.”); see also, e.g., Gonzalez
v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159–60 (2007) (“It is self-evident that a mother who comes to regret
her choice to abort must suffer with grief more anguished and sorrow more profound when she
learns, only after the event, what she once did not know[.]”).
224
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with “family” would travel with a sense of how family life should work as a model for
the Court, with all the Court’s children being equal and treated equally, if not exactly
the same, in the distribution of goods that flow to them, precisely what Masterpiece
Cakeshop’s round-robins of equal treatment and their distributions of constitutional
goods effectively achieves. All of the Father Court’s equally loved children share
equally in Masterpiece Cakeshop’s constitutional bounty.225 Even if “gay persons,” as
that asymmetry at the end of the opinion may be taken to reveal, are the opinion’s
favorites. Favorites who, of course, lose on the central issue in the case, but who don’t
really lose at all in the opinion’s wider scope, and who are set up for victory when the
central issue returns to the Court.
Now, to think of “the family” as the normative model for political relations and
political community is very old school.226 Familiarity notwithstanding, the prospect
that those whose ways of life have been adjudicated in Masterpiece Cakeshop will in
any serious numbers find this classic view’s expression in the moral politics of sibling
love acceptable—rather than a proper object of ridicule—beggars belief.227 This even
though efforts that bathe the opinion’s love for family love in the cynical acid of
critique run the risk of weakening the family-based, affective structures that are

225 See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1178
(1989) (“Parents know . . . children will accept quite readily all sorts of arbitrary substantive
dispositions[.] . . . But try to let one brother or sister watch television when the others do not,
and you will feel the fury of the fundamental sense of justice unleashed.”). Naturally, this
involves no suggestion of any substantive comparisons. Nor does it forget arguments from false
equivalences as suggested, inter alia, by Sager & Tebbe, supra note 66, at 189–90.
226 See, e.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2594 (invoking Confucius, who “taught that marriage
lies at the foundation of government”) (citing 2 LI CHI: BOOK OF RITES 266 (C. Chai & W. Chai
eds., J. Legge trans., 1967)); see also, e.g., JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS, FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC, IN REGARD TO CONTRACTS, RIGHTS, AND REMEDIES, AND
ESPECIALLY IN REGARD TO MARRIAGES, DIVORCES, WILLS, SUCCESSIONS, AND JUDGMENTS § 108
(1834):

Marriage is treated by all civilized nations as a peculiar and favored contract. It
is in its origin a contract of natural law. It may exist between two individuals of
different sexes, although no third person existed in the world, as happened in the
case of the common ancestors of mankind. It is the parent, and not the child of
society; principium urbis et quasi seminarium reipublicæ.
227 Hence the potential for some of the moves elaborated in, inter alia, Mary Anne Case, Why
“Live and Let Live” Is Not a Viable Solution to the Difficult Problems of Religious
Accommodation in the Age of Sexual Civil Rights, in INSTITUTIONALIZING RIGHTS AND
RELIGION: COMPETING SUPREMACIES 74–89 (Leora Batnitzky & Hanoch Dagan eds., 2017);
Alan Jacobs, What a Clash Between Conservatives Reveals, THE ATLANTIC (June 3, 2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/06/conservative-christians-need-staycivil/590866; Sohrab Ahmari, Against David French-ism, FIRST THINGS (May 29, 2019),
https://www.firstthings.com/web-exclusives/2019/05/against-david-french-ism.
See
also
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Klein v. Or. Bureau of Labor & Indus., No. 18-547, 2018 WL
5308156, at 4–5 (2018), cert. granted, Klein v. Or. Bureau of Labor & Indus., No. 18-548, 2019
WL 2493912 (2019) (“Because [The Kleins’] religion forbids complicity with sin, they could
not design and create cakes to celebrate events that violate their religious beliefs.”). But see,
e.g., Adam Serwer, The Illiberal Right Throws a Tantrum, THE ATLANTIC (June 14, 2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/06/ahmari-french-orban/591697/.
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integral to the foundations of the decision as it is written. This is one practical reason
why everyone who’s invested in the substantive outcomes that Masterpiece Cakeshop
generates, but who is additionally unwilling to embrace a sibling politics of love, may
practically be forced to countenance it and the general situation it produces: a situation
in which the Supreme Court governs the nation not merely by means of constitutional
mandate, nor by the light of reason’s objectivity, but in detectable measure by virtue
of a judicial preference for an aesthetic form—romance—that is to be tolerated on
pain of potentially losing access to the constitutional goods the case delivers. Walt
Whitman may well have been right that “sermons never convince.”228 The power of
the constitutional purse to purchase the silence of an unconvinced crowd, here,
involving the thick morality that Masterpiece Cakeshop is preaching, should not be
doubted.229

C. The Moral Politics of Sibling Love: Reconfigured
Let it be stipulated, then, that Masterpiece Cakeshop’s moral politics of sibling
love is doomed as a project that the parties to the Kulturkampf would willingly take
up to regulate their own political dealings with one another.230
Having noticed this political morality’s aesthetic investments, what if its
commitment to romanticism were not imagined to inspire any form of political
morality at all? What if, likewise, its aesthetic conditions were amplified in a way that
would drain the moral politics of sibling love of its evangelizing, moralizing energies?
Adverting to the prospect that Masterpiece Cakeshop itself raises, what if the moral
politics of sibling love involved an extra-constitutional, extra-legal, extra-political,
and non-morals-based project, say, a procedural protocol for encountering one’s
political enemies at a distance from politics in an aesthetic sphere? (If you’ve got a
thing against aesthetics as such, just imagine this is a non-legal, non-political, nonmorals-based plane of existence with room in it for reflection and repose.) Might the
politics of sibling love then be emphatically rejected as a political morality and still
countenanced, even favorably, as an aesthetic bid? Might the politics of sibling love
operate aesthetically to hold up a mirror to the world and how those who live the ways
of life implicated by Masterpiece Cakeshop look out onto others, both enemies and
friends, and likewise themselves, in ways that might begin to capture the lived
complexity of ideas and ideals of sibling love and their own, actual multi-faceted
reactions to them? Might the moral politics of sibling love be valued for its way of

228 WALT WHITMAN, Song of Myself, in LEAVES OF GRASS 53 (Deathbed ed., 1891–92)
(“Logic and sermons never convince, / The damp of the night drives deeper into my soul.”).

What’s partly being bought here is what David Luban has called “legal instrumentalism.”
See David Luban, Some Greek Trials: Order and Justice in Homer, Hesiod, Aeschylus and
Plato, 54 TENN. L. REV. 279, 284 (1987).
229

230 This is beyond the boundaries of what’s been recommended in, say, Koppelman, Gay
Rights, Religious Accommodations, and Antidiscrimination Law, supra note 124, at 628
(maintaining “[t]he gay rights movement has won[;] [i]t will not be stopped by a few
exemptions[;] it should be magnanimous in victory”); or Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty
and the Culture Wars, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 839 (2014) (noting some of the conflicts in “the
culture wars” and suggesting some positions that each side might take).
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conditioning encounters with beauty, including the beauty of worlds one does not
normally see within one’s own way of life?
An initial set of challenges of imagining an aesthetic encounter with the moral
politics of sibling love involves how pervasively, particularly but not only of late, “the
political” structures consciousness, experience, thought, and action. This is especially,
but not only, true in legal circles. No less significant a difficulty is how deeply moral
norms and sensibilities saturate U.S. modes of thought, making it a challenge, if not
an insurmountable task, to think beyond these terms. What could it even mean to have
an aesthetic encounter with the moral politics of sibling love? What could it mean to
think of these relations without thinking about politics or morality? What might it
mean to take up Masterpiece Cakeshop’s moral-political teaching as a way to
encounter the beauty, which is not the same thing as the political truth, that there can
be in discovering how the world looks not through one’s own eyes as they are trained
to see through the political and moral exigencies associated with one’s politics and
one’s identity, but as they would differently look upon the world as from within the
perhaps inside-outness of an enemy’s worldview? How might an encounter with such
a different way of being-in-the-world and such a foreign manner of seeing-the-world
feel? What would its sensations, intensities, contours, dark and bright, be like? What
could its pleasures otherwise entail? What thoughts and feelings might it generate
about the opportunities to live a beautiful life in step with the glory of God, with
traditional morals, or with the ways that lesbians and gay men and their allies have
sought to construct lives for themselves? What new admixtures, what new forms of
life and its beauty might come into sight—or erupt into being—through these
encounters?231
Masterpiece Cakeshop itself supplies a convenient point of entry into these
questions. While the case obviously involves a real, live legal dispute that features
multiple, conflictual encounters between real, living persons complexly situated in
relation to living, breathing institutional forms, all of which makes the opinion highly
materialist, Masterpiece Cakeshop is, in the final analysis, also a text. Seen in those
terms, it is unavoidably bound up with immaterial and literary representations: of the
parties, what happened between and among them, their resulting injuries and
institutional movements and adjudications of them, and the effects of the litigation and
its resolutions on the represented parties and those others in society that they serve as
stand-ins for. Read as a text, Masterpiece Cakeshop exceeds its functions as a site for
the announcement of authoritative legal propositions or for recommending moralpolitical ones. It is also itself precisely in its textual form a form of artifice, an aesthetic
creation that readily lends itself as grist for aesthetic encounters, both with itself and
with the ideas and characters that emerge within it, who are always, at most, partial
representations, hence distortions, of their comprehensive material truths.
Approached that way, imagine . . .
What it might be like for the figures called Charlie Craig and David Mullins to
encounter the figure named Jack Phillips and look out unto the world through his
231 See, e.g., Bog Gallagher & Alexander Wilson, Michel Foucault: An Interview: Sex, Power
and the Politics of Identity, ADVOCATE, Aug. 7, 1984, at 27 (quoting Michel Foucault discussing
the possibilities of “new forms of relationships, new forms of love, new forms of creation,” and,
generally, the “possibility of a creative life”).
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mind’s eye. What might he see happening in his world: his business, his kitchen, his
relationships, his faith, his artistry, his recipes and secrets, and the God and faith that
inspire him? How did Phillips decide to refuse Craig and Mullins the custom wedding
cake they wanted for their marriage celebration? It is said the decision served his God,
hence was a practice of his faith and/or artistic faith, but how did the choice get made,
and when? Did Phillips choose to refuse Craig and Mullins a custom wedding
celebration cake before he ever encountered them? (Is “choice” even the right concept
here?) Was it when Phillips first saw Craig and Mullins in person? When they asked
him to make the cake for their shared celebration? Did Phillips see them when he
looked at, and encountered, them? Were they recognizable to him as created in God’s
image, like himself, his brothers? As men in love? Did they appear to him either
initially or as their encounter unfolded, consistent with his religion, as sodomites,
sinners, evil-doers, sinning or doing evil, or wanting to, while talking to him and
telling him what they wanted him to do for them? Was conversation with them itself
a sinful, erotic, maybe a dirty-feeling, experience? Is that why Phillips couldn’t
imagine making them the custom cake they wanted without participating in their sinful
reverie? How important was it for Phillips to stay away from them? Why was this
distance so important? Was it all simply the principled affair reflected in the
systematized and worked-out account provided to authorities in litigation? What else
might it have been?
What did the decision that Craig and Mullins made to bring an action against
Phillips mean to him in terms of his ability to practice his religion, his artistic faith, or
simply his artistry through his business in the public realm? Did the ultimately failed
attempt to hold him legally to account itself asymmetrically seek to distribute
opportunities to live the fullness of one’s personality—so that Craig and Mullins but
not Phillips could fully be themselves in their sexual and religious and artistic
identities, respectively, in the public realm? From Phillips’s point of view, does
bringing the “hammer of government,” in the form of the state’s anti-discrimination
law machinery, to bear on him for his service refusal decision limit his ability as a
person of faith or an artist to live his life out and proud, as who he is?232 Are those
modes of self-expression or expression to be limited to non-public realms, like homes
or houses of worship? If so, does anti-discrimination law in its exemplary forms
actually reflect rule-of-law values of generality and neutrality? Appearances to the
contrary notwithstanding, do anti-discrimination laws violate liberal tenets of state
neutrality between competing conceptions of the good life, favoring some, disfavoring
232 The “hammer of government” language is George Will’s. Fox News Sunday with Chris
Wallace (Fox News Network television broadcast Mar. 2, 2014) (available at
https://archive.org/details/FOXNEWSW_20140302_230000_FOX_News_Sunday_With_Chri
s_Wallace/start/3060/end/3120) (“It’s a funny kind of sore winner in the gay rights movement
that would say a photographer doesn’t want to photograph my wedding. I have got lots of other
photographers I could go to. But I’m going to use the hammer of government to force them to
do this. It’s not neighborly and it’s not nice. The gay rights movement is winning. But they
should be, as I say, not sore winners.”). Similar thinking is in Ryan T. Anderson, Disagreement
Is Not Always Discrimination: On Masterpiece Cakeshop and the Analogy to Interracial
Marriage, 16 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 123, 124 (2018) (describing Colorado’s antidiscrimination statute as “part of a larger national trend in which authorities are using
antidiscrimination statutes as swords to punish already marginalized people (such as supporters
of the conjugal understanding of marriage), rather than as shields to protect people from unjust
discrimination (such as African Americans in the wake of Jim Crow and today).”).
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others, hence contemplating, if not constituting, a practice of discrimination against
people of faith in itself?
From Phillips’s perspective, what might the organized forces of political power
look like in light of Masterpiece Cakeshop’s reaffirmation of Obergefell, a decision
that reflects a politically liberal regime that may be extended by Colorado’s antidiscrimination rules? Might Phillips think of himself as a minority and an outsider in
the community he shared with Craig and Mullins? Is it because of his faith, his artistic
faith, or both? Were Craig and Mullins the majoritarian, hence socially dominant,
forces in the case, backed with state power, when they sought to make him make them
a custom wedding celebration cake against his wishes not to be involved with them,
their relationship, and their “marriage”? Against these arrangements of power, was
Phillips’s refusal of service a defensive or an offensive act? Was it more about
preserving his own self-understanding and his religious and artistic commitments than
transgressing against Craig and Mullins’s selfhood as capacitated by the political
community at large and also by the state? From Phillips’s point of view, did Craig and
Mullins see him in the fullness of his personality as they sought to exercise the statebacked power that they had over him? In seeking to override his faithful and artistic
refusal, did they discriminate against him because of his faith or artistry or otherwise
violate his religiously grounded autonomy?
Sticking with this perspective just a bit longer, as Jack Phillips saw it, what were
the meanings of the attitudes and expressions, along with the silences, of state actors
as his “case” was processed by governmental institutions? Did they reveal exceptional
sensibilities that could, as Masterpiece Cakeshop suggested, be corrected, or are they
in fact the ordinary sensibilities of the logic of politically liberal, including pro-LGBT,
legal regimes? Do they invariably function to make Phillips and others like him a
pariah? Do politically liberal equality politics operative in Colorado (and elsewhere)
risk making cultural conservatives and traditional moralists the outlaws that lesbians
and gay men once, not too long ago, were, and still are in certain communities? Is
what happened here also bad for artists generally or only artists of faith? What do these
deployments of power reveal, if anything, about the complex meanings of the equality
and freedom, hence the justice, that the lesbian and gay movements have been fighting
for? If those principles guarantee Craig and Mullins a right to public life and equal
service, what does it mean for them to exercise and enforce that right against Jack
Phillips?
Turning the tables around, what might it be like for the figure of Jack Phillips to
imagine what transpired between him and the figures of Charlie Craig and David
Mullins through their fictive minds’ eyes? Who were these men? What were their lives
like—separately then together—before they encountered Phillips? How did they know
and experience and suffer the conditions of homosexuality’s political and legal
outlawry in the time before Obergefell, when they were practically required to leave
the state to have their love and commitment to one another sanctified by law as the
union of man and man as spouses? How have they experienced homosexuality’s
political and legal outlawry since Masterpiece Cakeshop? What did their political and
legal exclusions from marriage and the complex histories of homophobia to which
they were related do to shape Craig and Mullins and their lives? How might it have
informed their encounters with religious conservatives and traditional moralists who
viewed them, their intimacies, and their relationships as sinful, evil, wicked, hellbound, or the corruption of the community, and thus would have—as law in Colorado
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once did—happily cast them out of political community altogether? How, to them,
might Phillips have represented, and even historically in a general sense been, a source
of their suffering—long before they entered Masterpiece Cakeshop? How safe did
they feel being themselves in public and in Phillips’s bakery? What effects on them
did Phillips’s refusal have? What embarrassment, humiliation, pain, trauma, did it
involve—or reopen? What injustice did they understand the refusal of service to
involve? Who else, as word of Phillips’s refusal spread, may Craig and Mullins have
understood to have been harmed by Phillips’s actions? How might they have taken
Phillips’s refusal as a tear in the politically liberal social fabric Obergefell represents
and which they esteem, and maybe experience as a condition of their own security?
How much did they see lodging an official complaint against Phillips as an attempt to
redress their own injuries and the injuries to the community that Phillips’s actions
involved? How much was it about protecting others from suffering what they did?
Was the action a cri de cœur by which they insisted they wouldn’t shrink into the sorts
of debased, shamed selves they may have understood Phillips’s refusal as seeking to
enforce? Did they care about the source of Phillips’s discriminatory refusal or were
they indifferent to it?
From the perspective of the figures of Craig and Mullins, what might the organized
forces of political power to which Phillips willingly allied himself look like both in
the run-up to and in the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s Masterpiece Cakeshop
decision? When significant elements in a large-scale and complex social movement
of cultural conservatives and traditional moralists from across the country and with
local roots in Colorado and every state in the union rallied to Phillips’s cause, joined
no less by the institutional authority of the federal government in the form of the U.S.
Solicitor General, how weak, how marginal, how dispossessed, how powerless, how
unable to inflict real political harm, including subordination on Craig and Mullins,
might he have looked to Craig and Mullins then? How much was the U.S. Supreme
Court’s decision a reminder of the insubstantiality and precarity of rules of law holding
that what Phillips did was discrimination that should be and was outlawed? How much
did Masterpiece Cakeshop remind Craig and Mullins that their legal rights under state
law are readily displaced by the authoritative force of a worldview that, seemingly out
of nowhere, decides that Phillips, despite his discriminatory refusal of service, was the
real victim at the state’s hands in the case? So victimized, in fact, that the state was
given no opportunity for a do-over in order to vindicate Craig and Mullins’s legal
rights? Considering all this, how is power nationally being arranged when state
administrative and judicial processes are this easily overturned in Phillips’s favor?
What does it mean when the injury that the figures of Craig and Mullins experienced,
recognized by state law and state actors, and consistent with the state’s obligations to
ensure equal treatment of lesbians and gay men, is legally for naught in relation to the
central holding of Masterpiece Cakeshop?233
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Compare Laycock, Broader Implications of Masterpiece Cakeshop, supra note 2 at 193
(venturing that the “problems of hostility to the LGBT community” that remain “are very far
from systemic” and “are not remotely comparable to the plight of African-Americans” of the
mid-twentieth century, and then observing that the “[r]efusal to protect religious liberty cannot
be justified by the absurd claim that conservative Christians today systematically suppress gays
and lesbians in the way that southern whites systematically suppressed African-Americans
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D. Aesthetics unto Itself & The Tragedy of the Moral Politics of Sibling Love
These are, of course, highly stylized representations of the radically discontinuous
and fundamentally oppositional perspectives framed by worldviews operative in
Masterpiece Cakeshop. Viewed aesthetically, they need not be abandoned,
compromised, or reconciled. Aesthetically, these representations may just be what
they are or as they seem as one considers them, moving one’s own mind’s eye across
the representational terrain. As one does, it is possible, but not necessary, that one’s
enemy and one’s enemy’s world, hence oneself and one’s own, may begin emerging
in a new and different light. On the aesthetic plane, unlike the political, experientially,
nothing needs to be decided or acted upon in relation to these perspectival shifts. Nondecisionism and inaction may be the rule here, the rule of beauty, of the encounter, of
its sensations, nothing more.
To be sure, none of this is the point Masterpiece Cakeshop seeks to make. It is not
the point of either the minima or the maxima of its moral-political instruction.
Be that as it may, taken strictly on its own terms, there’s something deeply ironic,
if also tragic, about the Court’s moral-political homiletics, particularly its moral
politics of sibling love. The irony is in the way this attempt to forge new political
moralities emerges in an opinion authored by a Supreme Court Justice whose
benchwork, particularly but not only in the context of lesbian and gay rights, was,
throughout his career on the Bench, willing to extract so many hotly contested issues
from the field of politics, deciding for the people who have been politically engaged,
in the name of the Constitution, the nation, and the people themselves. As James
Bradley Thayer noted over a century ago, robust practices of judicial review like this
are notable for their tendency to sap the people themselves of their capacities for
managing their own political relations, conflicts, and contests.234 It is thus tragic in the
sense that this opinion, which arrives at the endpoint of a career-defining
jurisprudence, seeks to return to the people and their politics something that it
recognizes they have seemingly lost. Now, at the end of his judicial career, Justice
Kennedy, who did what he did on the Court to rule the nation, produces a text that’s
actively searching for ways to express the view in moral-political terms that one of the
hopes for the country he unquestionably loves is to be found, after all, in how the
people relate to one another and govern themselves. It is fitting that the opinion’s
moral-political teaching, both its instruction in a moral politics of respect and
fraternity, but more especially its instruction in a moral politics of sibling love, arrives
not with a bang that announces itself, but with a whimper that must be carefully
attended to in order to discover its meaning. This whimper, not coincidentally, also

through the mid-twentieth century”), with Sager & Tebbe, supra note 66, at 187–88 (describing
lesbians and gay men as “long . . . the victims of structural injustice—or patterns of ‘disrespect
and subordinat[ion],’ to use Justice Kennedy’s language in Obergefell—that are enduring,
pervasive, and tentacular.”). To challenge the structuralism or the systematicity of anti-lesbian
and anti-gay discrimination in the present tense is at least in part to weaken the foundations on
which Obergefell, decided practically yesterday, rests.
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See James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional
Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 155–56 (1893).
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expresses the dim likelihood of this instruction’s success, virtually nil for the maximal
political morality of family, fraternity, sorority, and love.
Whether the partisans involved in Masterpiece Cakeshop choose on any level—
political, aesthetic, or otherwise—to hear and heed the call for sibling love that the
opinion issues is, again, beyond anything officially in the Court’s power to
command.235 This opinion, which does what it practically can to secure Justice
Kennedy’s jurisprudential legacy at the level of constitutional doctrine, promising to
continue the era he helped inaugurate of constitutional equal dignity, respect, and full
citizenship status for lesbians and gay men, has, as many landmark principles do, met
the practical limits of the power of judicial review and decision. While Justice
Kennedy may well have changed the course of lesbian and gay rights, hastening their
realization through Supreme Court opinions that altered our country’s history, and
perhaps by extension, the world’s, his position of high office left him and the other
Members of the Supreme Court utterly powerless to bring Messrs. Jack Phillips and
Charlie Craig and David Mullins—real, living persons, and not just figures in the
text—together in political friendship or in family, fraternity, and love, in a political
space of mutual understanding in which they might will to work together, lovingly,
toward a shared future of equal concern and respect for all that is of their own
collective making. Not even a swing Justice on the highest court in the most powerful
land on the face of the planet Earth can make of these neighbors, these enemies,
friends, much less brothers, nor teach them, finally, how to meet one another as though
in political family in their rich, complex, same and different, authentic fullnesses. The
source of that grace, or that outrage, whatever it is and wherever it is to be found,
comes from someplace else.

III. CONCLUSION
In this respect anyway, Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Masterpiece Cakeshop
Court is a narrow, shallow, and modest ruling. As a sign, Masterpiece Cakeshop both
is and is not.

235

Charles L. Black, Jr.’s thinking is apt here:
I think the concept of citizenship might be a useful corrective to another concept—
that of “brotherhood”—which played so prominent a part a few years ago in the
utterances of the opponents of racism. I have to say that it seems to me that this
word embodied a concept deeply wrong. It suggested that the public demand was
that some men had a duty to feel toward and to treat other men as brothers. This, I
submit, is an overreaching, a basic defect in theory, a radically wrong symbolism.
That demand never can be made as of right; to make it invites disappointment, and
may easily tend to frighten and repel those on whom the demand is made. Brotherly
love may stand somewhere in the shadow of time, waiting. There is not very much
that law can do about that. But fellow-citizenship is for now, for the day before
yesterday. The robust clarity, the received authority of right law, could make no
greater symbolic contribution to the theory of our race relations than by using this
concept as its chief building material.
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